Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Revisionist History
- 2 Predator Collusion: A High-Stakes Game
- 3 Kto Kogo?
- 4 Warlord Coalitions and Militia Politics
- 5 Coup-Proofing
- 6 Implications
- Appendix A Case Selection and External Validity
- Appendix B Mathematical Proofs
- Appendix C Ninety-Seven Anonymous Warlords
- References
- Index
- Other Books in the Series
4 - Warlord Coalitions and Militia Politics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2015
- Frontmatter
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Revisionist History
- 2 Predator Collusion: A High-Stakes Game
- 3 Kto Kogo?
- 4 Warlord Coalitions and Militia Politics
- 5 Coup-Proofing
- 6 Implications
- Appendix A Case Selection and External Validity
- Appendix B Mathematical Proofs
- Appendix C Ninety-Seven Anonymous Warlords
- References
- Index
- Other Books in the Series
Summary
For many, the answer to the puzzle of short wars along the post-Soviet periphery is overdetermined: Russia intervened, only Russia intervened, and the totalitarian legacy of scientfic socialism bequeathed institutions hard-wired for centralization. Large, slow-moving structural variables – inculcated beliefs and geopolitical realities – made for quick and stable war outcomes. But this chapter provides evidence that the great powers did not send money or guarantee regime support until after strong clients emerged, through local agreements among armed groups. In the language of the model: Russia was essential to establishing the stability threshold s; outsiders dangled v*, and locals adjusted. Aid produced new rents, which incentivized warlords to cartel the production of street violence, establish local order in the capital, secure international borders, and keep violence out of sight. Understandings between militia captains had to emerge on the ground before foreigners could help to shore up the fledgling regime with aid and assistance.
This chapter begins by describing the process by which heads of state were selected and installed. The presidents who were selected to head the warlord coalitions in Georgia and Tajikistan were nationalist technocrats with established reputations for honesty and fair-dealing. The people doing the selection were warlords – and in a few cases war criminals with notorious reputations. The figurehead presidents then managed shifting, overlapping coalitions of these criminal interests.
The remainder of the chapter explains how warlords came to understand which of them were “winners” and which were “losers” in the consolidation process. Ceding power to a civilian figurehead carried risks for warlords. Almost everyone had a criminal background and knew that his political immunity could be revoked if the political winds changed. In the interim period after installation but before the “coup-proofing” process was complete, political uncertainty translated into street violence. The number of armed actorsexpanded during this period.
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- Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States , pp. 85 - 122Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015