Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 The US Fleet Ballistic Missile system: technology and nuclear war
- 2 Theoretical models of weapons development
- 3 Heterogeneous engineering and the origins of the fleet ballistic missile
- 4 Building Polaris
- 5 Success and successors
- 6 Poseidon
- 7 Strat-X, ULMS and Trident I
- 8 The improved accuracy programme and Trident II
- 9 Understanding technical change in weaponry
- 10 Appendix: List of interviewees
- Notes
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
5 - Success and successors
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 The US Fleet Ballistic Missile system: technology and nuclear war
- 2 Theoretical models of weapons development
- 3 Heterogeneous engineering and the origins of the fleet ballistic missile
- 4 Building Polaris
- 5 Success and successors
- 6 Poseidon
- 7 Strat-X, ULMS and Trident I
- 8 The improved accuracy programme and Trident II
- 9 Understanding technical change in weaponry
- 10 Appendix: List of interviewees
- Notes
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Summary
This is not an ultimate missile here. We are going to keep improving this missile as we go along, even after it is first installed in the ships, so we are not going to get an ultimate missile and stop.
Admiral Burke.Polaris A1 became operational on 15 November 1960, when the submarine George Washington left Charleston, South Carolina, to patrol the Norwegian Sea. Then on 31 January 1961 the second FBM submarine, the Patrick Henry, went on patrol. Each carried sixteen Polaris A1 missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead over a range of about a thousand miles to within a few miles of the intended target. Polaris seemed to be an indisputable success.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SUCCESS
Within four years SPO had developed and deployed a complex new type of weapon system which provided a threat of potential retaliation against Soviet cities, but which itself seemed invulnerable. This success owed much to the skill and dedication of the people who worked on the programme. In particular SPO demonstrated great skill in managing both the ‘technical’ and ‘social’ aspects of technology. Moreover, within certain limits they were able to ‘engineer’ the expectations that Polaris had to meet just as well as the technology that met them.
Schedule was paramount, with a sense of urgency generated not only by concern about the need to counter possible Soviet developments, but also to establish a Navy right to ballistic missiles before the Air Force achieved the hegemony it clearly desired.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- From Polaris to TridentThe Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology, pp. 58 - 85Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994