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10 - Preparation for Transition (March 1967 to February 1972)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2018

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Summary

In wars of rebellion, there is other knowledge required … not only knowledge of the country, but the disposition of the people.

George Washington

Five years after seizing power, Ne Win had experienced many frustrations and disappointments. He readily admitted that the economy was dysfunctional, that the government had no adequate development plans, that its statistical base was woefully inadequate, that rice production was falling, and the men upon whom he was relying to build a socialist economy did not know what they were doing. But still he pressed on and did not change course. His underlying motive for the revolution that he had created could not be achieved by turning back. Burma had to be pulled up by its bootstraps and self-government restored. Moreover, Burma existed in the midst of a hostile world. The Americans were deep into their Southeast Asian quagmire, with the battle in Laos and Vietnam threatening Cambodia. Thailand, sanctuary to Ne Win's political and insurgent opponents, was locked into the American embrace. Myanmar apparently had amicable relations with its other neighbours, Pakistan, India and China, but the world was an uncertain place and no one could predict the future. As during the previous two years, so through the next few, Rangoon was occasionally a venue for quiet diplomacy to attempt to resolve the wars in Indochina. Ne Win stayed as far from such diplomacy as possible and claimed he was not in the habit of consulting with United Nations (UN) Secretary General U Thant, or anyone else, over the war in Vietnam or other matters. Preserving his neutrality in the Cold War came above all else.

Nevertheless, this did not mean that he did not take his responsibility and opportunities as a statesman on the world stage seriously. When U Thant visited Yangon in February and March 1967, he arranged, via the Soviet Undersecretary at the United Nations, Alexi Nesterenko, to have a secret meeting with North Vietnamese representatives in Yangon. North Vietnam, of course, was not a member of the world body. As Thant recalled in his memoirs:

I arrived in Rangoon on February 24 and called on Generals Ne Win and San Yu the next day.

Type
Chapter
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General Ne Win
A Political Biography
, pp. 360 - 410
Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
Print publication year: 2015

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