Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Principles
- Preface
- 1 Biography
- 2 Function and Argument
- 3 Sense and Reference
- 4 Frege's Begriffsschrift Theory of Identity
- 5 Concept and Object
- 6 Names and Descriptions
- 7 Existence
- 8 Thought, Truth Value, and Assertion
- 9 Indirect Reference
- 10 Through the Quotation Marks
- Appendix A Begriffsschrift in Modern Notation: (1) to (51)
- Appendix B Begriffsschrift in Modern Notation: (52) to (68)
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Existence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Principles
- Preface
- 1 Biography
- 2 Function and Argument
- 3 Sense and Reference
- 4 Frege's Begriffsschrift Theory of Identity
- 5 Concept and Object
- 6 Names and Descriptions
- 7 Existence
- 8 Thought, Truth Value, and Assertion
- 9 Indirect Reference
- 10 Through the Quotation Marks
- Appendix A Begriffsschrift in Modern Notation: (1) to (51)
- Appendix B Begriffsschrift in Modern Notation: (52) to (68)
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Introduction
The matter of existence is one of the most difficult in philosophy. The topic is infused with a particularly noxious mix of dogma and confusion. Needless to say, Frege's influence on modern thought is deep. There are three distinct aspects of the issue on which he made contributions:
First, there is the Context Principle – “never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition” (Frege 1884b: x) – which he employed to promote his own view that numbers are objects and to undermine the then current psychologism in mathematics;
Second, there is his treatment of nonreferring singular terms and the truth value of sentences containing them;
Third, and perhaps most significantly, there is his doctrine that existence is a property of properties, not of things.
We have little to offer that will help clear the general fog about Frege's Context Principle and its application. We spoke about Frege's treatment of nonreferring singular terms in Chapter 3, and again in Chapter 6. We will say more in Section 7.6. However, we will focus in this chapter primarily on the third issue, namely, whether existence is a first-order property.
Frege is widely credited with providing a precise interpretation in the language of modern logic of Kant's (1781: 504) well-known declaration: “‘Being’ is obviously not a real predicate.…” Frege's discussion of the issue is self-consciously derived from Kant's, and framed with the same explicit connection to the Ontological Argument for God's existence.
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- Information
- The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege , pp. 100 - 124Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005