Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables and Figures
- Preface
- One Terrorism
- Two The Dilemma of Liberal Democracies
- Three Statistical Studies and the Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior
- Four Counterterrorism
- Five Transference
- Six International Cooperation
- Seven Hostage Taking
- Eight Terrorist Groups and Their Organization
- Nine Before and After 9/11
- Ten The Economic Impact of Terrorism
- Eleven Homeland Security
- Twelve The Future of Terrorism
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
One - Terrorism
An Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables and Figures
- Preface
- One Terrorism
- Two The Dilemma of Liberal Democracies
- Three Statistical Studies and the Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior
- Four Counterterrorism
- Five Transference
- Six International Cooperation
- Seven Hostage Taking
- Eight Terrorist Groups and Their Organization
- Nine Before and After 9/11
- Ten The Economic Impact of Terrorism
- Eleven Homeland Security
- Twelve The Future of Terrorism
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Summary
The events on 11 September 2001 (henceforth, 9/11) served as a wake-up call to the world that transnational terrorism poses grave risks. The four simultaneous hijackings on 9/11 represent watershed terrorist incidents for a number of reasons. First, the deaths associated with 9/11 were unprecedented: the human toll was equal to the number of deaths from transnational terrorism from the start of 1988 through the end of 2000 (Sandler, 2003). Second, the losses associated with 9/11 topped $80 billion and caused insurance companies to end automatic coverage of terrorist-induced losses. Following 9/11, many companies were unable to afford terrorism insurance. To address the insurance concern, the US government enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) on 26 November 2002. Third, 9/11 showed that ordinary objects can be turned into deadly weapons with catastrophic consequences. Despite the huge carnage of 9/11, the death toll could have been much higher had the planes struck the towers at a lower floor. Fourth, 9/11 underscored the objectives of today’s fundamentalist terrorists to seek maximum casualties and to cause widespread fear, unlike the predominantly left-wing terrorist campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s that sought to win over a constituency. Fifth, 9/11 mobilized a huge reallocation of resources to homeland security – since 2002, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget has grown by over 60% to $36.2 billion for the fiscal year 2004 (DHS, 2003). In fiscal year 2005, the DHS budget grew another 10% to $40.2 billion (DHS, 2004). The proposed DHS budget for 2010 is $55.1 billion, with approximately 65% of the budget, or $35.7 billion, going to homeland security proper (DHS, 2009, p. 155). In past DHS budgets, between 60 and 65% went to defending against terrorism on US soil. This expenditure is small compared to proactive or military measures taken in fighting the “war on terror,” including the invasion against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 and the ongoing operations against these groups in Afghanistan in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Still other proactive spending involves improving intelligence, tracking terrorist assets, and fostering cooperative linkages with other countries. Sixth, protective actions taken by rich developed countries have transferred some attacks against these countries’ interests to poorer countries – for example, the post-9/11 attacks in Indonesia, Morocco, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere.
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- Chapter
- Information
- The Political Economy of Terrorism , pp. 1 - 27Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011