The pages that follow embody the fruits of an examination of the work of the Permanent Court of International Justice as an interpreter of treaties. For sake of clearness and simplicity the pertinent cases are dealt with in a few familiar groups.

During the year 1929, the Permanent Court of International Justice held two sessions, and handed down three judgments and three formal orders. The sixteenth (extraordinary) session of the court began on May 13, 1929, and ended on July 12, 1929; and the seventeenth (ordinary) session began on July 8, 1929, and ended on September 10, 1929. At the sixteenth session, the court gave an order in the “ Case Concerning the Denunciation by China of the Treaty of November 2, 1865, between China and Belgium” ; an order in the “ Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Indemnities)” ; a judgment (No. 14) in the “ Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France” ; and a judgment (No. 15) in the “ Case Concerning the Payment in Gold of the Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France.” At the seventeenth session, it gave an order in the “ Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex,” and a judgment (No. 16) in the “ Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder.” In addition to these activities, extensions of its jurisdiction and changes in the court's structure, which have been previsaged, make the year notable in the history of the court.

There is being developed a special technique of codification. The Sixth Pan American Conference at Havana adopted in the form of seven conventions a codification of that number of topics in public international law; namely, on the status of aliens, treaties, diplomatic privileges and immunities, asylum, civil strife, and maritime neutrality. The preparatory work had been done by (a) the American Institute of International Law working through its executive committee, and (b) the Rio Commission of Jurists reestablished by the Fifth Pan American Conference. The proposed world conference upon codification has now been called to meet at The Hague in the spring of this year. There have been no official indications as yet of its postponement because of other international conferences. The machinery created by the League of Nations to perform the work preparatory to this conference has been functioning since 1925. The working of this machinery has already been described in this Jo u rn al down to the creation of the present Preparatory Committee for the Codification Conference. It will be remembered that the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, composed of sixteen members, prepared a provisional list of topics suitable for codification by international agreement, made reports upon various topics, submitted questionnaires upon seven of them to the various governments, and selected therefrom three topics as the agenda of the first world conference on codification. This cpmmittee also made one general and two special reports upon the further work of codification, with some indications as to procedure.

There is no topic of present interest, involving as it does the status of men, women and children of various countries, and even of birth in the same country, as that of nationality. It bristles with difficulties! To begin with, various terms are used, apparently meant to mean one and the same thing, although unless they are carefully defined, they may refer to different aspects of the subject. For example, “ national” is used as a synonym for “ subject” or “ citizen,” yet one may be a national of a country, and subject to its jurisdiction, without, however, being a citizen—as in the case of the Filipinos, who are, indeed, subject to the Government of the United States and entitled to its protection abroad, although they are not citizens either in the sense of international, or of national law. Then there is a difference of opinion as to the branch of law to which the matter belongs—the Englishspeaking peoples regarding it as forming part of the public law of nations, whereas others consider it as more properly falling within the domain of private international law, to which, in turn, the English world gives the not inappropriate designation of conflict of laws.

On March 13,1930, a conference will meet at The Hague to make progress in the codification of international law about territorial waters. Implicit in the plans for this meeting are two assumptions. The first, that it is better to codify the law rather than to follow the road traveled by the American Law Institute and “ restate” it. The second, that codification may more wisely be expressed in spatial than in causal terms. As to the first assumption, is it right? As to the second, it is submitted that, irrespective of whether one is drafting a custom or a code, the particular subject of territorial waters should be examined and set forth in causal rather than in spatial terms. It is submitted that the law of territorial waters has been, is, and in its nature must remain a thing of custom, not statute or treaty, and that any attempt to treat it differently will have the effect which thirtyfour years ago the late F. W. Maitlan prophesied was to be expected from the excesses of restricting by putting enactments into constitutions in the United States. “ First,” he said, “ you will get the effect of a dam,—and then you will get the effect of a flood.” Both have been seen.

The case of the Oriental Navigation Company, decided October 3, 1928, by the Claims Commission established between the United States and Mexico, has brought up anew the difficult question of the de jure government's right to close ports which are at the time in the de facto control of insurgents.

Immediately after the outbreak of the World War in 1914, Secretary of State Bryan wisely approached the belligerent governments proposing that both sides agree to conduct their naval warfare in accordance with the rules embodied in the Declaration of London. This document was drawn up at the London Naval Conference called by Great Britain in 1908, and was signed by the delegates of all the nations represented. The conference agreed that the rules contained in the document “correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law.” The Declaration never became legally binding on the nations, however, having failed of ratification by the British Government itself. Legally, therefore, Great Britain was not bound by it in 1914, except in so far as it embodied preexisting rules of law.