Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I TERRORISM: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
- PART II WHY MORAL CONDEMNATIONS OF TERRORISM LACK CREDIBILITY
- PART III DEFENDING NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY
- Introduction: the ethics of war-fighting: a spectrum of possible views
- 8 The realist challenge to the ethics of war
- 9 An ethic of war for reasonable realists
- 10 Walzer on noncombatant immunity as a human right
- 11 The supreme emergency exception
- 12 Rights theories, utilitarianism, and the killing of civilians
- 13 Immunity rights vs. the right of self-defense
- 14 A rule-utilitarian defense of noncombatant immunity
- 15 Why utilitarian criticisms of noncombatant immunity are mistaken
- 16 Is noncombatant immunity a “mere” convention?
- PART IV HOW MUCH IMMUNITY SHOULD NONCOMBATANTS HAVE?
- Conclusion: terrorism and the ethics of war
- Bibliography
- Index
8 - The realist challenge to the ethics of war
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I TERRORISM: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
- PART II WHY MORAL CONDEMNATIONS OF TERRORISM LACK CREDIBILITY
- PART III DEFENDING NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY
- Introduction: the ethics of war-fighting: a spectrum of possible views
- 8 The realist challenge to the ethics of war
- 9 An ethic of war for reasonable realists
- 10 Walzer on noncombatant immunity as a human right
- 11 The supreme emergency exception
- 12 Rights theories, utilitarianism, and the killing of civilians
- 13 Immunity rights vs. the right of self-defense
- 14 A rule-utilitarian defense of noncombatant immunity
- 15 Why utilitarian criticisms of noncombatant immunity are mistaken
- 16 Is noncombatant immunity a “mere” convention?
- PART IV HOW MUCH IMMUNITY SHOULD NONCOMBATANTS HAVE?
- Conclusion: terrorism and the ethics of war
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Realism is generally understood as the view that morality does not apply to the conduct of states, especially states at war. Some realists reject this interpretation, but even if (contrary to fact) no serious thinker ever held this version of realism, the idea expressed is powerful and strikes many people as plausible.
The realist, “morality does not apply” view challenges the whole idea of an ethic of war. If it is correct, there can be no moral duty for countries and their leaders to accept noncombatant immunity. Or, if the only moral duty that nations and their leaders have is to pursue their own national interest, then there can be no duty to refrain from attacks on enemy civilians. From the realist perspective, terrorism and other attacks on civilians might be legitimate because anything goes so long as it is in the national interest.
Because of realism's influence, any serious attempt to defend noncombatant immunity or other restrictions on the conduct of war must begin by showing why the realistic perspective is defective. My aim is to show that, while realists have some insights, their inferences about the inapplicability of morality to war and international relations are mistaken.
WHY REALISM SEEMS ATTRACTIVE
Realism is generally seen as a tough-minded, no-nonsense perspective. By contrast, people who think that morality is relevant to war and international relations are often portrayed as naive idealists.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Terrorism and the Ethics of War , pp. 114 - 124Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010