Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of boxes
- Acknowledgements
- A roadmap to this book
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Enemies of corruption
- 3 What is bad about bureaucratic corruption? An institutional economic approach
- 4 The dilemma of the kleptocrat: What is bad about political corruption?
- 5 Corruption and transactions costs: The rent-seeking perspective
- 6 Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law
- 7 Exporters' ethics and the art of bribery
- 8 How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: An empirical approach
- 9 Corrupt relational contracting
- 10 Concluding thoughts
- Appendix: Technical Details to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
- References
- Subject index
10 - Concluding thoughts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of boxes
- Acknowledgements
- A roadmap to this book
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Enemies of corruption
- 3 What is bad about bureaucratic corruption? An institutional economic approach
- 4 The dilemma of the kleptocrat: What is bad about political corruption?
- 5 Corruption and transactions costs: The rent-seeking perspective
- 6 Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law
- 7 Exporters' ethics and the art of bribery
- 8 How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: An empirical approach
- 9 Corrupt relational contracting
- 10 Concluding thoughts
- Appendix: Technical Details to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
- References
- Subject index
Summary
Anticorruption is society's perpetual endeavor to discipline its public servants and politicians. It cannot be imagined that this goal will ever be reached solely by intellectual effort. Courage and commitment among civic-minded people will remain a prerequisite for low levels of corruption. But societies’ ventures require some thorough guidance. Our knowledge on anticorruption is increasing at a remarkable speed. Reform ideas are tested throughout the world and experiences are rapidly exchanged so as to determine best practice. Yet, there is still no overarching framework available that helps in organizing our thinking. An inspiration for such a framework is suggested in this book: the principle of the invisible foot.
A first approach intended to inspire anticorruption related to repression: draconic penalties and higher probabilities of detecting malfeasance. While this approach has its merits, it is doubtful whether it can be the guiding principle for the future. Data on prosecutions related to bribery and fraud reveal that they are common particularly in some more developed countries but extremely rare in some less-developed countries (United Nations 2006). Whether conviction rates in many crucial countries would ever reach levels where they can represent an effective deterrence can therefore be put in question. Furthermore, if the effects follow an economic law of decreasing marginal gains and increasing marginal costs, the likely outcome would be that criminals are less deterred by higher penalties while the pursuit of absolute integrity becomes more and more expensive, bringing about unpleasant side effects.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Institutional Economics of Corruption and ReformTheory, Evidence and Policy, pp. 225 - 235Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007