3 - Logics of Violence in Cartel–State Conflict

Summary

This chapter introduces the central logics that drive cartels to use violence against the state. Purely defensive violence to physically reduce losses from state repression is one important logic of violence, but cannot explain cartels’ use of threats, retribution, and terror tactics, all common and clearly coercive in nature. I distinguish two coercive logics by which anti-state violence can influence policy outcomes. In “violent corruption”, cartels use threats of violence against police and other enforcers to induce lax enforcement and more advantageous bribe agreements; in “violent lobbying”, cartels use high-profile, terroristic violence to pressure state leaders into making changes to de jure policy. I summarize the factors favoring each and their predicted empirical footprints. Violent lobbying is subject to collective action problems among cartels, and thus unlikely under conditions of turf war; I present quantitative evidence that it was more salient in Colombia (where cartelswere united at onset in a mutual-protection organization) than Rio de Janeiro and Mexico. Overall, violent corruption is the more prominent pathway. I then discuss several logics of anti-state violence that could arise from inter-cartel turf war, potential pathways of causal interaction between turf war and cartel–state conflict, and “general equilibrium” effects of repression when criminal markets are fragmented.

INTRODUCTION

My core argument is that cartels’ choices to adopt or eschew strategies of confrontation and anti-state violence are largely shaped by the state's repressive policies. This may seem trivially true—if the state left cartels to their own devices, surely they would have little reason to attack the state. But a little reflection shows that the converse is not true: almost every DTO in the world, from the smallest street-corner crews to the most powerful cartels, faces some degree of state repression—often quite significant repression—whereas systematic anti-state violence by DTOs is quite rare, even among cartels. State repression of the drug trade is a necessary but not sufficient condition for cartel–state conflict.

When police enforce drug laws, most traffickers in most parts of the world do not fight back. Instead, they respond with evasive, “hiding” strategies: maintaining anonymity or a low profile, carrying out drug transactions as discreetly as possible, and during busts, either fleeing or, when flight is impossi- ble, submitting peacefully.