Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures, tables and boxes
- Acknowledgements
- Foreword
- 1 Global standards, governance and the risk-based approach
- 2 The war on dirty money is mostly being lost in translation
- 3 How much do we really know about money laundering?
- 4 The obsession with defining money laundering
- 5 Money launderers and their superpowers
- 6 Global watchlists: money laundering risk indicators or something else?
- 7 Financial Intelligence Units or data black holes?
- 8 The ‘fingers crossed’ approach to money laundering prevention
- 9 Technology: the solution to all our AML/CFT problems
- 10 SARs: millions and millions of them
- 11 Information and intelligence sharing
- 12 Investigating money laundering
- 13 Prosecuting money laundering
- 14 Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory: confiscation
- 15 Countering the financing of terrorism: money laundering in reverse
- 16 National security vs the threat of money laundering
- 17 Tax avoidance vs tax evasion
- 18 Corruption: where did all the good apples go?
- 19 AML/CFT supervision or tick-list observers?
- 20 Punishing AML/CFT failures or raising government funds?
- 21 A future landscape
- Conclusion: A call to arms
- Notes
- Index
7 - Financial Intelligence Units or data black holes?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 January 2024
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures, tables and boxes
- Acknowledgements
- Foreword
- 1 Global standards, governance and the risk-based approach
- 2 The war on dirty money is mostly being lost in translation
- 3 How much do we really know about money laundering?
- 4 The obsession with defining money laundering
- 5 Money launderers and their superpowers
- 6 Global watchlists: money laundering risk indicators or something else?
- 7 Financial Intelligence Units or data black holes?
- 8 The ‘fingers crossed’ approach to money laundering prevention
- 9 Technology: the solution to all our AML/CFT problems
- 10 SARs: millions and millions of them
- 11 Information and intelligence sharing
- 12 Investigating money laundering
- 13 Prosecuting money laundering
- 14 Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory: confiscation
- 15 Countering the financing of terrorism: money laundering in reverse
- 16 National security vs the threat of money laundering
- 17 Tax avoidance vs tax evasion
- 18 Corruption: where did all the good apples go?
- 19 AML/CFT supervision or tick-list observers?
- 20 Punishing AML/CFT failures or raising government funds?
- 21 A future landscape
- Conclusion: A call to arms
- Notes
- Index
Summary
[T] he Council takes the view that the section on Financial Intelligence Units must be strengthened.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of EuropeThe national FIU is one of the main components of the global AML system. Established by individual countries, the national FIU is an expectation of the internationally agreed FATF standards. The collective group of FIUs are supported by the Egmont Group – a global semi-official organisation whose secretariat is in Canada. The number of FIUs has grown from 12 members in 1995 when it began, to 164 in 2020, as a way to generate mutual knowledge.
As a depository for AML/CFT data, FIUs have gained importance thanks to increasing need for suspicious transactions or suspicious activities to be reported. Sending such reports directly to law enforcement is impractical, due to the vast size and varying levels of quality and scope. Sometimes it can also be a lack of trust in law enforcement's ability to deal with SARs sensitively or even sensibly, that has triggered a country's FIU to become the first ‘port of call’.
Yet, it is here, in the FIU, where the details received can then be analysed and decisions made as to whether to take further action. The FIU acts as a buffer between law enforcement and the provider of the SAR. Still, the anticipation involved in sending a SAR to an FIU is like that of throwing a stone into a well and waiting for it to reach the bottom. Only in this instance, seldom do you ever hear the sound of any contact no matter how big the stone.
As the Egmont Group highlights, for effective collection and disclosure of financial intelligence related to money laundering derived from corruption, the most important requirement is the need for FIU operational independence and autonomy. Yet for those FIUs run by law enforcement personnel, independence and autonomy can be far from realistic. Still, according to the Egmont Group there are four models of FIUs: (1) the Judicial Model which permits seizing funds, freezing accounts, conducting interrogations, detaining people and conducting searches; (2) the Law Enforcement Model that exists within law enforcement systems; (3) the Administrative Model, which is a centralised, independent, administrative authority, which receives and processes information and disseminated accordingly; and (4) the Hybrid Model that provides a disclosure intermediary and a link to both judicial and law enforcement authorities.
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- Information
- The War on Dirty Money , pp. 126 - 140Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2023