Introduction

Summary

We appeal for appreciation of the moderation that underlies the spirit of constitutionality, something which is also Girondist, liberal, republican and, why not, truly democratic. The concept of constitutional moment is used to explain the development of constitutional politics in Chile. It enables us to register the most important changes and to structure the periods according to changes in the doctrinal conception of law and rights, the relationship between rulers and the ruled and between the different government bodies, as well as the organization of political agents. All of these dimensions underwent important alterations in Chile, in at least five different eras. With these five distinct republican periods, we can appreciate that Chilean history has evolved around different constitutional moments. Thus, the first stage was marked by the moment of the Constitution of 1828; the second, by the constitutional reform of 1833; the third, by the constitutional reforms of 1871-1874; the fourth, by the reforms of 1925 which came into force at the end of 1932; the fifth, by the 1989 reforms to the existing constitutional text first enacted by the military dictatorship in 1980.

This work is inspired by the bicentennial of Chilean independence (1818-2018) and explains -from a historical perspective - the creation, change of structure, and destruction of Chilean republican and democratic constitutionalism. A distinction is made between those historical moments that were de facto dictatorships and those influenced by democratic and republican principles. The ideal type that is used in this work for the analytical comparison of Chilean constitutional law is based upon several different sources, such as history, politics, and philosophy (jurisprudence). These sources are used to formulate a comparative reconstruction of the ideological and institutional history of Chile’s constitutional law. This reconstruction draws on concepts and theoretical developments originating in western constitutional theory, history, and political philosophy, especially the French and Anglo-Saxon legal traditions.

This sections is an aknowledgement of all persons the author wishes to thank. Among them, my special thanks to the students and professors of the Doctoral Program and to the courses “Introduction to Law” and “Constitutional Law” of the Law Faculty at Universidad de Chile who have greatly contributed to the airing and reviewing of these ideas and with whom, in a trial and error procedure, we have revised over and over the main assumptions and arguments.