Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T00:57:08.758Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Letter to Francis Hutcheson, March 16, 1740 (extract)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Dorothy Coleman
Affiliation:
Northern Illinois University
Get access

Summary

Editor's note: Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow and a popularizer of Shaftesbury's thought in Scotland, helped foster a more enlightened attitude among the Scottish clergy. Hume and Hutcheson shared the Shaftesburean conviction that moral judgments do not convey factual information but express disinterested emotions. Further, they both believed that moral sense is independent of religious belief. Hume sought Hutcheson's advice in preparing the third volume of his Treatise of Human Nature for publication. Hutcheson was very helpful to Hume in this regard, but four years later their disagreements about religion led Hutcheson to oppose Hume's candidacy for a faculty appointment at the University of Edinburgh.

Dear Sir:

… I must consult you in a point of prudence. I have concluded a reasoning with these two sentences. When you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing but that from the particular constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a mighty advancement of the speculative sciences; though like that too, it has little or no influence on practice. Is not this laid a little too strong?

Type
Chapter
Information
Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
And Other Writings
, pp. 113 - 114
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×