Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by Juan Linz
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction: Political parties, theories of regime change, and the Uruguayan case
- PART I THE CRISIS AND SURVIVAL OF URUGUAYAN POLITICAL PARTIES
- 2 Politicians and parties in Uruguay: origins and crisis
- 3 The breakdown of democracy
- 4 The failure of military institutionalization and political engineering: the survival of political parties
- PART II FROM AUTHORITARIAN CRISIS TO TRANSITION
- PART III POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
- Conclusion: Parties and regime change – some lessons and comparisons
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
3 - The breakdown of democracy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by Juan Linz
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction: Political parties, theories of regime change, and the Uruguayan case
- PART I THE CRISIS AND SURVIVAL OF URUGUAYAN POLITICAL PARTIES
- 2 Politicians and parties in Uruguay: origins and crisis
- 3 The breakdown of democracy
- 4 The failure of military institutionalization and political engineering: the survival of political parties
- PART II FROM AUTHORITARIAN CRISIS TO TRANSITION
- PART III POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
- Conclusion: Parties and regime change – some lessons and comparisons
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
Summary
Uruguay's democratic regime did not break down in a single event, but rather was eroded by stages. Democracy has at least two analytic dimensions: the degree of accountability of rulers and the degree of pluralistic toleration of opposition and dissent within political society. After 1968 there was a twofold process of closing down representative institutions and political arenas (from the power-sharing executive, to the wage councils, to the National Assembly) and an escalating repression of opposition groups (from terrorists, to unions, to students, to leftists, to Colorados and Blancos).
Just before his sudden death in December 1967, President Gestido issued an executive order banning the Socialist party, which had openly advocated guerrilla warfare for “national liberation.” He was succeeded by Vice-President Pacheco, who introduced nonparty technocrats into the cabinet, began to rule by emergency decree, and used the military to repress strikes. In July 1969 the Pacheco administration announced curbs on media coverage of terrorism. In September of 1971 the effort to repress the Tupamaros guerrillas led to suspension of the right of habeas corpus on the basis of a declaration of “internal war.” The following year the National Assembly approved the Law of State Security and Public Order, permitting military trials of alleged subversives.
President Bordaberry was inaugurated in 1972 following the hotly contested elections of the previous year. However, the involvement of the military in politics, first in strikebreaking and then in the war against the guerrillas, produced unstoppable momentum for their final takeover of power.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Negotiating DemocracyPoliticians and Generals in Uruguay, pp. 33 - 49Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991