15 - Paradox and Substitutivity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
Summary
But is language the only language? Why should there not be a mode of expression through which I can talk about language in such a way that it can appear to me in co-ordination with something else?
Ludwig WittgensteinKripke's cautionary lessons
In Chapter 14 we showed that, in “A Puzzle About Belief,” Saul Kripke relies on antecedent commitments to Russell's Principle and Referential Realism, which lead him to embrace a notion of linguistic competence that is both incompatible with the alleged paradox and with ordinary practice. In this chapter we show that the roots of these commitments run deep, so deep that Kripke's Referential Realism would, if successful, allow him to sustain his Millian view of meaning and reference, along with the version of de re essentialism in Naming and Necessity. We argue here that these conclusions are unwarranted: neither Millianism nor de re essentialism are defensible. However, as our earlier arguments show, and as will be more fully spelled out in the Epilogue, this does not result in an abandonment of Realism.
Kripke's paper ends with a cautionary conclusion.
When we enter into the area exemplified by Jones and Pierre, we enter into an area where our normal practices of interpretation and attribution of belief are subjected to the greatest possible strain, perhaps to the point of breakdown. So is the notion of the content of someone's assertion, the proposition it expresses. In the present state of our knowledge, I think it would be foolish to draw any conclusions, positive or negative, about substitutivity. […]
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- Word and WorldPractice and the Foundations of Language, pp. 324 - 344Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003