Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-8ctnn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-29T05:37:16.981Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 December 2019

Thomas Kroedel
Thomas Kroedel
Affiliation:
Universität Hamburg

Summary

A summary is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button.
Type
Chapter
Information
Mental Causation
A Counterfactual Theory
 , pp. 208 - 220
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

References

Aimar, S. 2011. Counterfactuals, Overdetermination and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111: 469–477.Google Scholar
Armstrong, D.M. 1983. What Is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Árnadóttir, S.T. and Crane, T.. 2013. There is no Exclusion Problem. In Gibb, S.C., Lowe, E.J., and Ingthorsson, R., eds, Mental Causation and Ontology. New York: Oxford University Press, 248–266.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aronson, J.L. 1971. On the Grammar of ‘Cause’. Synthese 22: 414–430.Google Scholar
Averill, E.W. and Keating, B.. 1981. Does Interactionism Violate a Law of Classical Physics? Mind 90: 102–107.Google Scholar
Bader, R.M. 2013. Towards a Hyperintensional Theory of Intrinsicality. Journal of Philosophy 110: 525–563.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bailey, A.M., Rasmussen, J., and Horn, L.. 2011. No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies 154: 349–360.Google Scholar
Baker, L.R. 1993. Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In Heil, J. and Mele, A., eds, Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 75–95.Google Scholar
Baker, L.R. 2009. Nonreductive Materialism. In McLaughlin, B.P., Beckermann, A., and Walter, S., eds, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109–127.Google Scholar
Baumgartner, M. 2009. Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non‐Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23: 161–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baumgartner, M. 2010. Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40: 359–384.Google Scholar
Beebee, H. 2017. Epiphenomenalism for Functionalists. In Beebee, H., Hitchcock, C., and Price, H., eds, Making a Difference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 286–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, J. 2003. A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, K. 2003. Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It. Noûs 37: 471–497.Google Scholar
Bennett, K. 2007. Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2: 316–337.Google Scholar
Bennett, K. 2008. Exclusion Again. In Hohwy, J. and Kallestrup, J., eds, Being Reduced. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 280–305.Google Scholar
Bernstein, S. 2016. Overdetermination Underdetermined. Erkenntnis 81: 17–40.Google Scholar
Bhaskar, R. 1975. A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds: Leeds Books.Google Scholar
Block, N. 1978. Troubles with Functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9: 261–325.Google Scholar
BonJour, L. 2010. Against Materialism. In Hohwy, J. and Kallestrup, J., eds, The Waning of Materialism: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–23.Google Scholar
Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D.J.. 2014. What Do Philosophers Believe? Philosophical Studies 170: 465–500.Google Scholar
Brand, M. 1977. Identity Conditions for Events. American Philosophical Quarterly 14: 329–337.Google Scholar
Briggs, R. 2012. Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160: 139–166.Google Scholar
Burge, T. 1993. Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice. In Heil, J. and Mele, A., eds, Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 97–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, J. 2007. An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology. In Gopnik, A. and Schulz, L., eds, Causal Learning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 58–66.Google Scholar
Campbell, K. 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Carey, B. 2011. Overdetermination and the Exclusion Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89: 251–262.Google Scholar
Carroll, J.W. 1988. General Causation. In PSA 1988: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1: Contributed Papers. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 311–317.Google Scholar
Carroll, J.W. 1991. Property-Level Causation? Philosophical Studies 63: 245–270.Google Scholar
Cartwright, N. 1989. Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Caston, V. 1997. Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern. Philosophical Review 106: 309–363.Google Scholar
Chalmers, D.J. 1996. The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Christensen, J. and Kallestrup, J.. 2012. Counterfactuals and Downward Causation: A Reply to Zhong. Analysis 72: 513–517.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clifford, W.K. 1874. Body and Mind. Fortnightly Review 16: 714–736.Google Scholar
Collins, J. 2000. Preemptive Prevention. Journal of Philosophy 97: 223–234.Google Scholar
Crane, T. and Mellor, D.H.. 1990. There Is No Question of Physicalism. Mind 99: 185–206.Google Scholar
Crook, S. and Gillett, C.. 2001. Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31: 333–359.Google Scholar
Cross, C.B. 2006. Conditional Logic and the Significance of Tooley’s Example. Analysis 66: 325–335.Google Scholar
Dancy, J. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 1969. The Individuation of Events. In Rescher, N., ed., Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht: Reidel, 216–234.Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 1970. Events, Mental. In Foster, L. and Swanson, J., eds, Experience and Theory. New York: Humanities Press, 79–101.Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 1985. Reply to Quine on Events. In LePore, E. and McLaughlin, B., eds, Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell, 172–176.Google Scholar
Descartes, R. 1984–1991. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, ed. and trans. Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., Murdoch, D., and Kenny, A., 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Descartes, R. 1996. Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Adam, C. and Tannery, P., 11 vols. Paris: Vrin.Google Scholar
Dowe, P. 2000. Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Dunn, J. 2011. Fried Eggs, Thermodynamics, and the Special Sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62: 71–98.Google Scholar
Ehring, D. 2003. Part-Whole Physicalism and Mental Causation. Synthese 136: 359–388.Google Scholar
Ehring, D. 2011. Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Elga, A. 2001. Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence. Philosophy of Science 68: S313–S324.Google Scholar
Ellis, B. 2001. Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Esfeld, M. 2007. Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Causation. Erkenntnis 67: 207–220.Google Scholar
Fair, D. 1979. Causation and the Flow of Energy. Erkenntnis 14: 219–250.Google Scholar
Feigl, H. 1958. The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’. In Feigl, H., Scriven, M., and Maxwell, G., eds, Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 370–497.Google Scholar
Fenton-Glynn, L. and Kroedel, T.. 2015. Relativity, Quantum Entanglement, Counterfactuals, and Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66: 45–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J.A. 1989. Making Mind Matter More. Philosophical Topics 17:59–79.Google Scholar
Galles, D. and Pearl, J.. 1998. An Axiomatic Characterization of Causal Counterfactuals. Foundations of Science 3: 151–182.Google Scholar
Garber, D. 1983a. Mind, Body and the Laws of Nature in Descartes and Leibniz. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8: 105–133.Google Scholar
Garber, D. 1983b. Understanding Interaction: What Descartes Should Have Told Elisabeth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 21: 15–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gebharter, A. 2017. Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95: 353–375.Google Scholar
Gibb, S.C. 2004. The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 464–476.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibb, S.C. 2010. Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum. Dialectica 64: 363–384.Google Scholar
Gibb, S.C. 2013. Mental Causation and Double Prevention. In Gibb, S.C., Lowe, E.J., and Ingthorsson, R., eds, Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 193–214.Google Scholar
Gibb, S.C. 2014. Recent Work: Mental Causation. Analysis 74: 327–338.Google Scholar
Gibb, S.C. 2015a. Physical Determinability. Humana.Mente 29: 69–90.Google Scholar
Gibb, S.C. 2015b. The Causal Closure Principle. Philosophical Quarterly 65: 626–647.Google Scholar
Gibbons, J. 2006. Mental Causation Without Downward Causation. Philosophical Review 115: 79–103.Google Scholar
Gillies, A.S. 2007. Counterfactual Scorekeeping. Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 329–360.Google Scholar
Ginley, D.S., Hosono, H., and Paine, D.C. (eds) 2010. Handbook of Transparent Conductors. New York: Springer.Google Scholar
Gorham, G., 2013. The Theological Foundations of Hobbesian Physics: A Defense of Corporeal God. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21: 240–261.Google Scholar
Guyton, A.C. and Hall, J.E.. 2006. Textbook of Medical Physiology, 11th edn. Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier Saunders.Google Scholar
Hájek, A. (ms.). Most Counterfactuals Are False. URL: http://philpapers.org/rec/hjemca.Google Scholar
Hall, Ned. 2004a. The Intrinsic Character of Causation. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1: 255–300.Google Scholar
Hall, N. 2004b. Two Concepts of Causation. In Collins, J., Hall, N., and Paul, L.A., eds, Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 225–276.Google Scholar
Hall, N. 2007. Structural Equations and Causation. Philosophical Studies 132: 109–136.Google Scholar
Halpern, J.Y. 2000. Axiomatizing Causal Reasoning. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 12: 317–337.Google Scholar
Halpern, J.Y. 2008. Defaults and Normality in Causal Structures. In Brewka, G. and Lang, J., eds, Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference (KR 2008). Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press, 198–208.Google Scholar
Halpern, J.Y. 2013. From Causal Models to Counterfactual Structures. Review of Symbolic Logic 6: 305–322.Google Scholar
Halpern, J.Y. and Hitchcock, C.. 2010. Actual Causation and the Art of Modeling. In Dechter, R., Geffner, H., and Halpern, J.Y., eds, Heuristics, Probability and Causality: A Tribute to Judea Pearl. London: College Publications, 383–406.Google Scholar
Halpern, J.Y. and Hitchcock, C.. 2015. Graded Causation and Defaults. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66: 413–457.Google Scholar
Halpern, J.Y. and Pearl, J.. 2005. Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 56: 843–887.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harbecke, J. 2014. Counterfactual Causation and Mental Causation. Philosophia 42: 363–385.Google Scholar
Harré, R. and Madden, E.H.. 1975. Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Hart, W.D. 1988. The Engines of the Soul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hawthorne, J. 2004. Why Humeans Are Out of Their Minds. Noûs 38: 351–358.Google Scholar
Hawthorne, J. 2005. Chance and Counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70: 396–405.Google Scholar
Heil, J. 1992. The Nature of True Minds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Heil, J. 2003. From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Heil, J. 2012. The Universe As We Find It. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Heil, J. and Robb, D.. 2003. Mental Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 40: 175–196.Google Scholar
Hiddleston, E. 2005. A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals. Noûs 39: 632–657.Google Scholar
Hitchcock, C. 1995. Salmon on Explanatory Relevance. Philosophy of Science 62: 304–320.Google Scholar
Hitchcock, C. 2001. The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs. Journal of Philosophy 98: 273–299.Google Scholar
Hitchcock, C. 2003. Of Humean Bondage. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54: 1–25.Google Scholar
Hitchcock, C. 2004a. Do All and Only Causes Raise the Probabilities of Effects? In Collins, J., Hall, N., and Paul, L.A., eds, Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 403–417.Google Scholar
Hitchcock, C. 2004b. Routes, Processes, and Chance-Lowering Causes. In Dowe, P. and Noordhof, P., eds, Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. London: Routledge, 139–151.Google Scholar
Hitchcock, C. 2007a. Prevention, Preemption, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Philosophical Review 116: 495–532.Google Scholar
Hitchcock, C. 2007b. What’s Wrong with Neuron Diagrams? In Campbell, J.K., O’Rourke, M., and Silverstein, H., eds, Causation and Explanation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 69–92.Google Scholar
Hitchcock, C. 2012a. Events and Times: A Case Study in Means-Ends Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 160: 79–96.Google Scholar
Hitchcock, C. 2012b. Theories of Causation and the Causal Exclusion Argument. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19: 40–56.Google Scholar
Hoffmann-Kolss, V. 2014. Interventionism and Higher-level Causation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28: 49–64.Google Scholar
Honderich, T. 1982. The Argument for Anomalous Monism. Analysis 42: 59–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horgan, T. 1989. Mental Quausation. Philosophical Perspectives 3: 47–76.Google Scholar
Horgan, T. 1993. From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World. Mind 102: 555–586.Google Scholar
Hornsby, J. 2015. Causality and the Mental. Humana.Mente 29: 125–140.Google Scholar
Huber, F. 2013. Structural Equations and Beyond. Review of Symbolic Logic 6: 709–732.Google Scholar
Hüttemann, A. 2013. A Disposition-Based Process Theory of Causation. In Mumford, S. and Tugby, M., eds, Metaphysics and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 101–122.Google Scholar
Huxley, T. 1874. On the Hypothesis that Animals Are Automata, and Its History. Fortnightly Review 95: 555–580.Google Scholar
Ismael, J. 2016. How Do Causes Depend on Us? The Many Faces of Perspectivalism. Synthese 193: 245–267.Google Scholar
Jackson, F. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Jackson, F. and Pettit, P.. 1990. Causation in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50: 195–214.Google Scholar
Jenkins, C.S. and Nolan, D.. 2008. Backwards Explanation. Philosophical Studies 140: 103–115.Google Scholar
Kallestrup, J. 2006. The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131: 459–485.Google Scholar
Keaton, D. 2012. Kim’s Supervenience Argument and the Nature of Total Realizers. European Journal of Philosophy 20: 243–259.Google Scholar
Keaton, D. and Polger, T.W.. 2014. Exclusion, Still Not Tracted. Philosophical Studies 171: 135–148.Google Scholar
Keil, G. 2001. How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and Events. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61: 43–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. 1973. Causes and Counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy 70: 570–572.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 1976. Events as Property Exemplifications. In Brand, M. and Walton, D., eds, Action Theory. Dordrecht: Reidel, 159–177.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 1984. Concepts of Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45: 153–176.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 1989. Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 3: 77–108.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 1992. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 1–26.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 1993. Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 1998. Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 2005. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 2007. Causation and Mental Causation. In McLaughlin, B.P. and Cohen, J.D., eds, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 227–242.Google Scholar
Kistler, M. 2013. The Interventionist Account of Causation and Non-Causal Association Laws. Erkenntnis 78: 65–84.Google Scholar
Kment, B. 2006a. Counterfactuals and Explanation. Mind 115: 261–310.Google Scholar
Kment, B. 2006b. Counterfactuals and the Analysis of Necessity. Philosophical Perspectives 20: 237–302.Google Scholar
Kment, B. 2010. Causation: Determination and Difference-Making. Noûs 44: 80–111.Google Scholar
Kment, B. 2014. Modality and Explanatory Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Koksvik, O. 2007. Conservation of Energy Is Relevant to Physicalism. Dialectica 61: 573–582.Google Scholar
Kripke, S.A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Kroedel, T. 2008. Mental Causation as Multiple Causation. Philosophical Studies 139: 125–143.Google Scholar
Kroedel, T. 2015a. A Simple Argument for Downward Causation. Synthese 192: 841–858.Google Scholar
Kroedel, T. 2015b. Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem. Noûs 49: 357–375.Google Scholar
Kroedel., T. 2018. A New Future Similarity Objection. Philosophical Studies 175: 1477–1493.Google Scholar
Kroedel, T. and Huber, F.. 2013. Counterfactual Dependence and Arrow. Noûs 47: 453–466.Google Scholar
Kvart, I. 2001. Lewis’s ‘Causation as Influence’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79: 409–421.Google Scholar
La Mettrie, J.O. 1912. Man a Machine, ed. Bussey, G.C.. Chicago, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Langton, R. and Lewis, D.. 1998. Defining ‘Intrinsic’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 333–345.Google Scholar
Leibniz, G.W. 1898. The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings, trans. Latta, R.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Leibniz, G.W. 1985. Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, ed. Farrer, A., trans. Huggard, E.M.. La Salle, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Lemmon, E.J. 1967. Comments on D. Davidson’s ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’. In Rescher, N., ed., The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 96–103.Google Scholar
Lepore, E. and Loewer, B.. 1987. Mind Matters. Journal of Philosophy 84: 630–641.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1966. An Argument for the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 63: 17–25.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1973a. Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70: 556–567.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1973b. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1973c. Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2: 418–446.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. 1979. Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow. Noûs 13: 455–476.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1980. Mad Pain and Martian Pain. In Block, N., ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 216–222.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1983. Extrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 44: 197–200.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986a. Causal Explanation. In Philosophical Papers, Volume II. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986b. Events. In Philosophical Papers, Volume II. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986c. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986d. Postscripts to ‘Causation’. In Philosophical Papers, Volume II. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986e. Postscripts to ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’. In Philosophical Papers, Volume II. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1994a. Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind 103: 473–490.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1994b. Reduction of Mind. In Guttenplan, S., ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 2000. Evil for Freedom’s Sake? In Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 2004. Causation as Influence. In Collins, J., Hall, N., and Paul, L.A., eds, Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 75–106.Google Scholar
List, C. and Menzies, P.. 2009. Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle. Journal of Philosophy 106: 475–502.Google Scholar
Loewer, B. 2001a. From Physics to Physicalism. In Gillett, C. and Loewer, B., eds, Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 37–56.Google Scholar
Loewer, B. 2001b. Review of J. Kim, Mind in a Physical World. Journal of Philosophy 98: 315–324.Google Scholar
Loewer, B. 2007. Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough. In McLaughlin, B.P. and Cohen, J.D., eds, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 243–264.Google Scholar
Lombrozo, T. 2010. Causal-Explanatory Pluralism: How Intentions, Functions, and Mechanisms Influence Causal Ascriptions. Cognitive Psychology 61: 303–332.Google Scholar
Lowe, E.J. 1996. Subjects of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Lowe, E.J. 1999. Self, Agency and Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6: 225–239.Google Scholar
Lowe, E.J. 2000. Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism. Philosophy 75: 571–585.Google Scholar
Lowe, E.J. 2003. Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation. In Walter, S. and Heckmann, H.-D., eds, Physicalism and Mental Causation. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 137–154.Google Scholar
Lowe, E.J. 2008. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lowe, E.J. 2013. Substance Causation, Powers, and Human Agency. In Gibb, S.C., Lowe, E.J., and Ingthorsson, R., eds, Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 153–172.Google Scholar
Lycan, W.G. 2009. Giving Dualism Its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 551–563.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacDonald, C. and MacDonald, G.. 1986. Mental Causes and Explanation of Action. Philosophical Quarterly 36: 145–158.Google Scholar
MacDonald, C. and MacDonald, G.. 2006. The Metaphysics of Mental Causation. Journal of Philosophy 103: 539–576.Google Scholar
Mackie, J.L. 1965. Causes and Conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly 2: 245–264.Google Scholar
Malcolm, N. 1968. The Conceivability of Mechanism. Philosophical Review 77: 45–72.Google Scholar
Malebranche, N. 1997. Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, ed. Jolley, N., trans. Scott, D.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Martin, C.B. 2008. The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Maudlin, T. 2007. A Modest Proposal Concerning Laws, Counterfactuals, and Explanations. In The Metaphysics Within Physics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Mayr, E. 2017. Powers and Downward Causation. In Paolini Paoletti, M. and Orilia, F., eds, Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation. New York: Routledge, 76–91.Google Scholar
McDermott, M. 1995. Redundant Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46: 523–544.Google Scholar
McDonnell, N. 2017. Causal Exclusion and the Limits of Proportionality. Philosophical Studies 174: 1459–1474.Google Scholar
McGrath, S. 2005. Causation By Omission: A Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 123: 125–148.Google Scholar
McLaughlin, B.P. 1995. Varieties of Supervenience. In Savellos, E.E. and Yalcin, U., eds, Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 16–59.Google Scholar
McLaughlin, B.P. 2009. Review of S. Shoemaker, Physical Realization. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. URL: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24086-physical-realization/.Google Scholar
Melnyk, A. 2003. A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Menzies, P. 1988. Against Causal Reductionism. Mind 97: 551–574.Google Scholar
Menzies, P. 2004. Difference-Making in Context. In Collins, J., Hall, N., and Paul, L.A., eds, Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 139–180.Google Scholar
Mills, E. 1996. Interactionism and Overdetermination. American Philosophical Quarterly 33: 105–117.Google Scholar
Molnar, G. 2003. Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Montero, B. 2006. What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Do with Physicalism? Dialectica 60: 383–396.Google Scholar
Moore, D. 2012. Causal Exclusion and Dependent Overdetermination. Erkenntnis 76: 319–335.Google Scholar
Moore, M.S. 2009. Causation and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Morreau, M. 2010. It Simply Does Not Add up: Trouble with Overall Similarity. Journal of Philosophy 107: 469–490.Google Scholar
Morris, K. 2015. Against Disanalogy-Style Responses to the Exclusion Problem. Philosophia 43: 435–453.Google Scholar
Moss, S. 2012. On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals. Noûs 46: 561–586.Google Scholar
Mumford, S. and Anjum, R.L.. 2009. Double Prevention and Powers. Journal of Critical Realism 8: 277–293.Google Scholar
Mumford, S. and Anjum, R.L.. 2011. Getting Causes from Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Nadler, S. 1997. Occasionalism and the Mind-Body Problem. In Stewart, M.A., ed., Studies in Seventeenth-Century European Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 75–96.Google Scholar
Newen, A. and Čuplinskas, R.. 2002. Mental Causation: A Real Phenomenon in a Physicalistic World Without Epiphenomenalism or Overdetermination. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65: 139–167.Google Scholar
Ney, A. 2012. The Causal Contribution of Mental Events. In Gozzano, S. and Hill, C.S., eds, New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 230–250.Google Scholar
Noordhof, P. 1998. Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation? Philosophical Quarterly 48: 221–226.Google Scholar
Papineau, D. 2001. The Rise of Physicalism. In Gillett, C. and Loewer, B., eds, Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3–36.Google Scholar
Paprzycka, K. 2014. Lowe’s Argument Against the Psychoneural Token Identity Thesis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95: 372–396.Google Scholar
Pauen, M. 2002. Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization? Grazer Philosophische Studien 65: 37–49.Google Scholar
Paul, L.A. 2000. Aspect Causation. Journal of Philosophy 97: 235–256.Google Scholar
Paul, L.A. and Hall, N.. 2013. Causation: A User’s Guide. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pearl, J. 2000. Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Perler, D. 1996. Repräsentation bei Descartes. Frankfurt: Klostermann.Google Scholar
Pernu, T.K. 2016. Causal Exclusion and Downward Counterfactuals. Erkenntnis 81: 1031–1049.Google Scholar
Place, U.T. 1956. Is Consciousness a Brain Process? British Journal of Psychology 47: 44–50.Google Scholar
Polger, T.W. 2004. Natural Minds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Price, H. and Corry, R. (eds) 2007. Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and R. Descartes. 2007. The Correspondence Between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes, ed. and trans. Shapiro, L.. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1967. Psychological Predicates. In Capitan, W.H and Merrill, D.D., eds, Art, Mind, and Religion. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 37–48.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V.O. 1970. Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V.O. 1974. The Roots of Reference. La Salle, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Raatikainen, P. 2010. Causation, Exclusion, and the Special Sciences. Erkenntnis 73: 349–363.Google Scholar
Robb, D. 1997. The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47: 178–194.Google Scholar
Robb, D. 2001. Reply to Noordhof on Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 51: 90–94.Google Scholar
Robb, D. 2013. The Identity Theory as a Solution to the Exclusion Problem. In Gibb, S.C., Lowe, E.J., and Ingthorsson, R.D., eds, Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 215–232.Google Scholar
Robb, D. 2015. Mental Causation and Intelligibility. Humana.Mente 29: 213–226.Google Scholar
Russell, B. 1912. On the Notion of Cause. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13: 1–26.Google Scholar
Russo, A. 2016. Kim’s Dilemma: Why Mental Causation Is Not Productive. Synthese 193: 2185–2203.Google Scholar
Rutherford, D. 1993. Natures, Laws, and Miracles: The Roots of Leibniz’s Critique of Occasionalism. In Nadler, S., ed., Causation in Early Modern Philosophy. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 135–158.Google Scholar
Salmon, W. 1994. Causality Without Counterfactuals. Philosophy of Science 61: 297–312.Google Scholar
Sartorio, C. 2005. Causes as Difference-Makers. Philosophical Studies 123: 71–96.Google Scholar
Sartorio, C. 2006. Disjunctive Causes. Journal of Philosophy 103: 521–538.Google Scholar
Sartorio, C. 2007. Causation and Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 2: 749–765.Google Scholar
Sartorio, C. 2010. The Prince of Wales Problem for Counterfactual Theories of Causation. In Hazlett, A., ed., New Waves in Metaphysics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 259–276.Google Scholar
Sartorio, C. 2016. Causation and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2000a. Causation by Disconnection. Philosophy of Science 67: 285–300.Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2000b. Trumping Preemption. Journal of Philosophy 97: 165–181.Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2003. Overdetermining Causes. Philosophical Studies 114: 23–45.Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2004a. Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation. In Hitchcock, C., ed., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell, 197–216.Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2004b. Of Ghostly and Mechanical Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68: 230–244.Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. 2012. Disconnection and Responsibility. Legal Theory 18: 399–435.Google Scholar
Schneider, S. 2012. Non-Reductive Physicalism Cannot Appeal to Token Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 719–728.Google Scholar
Schnieder, B. 2015. The Asymmetry of ‘Because’. In Lapointe, S., ed., Themes from Ontology, Mind, and Logic. Leiden: Brill Rodopi, 131–164.Google Scholar
Shapiro, L.A. 2010. Lessons from Causal Exclusion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81: 594–604.Google Scholar
Shapiro, L.A. and Sober, E.. 2007. Epiphenomenalism: The Dos and the Don’ts. In Machamer, P. and Wolters, G., eds, Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 235–264.Google Scholar
Sharpe, K.W. 2015. Causal Overdetermination and Modal Compatibilism. Philosophia 43: 1111–1131.Google Scholar
Shoemaker, S. 1981. Some Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12: 93–119.Google Scholar
Shoemaker, S. 2001. Realization and Mental Causation. In Gillett, C. and Loewer, B., eds, Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 74–98.Google Scholar
Shoemaker, S. 2007. Physical Realization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sider, T. 2003. What’s So Bad about Overdetermination? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67: 719–726.Google Scholar
Sleigh, R.C. Jr 1990. Leibniz on Malebranche on Causality. In Cover, J. and Kulstad, M., eds, Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 161–194.Google Scholar
Slowik, E. 2014. Descartes’ Physics. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 edition), ed. Zalta, E.N.. URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/descartes-physics/.Google Scholar
Smart, J.J.C. 1972. Further Thoughts on the Identity Theory. The Monist 56: 177–192.Google Scholar
Spalding, D.A. 1877. The Physical Basis of Mind. Nature 16: 261–263.Google Scholar
Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., and Scheines, R.. 2000. Causation, Prediction, and Search. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Springborg, P. 2012. Hobbes’s Challenge to Descartes, Bramhall and Boyle: A Corporeal God. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20: 903–934.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, R. 1968. A Theory of Conditionals. In Cornman, J.W., ed., Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs, Vol. 2).Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112.Google Scholar
Stephan, A. 2002. Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65: 77–93.Google Scholar
Swanson, E. 2010. Lessons from the Context Sensitivity of Causal Talk. Journal of Philosophy 107: 221–242.Google Scholar
Swanson, E. 2012a. Conditional Excluded Middle without the Limit Assumption. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 301–321.Google Scholar
Swanson, E. 2012b. The Language of Causation. In Graff Fara, D. and Russell, G., eds, The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge, 716–728.Google Scholar
Thomson, J.J. 2003. Causation: Omissions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66: 81–103.Google Scholar
Tooley, M. 2002. Backward Causation and the Stalnaker–Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals. Analysis 62: 191–197.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, B.C. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
van Riel, R. 2013. Identity, Asymmetry, and the Relevance of Meanings for Models of Reduction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64: 747–761.Google Scholar
Vetter, B. 2015. Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
von Fintel, K. 2001. Counterfactuals in a Dynamic Context. In Kenstowicz, M., ed., Ken Hale: A Life in Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 123–152.Google Scholar
Walter, S. 2010. Taking Realization Seriously: No Cure for Epiphobia. Philosophical Studies 151: 207–226.Google Scholar
Wasserman, R. 2006. The Future Similarity Objection Revisited. Synthese 150: 57–67.Google Scholar
Weatherson, B. 2001. Intrinsic Properties and Combinatorial Principles. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63: 365–380.Google Scholar
Weatherson, B. 2007. Humeans Aren’t out of Their Minds. Noûs 41: 529–535.Google Scholar
Weslake, B. 2013. Proportionality, Contrast and Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91: 785–797.Google Scholar
Weslake, B. 2017. Difference-Making, Closure and Exclusion. In Beebee, H., Hitchcock, C., and Price, H., eds, Making a Difference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 215–231.Google Scholar
Wilson, J. 2005. Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism. Noûs 39: 426–459.Google Scholar
Williams, J.R.G. 2008. Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 385–420.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2006. Indicative versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential Versus Non-Hyperintensional Contexts. Philosophical Issues 16: 310–333.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. Forthcoming. Counterpossibles in Metaphysics. In Armour-Garb, B. and Kroon, F., eds, Philosophical Fictionalism.Google Scholar
Wolff, J.E. 2016. Using Defaults to Understand Token Causation. Journal of Philosophy 113: 5–26.Google Scholar
Won, C. 2014. Overdetermination, Counterfactuals, and Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 123: 205–229.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. 2002. What Is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account. Philosophy of Science 69: S366–S377.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. 2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. 2008. Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms. In Hohwy, J. and Kallestrup, J., eds, Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 218–262.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. 2010. Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation. Biology and Philosophy 3: 287–318.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. 2012. Causation: Interactions between Philosophical Theories and Psychological Research. Philosophy of Science 79: 961–972.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. 2014. Causal Reasoning: Philosophy and Experiment. In Lombrozo, T., Knobe, J., and Nichols, S., eds, Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 294–324.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. 2015. Interventionism and Causal Exclusion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91: 303–347.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. 2016. The Problem of Variable Choice. Synthese 193: 1047–1072.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. 2017. Intervening in the Exclusion Argument. In Beebee, H, Hitchcock, C., and Price, H., eds, Making a Difference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 251–268.Google Scholar
Yablo, S. 1992. Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 101: 245–280.Google Scholar
Yablo, S. 1997. Wide Causation. Philosophical Perspectives 11: 251–281.Google Scholar
Zhong, L. 2011. Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83: 129–147.Google Scholar
Zhong, L. 2012. Counterfactuals, Regularity and the Autonomy Approach. Analysis 72: 75–85.Google Scholar
Zhong, L. 2015. Why the Counterfactualist Should Still Worry about Downward Causation. Erkenntnis 80: 159–171.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • References
  • Thomas Kroedel, Universität Hamburg
  • Book: Mental Causation
  • Online publication: 09 December 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108762717.010
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • References
  • Thomas Kroedel, Universität Hamburg
  • Book: Mental Causation
  • Online publication: 09 December 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108762717.010
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • References
  • Thomas Kroedel, Universität Hamburg
  • Book: Mental Causation
  • Online publication: 09 December 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108762717.010
Available formats
×