Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Comparative counterfactual analysis and the 2003 Iraq war
- 2 Leadership, political context(s) and the Iraq war
- 3 Democratic national security advisers
- 4 Domestic and congressional politics
- 5 American intelligence failures and miscalculations
- 6 Societal pressures and public opinion
- 7 International politics, global WMD consensus and UN power balancing
- 8 Hussein’s mistakes, miscalculations and misperceptions
- 9 Summary and implications
- 10 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Summary and implications
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Comparative counterfactual analysis and the 2003 Iraq war
- 2 Leadership, political context(s) and the Iraq war
- 3 Democratic national security advisers
- 4 Domestic and congressional politics
- 5 American intelligence failures and miscalculations
- 6 Societal pressures and public opinion
- 7 International politics, global WMD consensus and UN power balancing
- 8 Hussein’s mistakes, miscalculations and misperceptions
- 9 Summary and implications
- 10 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Consider the following expanded sample of idiosyncratic, domestic and international factors, derived from the preceding analysis, that would very likely have influenced President Gore during the same crucial period from 2002 to 2003 (see Table 9.1).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Explaining the Iraq WarCounterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence, pp. 265 - 284Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011