Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Part I The science of language and mind
- Part II Human nature and its study
- 15 Chomsky on human nature and human understanding
- 16 Human nature and evolution: thoughts on sociobiology and evolutionary psychology
- 17 Human nature again
- 18 Morality and universalization
- 19 Optimism and grounds for it
- 20 Language, agency, common sense, and science
- 21 Philosophers and their roles
- 22 Biophysical limitations on understanding
- 23 Epistemology and biological limits
- 24 Studies of mind and behavior and their limitations
- 25 Linguistics and politics
- Appendices
- Commentaries
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
20 - Language, agency, common sense, and science
from Part II - Human nature and its study
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Part I The science of language and mind
- Part II Human nature and its study
- 15 Chomsky on human nature and human understanding
- 16 Human nature and evolution: thoughts on sociobiology and evolutionary psychology
- 17 Human nature again
- 18 Morality and universalization
- 19 Optimism and grounds for it
- 20 Language, agency, common sense, and science
- 21 Philosophers and their roles
- 22 Biophysical limitations on understanding
- 23 Epistemology and biological limits
- 24 Studies of mind and behavior and their limitations
- 25 Linguistics and politics
- Appendices
- Commentaries
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
JM: Switching topics slightly for a while in order to look at the issue from a different point of view . . . What's on the other side of language [the faculty]? If it has this capacity of integrating, coordinating, and innovating, what are we to think of what lies on the ‘other side’ of its [the faculty's] operations? You spoke of performance systems in some of your earlier works, and in the case of production and perception, it's pretty clear what those are. But what about the conceptual and intentional systems?
NC: . . . Those are internal systems; they're something that's going on in your head and my head.
JM: Those are internal systems. OK, but I'm trying to get clear about what role language has in contributing to agency, action. Let me put it this way: philosophers like to think of people as agents, as decision-makers who deliberate, who take into account various kinds of information and bring them to bear on making decisions in ways that satisfy desires, and the like. What about that notion of an agent? To a certain extent, it seems as though language is being given some of those roles (of gathering information, etc.).
NC: Language can be conceived of as a tool for agents, for agency – whatever that is. It's Descartes's point, basically, that you can use your linguistic abilities to say anything you want about any topic which is in your conceptual range, but when you do it, you're acting as a human agent with a human will, whatever that is.
Most scientists tend to accept the Cartesian dogma that only humans have this capacity, so that insects are automata. But we don't know that. If you ask the best theorists of ants why an ant decides at one point to turn left rather than right . . . well, the question can't even come up [for a scientific answer]. You can talk about the mechanisms, you can talk about the motivations, you can talk about the external and internal stimuli, but they don't predict what the ant's going to do. Maybe that's because we don't know enough and the ant's really an automaton. Or maybe we just haven't captured the notion of agency properly.
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- Information
- The Science of LanguageInterviews with James McGilvray, pp. 124 - 128Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012