The Rapier project began to emerge shortly after the publication of the report of the committee which sat under Sir Solly Zuckerman to consider the management and control of Research and Development. The “Zuckerman” formula was applied to Rapier and feasibility studies were followed by a project study, a holding contract, and eventually full development.

Meanwhile another committee under Mr. W. G. Downey had been considering the management of large development projects, and some of the techniques advocated by them have already been applied to Rapier.

Rapier, therefore, can be said to span the Zuckerman-Downey period, a period which has seen modern management techniques applied in more and more depth throughout the aerospace industry.

Space Technology, internationally, is now in its second decade and already in this comparatively short time new skills and disciplines have emerged and are still emerging. In other papers you will have read of new developments and improvements in electrical power supplies, ion propulsion systems, attitude control and telecommand and data handling. But in the midst of this brave new technical world there is the still small voice of the structures engineer who it is commonly thought only has to offer his 18 gauge sheet suitably bent, honeycomb panels, rivets, brackets, and a simple practical outlook. Perhaps due to the elementary and familiar nature of his materials, the structures engineer tends to be taken for granted when compared with his colleagues working in the more exotic technical fields. The usual procedure followed when a new satellite design is being undertaken and the part played by the structures engineer and analyst is described. Examples are given and views expressed on design philosophy and its implementation.

Although this paper forms part of a symposium dealing with management techniques used in guided weapon development, it is concerned with the organisation of management rather than with the techniques used. Techniques used on different guided weapon systems may well be the same in principle, although differing in detail. Martel differs from the other weapon systems considered in this symposium, however, in that it is a project in which the development was carried out by organisations in two different countries working in collaboration. The lessons which may be drawn from Martel, which cannot be drawn from other guided weapon projects, are concerned with international collaboration, and not with the detailed techniques used to manage the project. It seems, therefore, that it is desirable to concentrate on the management arrangements associated with this project and not on the detailed techniques used. It is an inevitable consequence of this concentration on international organisation that this paper is concerned mainly with the Government agencies and the main contractors.

The title of this paper was not of my own choosing, although I could not resist the challenge which it presented. It illustrates immediately one danger of which industry must beware—that of under-rating the extent of protection which the laws of this country afford to inventors and innovators. The limitation to Patents and Designs implied by the title, will be exceeded and there are included in the following remarks, Copyright and Trade Marks, both of which can contribute to the protection of industrial innovations.

MY paper concerns the Management of the UK Polaris Project. Only Admiral Sir Hugh MacKenzie, leader of the UK Polaris Team, with his complete knowledge of the story, could do justice to this subject. However, as a member of the Polaris Management Team from January 1963 to December 1968 I was in a position to know most of the story.

Before describing the management organisation, it is necessary to outline the job to be done. Major features of the UK Polaris Programme were:—

• (a) The design and building in the UK of four 8000 ton nuclear propelled submarines, craft twice as big as the Valiant class.

• (b) The procurement from the USA of Polaris A3 weapon systems for the submarines.

• (c) The design and manufacture in the UK of nuclear war-heads for the missiles.

Geostationary communications satellites relaying television pictures around the world have now become an accepted part of everyday life. The present type of system uses low power satellites in orbit transmitting to large earth receiving stations, the signal then being reformed and transmitted onward to the domestic television set through the existing network of ground transmission and repeater stations. It must be remembered that these existing satellites are primarily telephone links and that the ground receiving stations are operated by the national post office or telephone company who let circuits to the television companies. This system is viable where a network of repeater stations exists, but in very remote and mountainous areas the cost of providing enough repeater stations is prohibitive.

The role of market research, as applied to the military side of the aircraft industry, is beset by various difficulties, but before discussing these it is essential to consider the reasons for which it should play an important part among the management tools of the industry. In other words, why market research? Too often the term is applied to desperate attempts to find a market of some sort for an aircraft built for the British Services, at a time when production for home consumption is coming to an end. Too often the answer has been “no good”, generally for one of two reasons. Either the aircraft, as initially conceived for the RAF or Royal Navy, has been too sophisticated and hence too expensive for foreign Air Forces, or else the British re-equipment cycle has been out of phase with the rest of the world. There is a widespread belief among people who should know better, that there is a mystique about selling military aircraft. It is true that it is not easy, but the basic conditions for a sale are similar to those for any product, i.e. that the product should meet the demands of the customer in terms of requirement and timescale.