Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-4rdpn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T20:39:05.099Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Moral Bodies: Epistemologies of Embodiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Jackie Leach Scully
Affiliation:
Newcastle University
Hilde Lindemann
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
Marian Verkerk
Affiliation:
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
Margaret Urban Walker
Affiliation:
Marquette University, Wisconsin
Get access

Summary

Understanding is always against a background of what is taken for granted, just relied on.

– Charles Taylor, “To Follow a Rule”

A naturalized bioethics involves taking a more skeptical look at things that mainstream bioethics tends to take for granted. As Margaret Walker writes in the Introduction to this volume, naturalized bioethics grasps that “ethical theories often deceptively abstract selectively from social realities and may idealize moral positions and powers that characterize those socially privileged” and, most significantly, that this idealization has effects on moral perceptions and judgments. As moral thinking is not disconnected from other kinds of thinking that we engage in, we need to be scrupulously self-aware — more than most of us can hope to be — to avoid importing taken-for-granted assumptions about knowledge and value into our moral thinking as well.

An early consequence of this kind of bias, as feminist bioethicists were among the first to point out, is the exclusion of the viewpoints of certain social actors from serious bioethical discussions. In general, the voices of women, ethnic or cultural minorities, the very young and the very old, the minimally educated, and others are absent or underrepresented in mainstream bioethical discourse. This exclusion occurs through two main conceptual moves: the move of commonality, which claims that any or all of these viewpoints are adequately represented by other spokespeople (so that a white person can “speak for” a black person, or a man for a woman) because the moral views and values of these different agents still have enough in common; and the move of marginality, which makes the opposite claim that in fact these viewpoints are so marginal as to be not only numerically insignificant but also too whacky to take seriously.

Type
Chapter
Information
Naturalized Bioethics
Toward Responsible Knowing and Practice
, pp. 23 - 41
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×