Valuing Activity

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Call the proposition that the good life consists of excellent (or virtuous), distinctively human activity the Aristotelian Thesis. I think of a photograph I clipped from the New York Times as vividly depicting this claim. It shows a pianist, David Golub, accompanying two vocalists, Victoria Livengood and Erie Mills, at a tribute for Marilyn Home. All three artists are in fine form, exercising themselves at the height of their powers. The reason I saved the photo, however, is Mr. Golub's face. He is positively grinning, as if saying to himself, “And they pay me to do this?”

Mr. Golub's delight is a sign of his activity's value, not what makes it good. His pleasure “completes the activity … as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age” (1174b33-35). The metaphor is apt, since “eudaimonia,” Aristotle's term for the human good, is frequently translated as “flourishing.” “Flourish” comes from the same Old French root as “flower” (“ florir ”). When applied to plants and trees, “flourish” meant to grow vigorously to the point of putting out leaves or flowers. And a “flourish” was originally the bios som itself. More generally, something flourishes when it thrives or prospers as a healthy plant does coming to full flower. Making the relevant substitutions, Mr. Golub's manifest enjoyment is the sign of his flourishing, its flower or “flourish.” What his flourishing consists in, however, is the excellent activity that produces his delight.