Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Section 1 Two Dialogues on Mind and Body
- Introduction
- First Dialogue On the Nature of the Mind
- Second Dialogue The Mind and the Body
- Section 2 Two Dialogues on Consciousness
- Section 3 A Dialogue on the Objectivity or Subjectivity of Perceptual Qualities
- Section 4 Two Dialogues on Thought
- Section 5 A Dialogue on Ownership of Pain
First Dialogue - On the Nature of the Mind
from Section 1 - Two Dialogues on Mind and Body
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 December 2019
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Section 1 Two Dialogues on Mind and Body
- Introduction
- First Dialogue On the Nature of the Mind
- Second Dialogue The Mind and the Body
- Section 2 Two Dialogues on Consciousness
- Section 3 A Dialogue on the Objectivity or Subjectivity of Perceptual Qualities
- Section 4 Two Dialogues on Thought
- Section 5 A Dialogue on Ownership of Pain
Summary
Protagonists:
Richard: a middle-aged Oxford philosopher of the mid-twentieth century, dressed in cavalry twill slacks, waistcoat and tie, and well-cut jacket.
Jill: a philosopher in her early thirties, dressed in an elegant but informal manner.
Frank Craik: a contemporary American neuroscientist, casually dressed in jeans and pullover, with open-necked shirt. He has a marked American accent.
Descartes: in sombre Dutch mid-seventeenth century dress. Speaks with a thick French accent.
Aristotle: in Greek dress – himation and sandals.
The setting is a garden in Elysium. The sun is shining. A rich verdant lawn is surrounded by flower beds and flowering bushes, with a grove of magnificent trees behind. Beyond, there is a large lake and in the distance, high mountains. Five comfortable garden chairs are placed in the shade of some trees. There is a low table on which are placed a wine decanter and glasses, three of which are half full. Richard, Jill and Frank are deep in discussion.
Richard: But you must admit that it is very puzzling that we speak of having a mind and having a body. I mean, if I have a mind and also have a body, then who and what am I that has these two things?
Jill: Well, it seems obvious enough. After all, you just said ‘I have a mind’ and ‘I have a body’. It is you, the ‘I’, the Ego, the Self, that has a mind, on the one hand, and a body, on the other.
Richard: But, Jill, what on earth is this ‘I’ or ‘Ego’ or ‘self’? Surely I'm a human being.
Frank: Sure. And if you're a human being, then you can't be an Ego or Self. Unless human beings are selves.
Jill: All right. But then I surely have an Ego or Self. Human beings have selves.
Frank: No, no. Do I have a self? I've never come across it! I'm sure I'm sometimes selfish, but that doesn't mean that I have a self. And as for an Ego, that's just a fancy way of saying that I have an ‘I’. It may sound better in Latin, but it's just baloney. Look, talking of an ‘I’ is just plain ungrammatical. I mean, y'don't talk of the you, the she or the it. Well, it's just as ungrammatical to talk of an I, of the I, or of my I.
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- Information
- Intellectual EntertainmentsEight Dialogues on Mind, Consciousness and Thought, pp. 7 - 32Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2019