Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editor's preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I The semantic tradition
- Part II Vienna, 1925–1935
- 9 Schlick before Vienna
- 10 Philosophers on relativity
- 11 Carnap before Vienna
- 12 Scientific idealism and semantic idealism
- 13 Return of Ludwig Wittgenstein
- 14 A priori knowledge and the constitution of meaning
- 15 The road to syntax
- 16 Syntax and truth
- 17 Semantic conventionalism and the factuality of meaning
- 18 The problem of induction: theories
- 19 The problem of experience: protocols
- Notes
- References
- Index
18 - The problem of induction: theories
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editor's preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I The semantic tradition
- Part II Vienna, 1925–1935
- 9 Schlick before Vienna
- 10 Philosophers on relativity
- 11 Carnap before Vienna
- 12 Scientific idealism and semantic idealism
- 13 Return of Ludwig Wittgenstein
- 14 A priori knowledge and the constitution of meaning
- 15 The road to syntax
- 16 Syntax and truth
- 17 Semantic conventionalism and the factuality of meaning
- 18 The problem of induction: theories
- 19 The problem of experience: protocols
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
Contrary to Kant's belief, synthetic judgments a priori do not exist. … But one problem remains still unsolved which since then has caused greatest difficulties to philosophy; and moreover no consistent empiricism can be developed as long as it remains unsolved: that is the problem of induction. Since Hume's splendid critique, this problem dominates all epistemology and, now that the solution suggested by Kant has been proved untenable, one had to find another.
Reichenbach, “Autobiographical Sketch,” Selected Writings, 1909–1953, vol. 1In earlier chapters we saw how the domains of mathematics and logic had been taken care of (albeit differently) by Wittgenstein and Carnap. Most positivists were willing to go along with one or the other of them on those topics; but they were far more interested in empirical knowledge. Once again, as in the case of mathematics, the leading questions were semantic and foundational: What does science say, and what kinds of reasons do we have for believing what it says? These two questions were the kernel of what was misleadingly called at the time the “problem of induction.” A variety of ways of looking at it had been taking shape for decades. Their proponents finally confronted one another in Vienna in the early 1930s. The showdown was, as usual, inconclusive, but it greatly sharpened the conflicting positions and helped reveal their respective virtues and vices. Moreover, beneath the wide variety of responses, one may detect further evidence of the methodological shift toward the transcendental approach adumbrated in Chapter 10.
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- The Semantic Tradition from Kant to CarnapTo the Vienna Station, pp. 327 - 353Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991