Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables and figures
- About the author
- Acknowledgements
- one Introduction: some starting points
- two The new material and moral saliences of private capital
- three Framing the crisis: moral critique and the renewal of ‘business as usual’
- four Regulation, orthodoxy and hegemony: crisis, what crisis?
- five Re-regulation in action: ‘Better Regulation’
- six Regulatory inaction? Regulation without enforcement
- seven After regulation?
- Notes
- References
- Index
five - Re-regulation in action: ‘Better Regulation’
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2022
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables and figures
- About the author
- Acknowledgements
- one Introduction: some starting points
- two The new material and moral saliences of private capital
- three Framing the crisis: moral critique and the renewal of ‘business as usual’
- four Regulation, orthodoxy and hegemony: crisis, what crisis?
- five Re-regulation in action: ‘Better Regulation’
- six Regulatory inaction? Regulation without enforcement
- seven After regulation?
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
The argument is not the old one – more regulation against less regulation. Our focus is on getting regulation right – better regulation…regulation that will improve, not hinder, business competitiveness. (Blair, 1998, 18)
We are sticking to the task. But that doesn't just mean making difficult decisions on public spending. It also means something more profound. It means building a leaner, more efficient state. We need to do more with less. Not just now, but permanently. (Cameron, 2013)
Introduction
As indicated in Chapter One, the Labour government, elected in 1997, set itself on a concerted effort to prove itself as the party of business in a way the Conservative Party, as capital's natural representatives, have never had to do. Integral to this effort were two key, underlying convictions which underpinned its repositioning as the party of business.
The first was that Britain's global economic competitiveness hinged upon the creation of a business-friendly environment. Behind this rationale was an apocryphal fear of capital flight; the idea that over-regulation would result in the displacement of firms to more business-friendly foreign locations. On this basis, Blair sought to make Britain ‘A great place to do business. Labour is now the party for business, the entrepreneur's champion’ (Blair, cited in Osler, 2002, 57). The second was the central conviction that private economic activity is inherently and necessarily better than public sector activity. New Labour bought into a set of neoliberal claims that proposed, on grounds of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, the private sector as the most appropriate provider of goods and services. The logical consequence of this is that private businesses can also deliver regulatory outcomes more effectively than government mechanisms.
On entering office, those two rationales framed New Labour's approach to the regulation of business and enabled regulation, as a necessary evil, to be repositioned along neoliberal lines. These rationales were to be rolled out within the over-arching rubric of ‘Better Regulation’, a concept which can be traced back to the 1990s, but which in the UK and in the EU received particular impetus from the first Blair government.
Blair emphasised the bases for ‘Better Regulation’ in 1998 in the context of Britain's Presidency of the EU.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Social Protection after the CrisisRegulation without Enforcement, pp. 107 - 136Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2015