Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I Basic Problems of Sociality
- 1 Language and Social Ontology
- Comment
- 2 Shared Agency
- Comment
- 3 The Reality of Group Agents
- Comment
- Part II Laws and Explanation in the Social Sciences
- Part III How Philosophy and the Social Sciences Can Enrich Each Other: Three Examples
- Epilogue
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- References
Comment
A Note on Group Agents
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I Basic Problems of Sociality
- 1 Language and Social Ontology
- Comment
- 2 Shared Agency
- Comment
- 3 The Reality of Group Agents
- Comment
- Part II Laws and Explanation in the Social Sciences
- Part III How Philosophy and the Social Sciences Can Enrich Each Other: Three Examples
- Epilogue
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- References
Summary
Pettit provides a general framework detailing the conditions for ascribing agential status to groups (such as political parties, assemblies, churches, states, etc.) in a way that parallels the attribution of agency to individuals. We normally use an intentional vocabulary to refer to the behavior of complex collective organizations, and we implicitly assume that these organizations behave as true agents. We say, for instance, that the aim of Parliament at the moment of a vote on new legislation is to reduce poverty by increasing welfare allocations; or, we say that the objective of the government with this or that measure is to reduce unemployment. In both cases, parliaments and governments are conceived as agents having specific goals and objectives that they attempt to promote. These ascriptions of intentional and purposive behavior have both normative and explanatory consequences. From the normative point of view, they are used to create obligations and other commitments: we say, for instance, that such and such an assembly has promised to do this or that, and we can criticize it for failing to honor its self-imposed obligations. From the explanatory point of view, ascribing purposes and goals to organizations and groups is a way to account for their behavior: we explain, for instance, the behavior of governments and states by ascribing goals to them and assuming that they attempt to satisfy – with different degrees of success – such goals. I take as uncontroversial the existence of this kind of agential talk about groups and organizations.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Philosophy of the Social SciencesPhilosophical Theory and Scientific Practice, pp. 92 - 98Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009