Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Preface
- 1 Economic Development, Interdependence, and Incentives
- 2 Games
- 3 Development Traps and Coordination Games
- 4 Rural Poverty, Development, and the Environment
- 5 Risk, Solidarity Networks, and Reciprocity
- 6 Understanding Agrarian Institutions
- 7 Savings, Credit, and Microfinance
- 8 Social Learning and Technology Adoption
- 9 Property Rights, Governance, and Corruption
- 10 Conflict, Violence, and Development
- 11 Social Capital
- 12 The Political Economy of Trade and Development
- Appendix
- Exercises for Interested Readers
- References
- Index
12 - The Political Economy of Trade and Development
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Preface
- 1 Economic Development, Interdependence, and Incentives
- 2 Games
- 3 Development Traps and Coordination Games
- 4 Rural Poverty, Development, and the Environment
- 5 Risk, Solidarity Networks, and Reciprocity
- 6 Understanding Agrarian Institutions
- 7 Savings, Credit, and Microfinance
- 8 Social Learning and Technology Adoption
- 9 Property Rights, Governance, and Corruption
- 10 Conflict, Violence, and Development
- 11 Social Capital
- 12 The Political Economy of Trade and Development
- Appendix
- Exercises for Interested Readers
- References
- Index
Summary
The notion that globalization needs a human face … is wrong. Globalization has a human face, but we can make that face yet more agreeable.
– Jagdish Bhagwati (2004)THE DOHA ROUND of world trade negotiations began in November 2001 in an atmosphere of heightened anticipation. The 148 members of the World Trade Organization began the round of talks (named after the capital of Qatar where the kickoff meeting was hosted) with an objective that was both lofty and noble: The Doha round was to incorporate the poorest countries of the world into a free and fair global trade system. The talks sought to rectify a long-identified bias against the poor countries in international trade – the forbidding shield of protection erected by the rich countries to defend domestic farmers against foreign agriculture. The sheer size of agricultural protection in the OECD countries is staggering. Recently calculated at $279 billion, it equals 30 percent of total agricultural receipts, and six times the amount spent on foreign aid to the developing countries.
Serious reductions in agricultural protection in the Doha round would have momentous implications for economic growth in the developing world. Indeed, as the Doha round began, the World Bank had estimated that better poor-country access to rich-country markets would increase world income by $520 billion, and would lift 144 million people out of poverty by 2015.
Benefiting most directly by a Doha trade agreement would be the rural poor in the less-developed countries (LDCs).
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- Games in Economic Development , pp. 224 - 248Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007