Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- List of abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- Part I The rod of the Lord: ideology and the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War
- Part II To unite against the common enemy: the 1654 Treaty of Westminster and the end of apocalyptic foreign policy
- Part III Popery, trade, and universal monarchy: ideology and the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War
- Part IV The Medway, Breda, and the Triple Alliance: the collapse of Anglican Royalist Foreign Policy
- 17 Historiographical overview
- 18 The circulation of news and the course of the war
- 19 The popular understanding of the war
- 20 The government's war aims
- 21 An Orangist revolution
- 22 Victory denied and wartime consensus shattered
- 23 The rise of political opposition
- 24 The road to Chatham: the decision not to send out a battle fleet
- 25 The demise of Anglican Royalist foreign policy
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
21 - An Orangist revolution
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- List of abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- Part I The rod of the Lord: ideology and the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War
- Part II To unite against the common enemy: the 1654 Treaty of Westminster and the end of apocalyptic foreign policy
- Part III Popery, trade, and universal monarchy: ideology and the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War
- Part IV The Medway, Breda, and the Triple Alliance: the collapse of Anglican Royalist Foreign Policy
- 17 Historiographical overview
- 18 The circulation of news and the course of the war
- 19 The popular understanding of the war
- 20 The government's war aims
- 21 An Orangist revolution
- 22 Victory denied and wartime consensus shattered
- 23 The rise of political opposition
- 24 The road to Chatham: the decision not to send out a battle fleet
- 25 The demise of Anglican Royalist foreign policy
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
How successful were the English at achieving their war aims? Was there any evidence that English pressure, either external or internal, succeeded in destabilizing the Dutch republican regime? While Dutch political culture was fluid, its ebbs and flows frequently responding to the most recent battle news from the North Sea, there can be no doubting the ubiquity of popular political criticism throughout the United Provinces in the first two years of the war.
Almost as soon as Parliament resoundingly signaled its support of the war, the usually booming Dutch economy began to wilt. The United Provinces “is in an uproar for want of trade,” Gilbert Talbot informed his fellow ambassador Henry Coventry during the war's first spring, the Dutch navy “must be forced to fight us or their leaders will be torn in pieces.” In letter after letter George Downing reported that “the people here are weary of the war” not so much for what they had already lost “but because they see no probability of an end thereof, and (say they) how is it possible for us to hold out and have no trade.” So discontented were the people that “many poor artists daily quit this country for want of employment, and many merchants speak of removing this spring if the peace be not made before.”
Not only had the war severed Dutch trade routes, but the astronomically high taxes necessitated by the war were crushing the domestic economy.
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- Information
- Protestantism and PatriotismIdeologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1668, pp. 331 - 342Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996