10 - Conclusion

Summary

We have focused on four features of psychiatry that distinguish it from many other sciences: (i) the subject matter of psychiatry is contested; (ii) psychiatry employs particular modes of explanation; (iii) mental health professionals work within multiple different theoretical frameworks; and (iv) psychiatry is problematically shaped by values and interests.

In Chapters 2 and 3 I examined the nature of mental illness. I concluded that the antipsychiatrists are mistaken, and that mental illness is no myth. When it comes to providing a positive account of mental disorder, the jury is still out. At present there are multiple accounts of disorder being developed, and it is unclear which, if any, will prove successful. Still, a consensus is emerging on some fronts. Most agree that mental and physical disorders cannot be cleanly distinguished. In addition, it looks likely that determining whether a condition is a disorder involves value judgements. Still, even if value judgements are involved in determining whether a condition is a disorder, projects that seek to investigate the causes and natural history of particular conditions can be properly scientific.

With the subject matter of psychiatry ensured, in Chapters 4 and 5 we examined two types of explanation that are particularly common in psychiatry. Chapter 4 focused on “natural-history style” explanations. These explanations work by identifying the natural kind to which an individual belongs. I argued that at least some types of mental disorder are plausibly natural kinds, and that the use of such explanations in psychiatry is thus justified.