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Getting back from the basics: What is the role for attention and fronto-parietal circuits in consciousness?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2016

Paul E. Dux
Paul E. Dux*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St. Lucia, Queensland 4072, [email protected]@psy.uq.edu.auwww.paulduxlab.org
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Abstract

Morsella et al. present a novel theory of consciousness which is more “low-level, circumscribed, counterintuitive, and passive” than previous accounts. There is much to like about this approach. However, what are the explanatory costs associated with these characteristics? In particular, how does this low-level and passive theory accommodate evidence for top-down attention being necessary (but not sufficient) for visual consciousness?

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e175
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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