Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Prologue
- Miscellaneous Frontmatter
- 1 A Constitutional Tyranny and Presidential Dictatorship
- Part I What Is the History?
- Part II What Is a Declaration of War?
- 5 Declaring and Commanding
- 6 Lawful and Unlawful Declarations of War
- 7 Six Possible Structures
- Part III What Are the Solutions?
- Part IV What Is the Theory?
- Appendix I Five Congressional Declarations of War and One Appropriations Act
- Appendix II The Fœderative Powers in Parliamentary Governments
- References
- Index
5 - Declaring and Commanding
Forms, Functions, and Relationships
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Prologue
- Miscellaneous Frontmatter
- 1 A Constitutional Tyranny and Presidential Dictatorship
- Part I What Is the History?
- Part II What Is a Declaration of War?
- 5 Declaring and Commanding
- 6 Lawful and Unlawful Declarations of War
- 7 Six Possible Structures
- Part III What Are the Solutions?
- Part IV What Is the Theory?
- Appendix I Five Congressional Declarations of War and One Appropriations Act
- Appendix II The Fœderative Powers in Parliamentary Governments
- References
- Index
Summary
The Congress shall have power … to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.
(article I, section 8, clause 11)The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.
Hague Convention III, 1907Relative to the Opening of HostilitiesThe President shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.
(article II, section 2, clause 1)After more than two hundred and twenty years, the consequences of the Founders’ fatally impractical division of the sovereign’s war powers are plain for all to see. The inescapable conclusion is that the Congress simply cannot, should not, and will not in the future exercise its power to declare war. The otherwise simple act of recognizing rising tensions and seizing the initiative to draft, debate, and vote up or down a declaration of war is entirely beyond the organizational capacity, the moral vision, or the political ambition of the U.S. Congress. Indeed, despite its dictatorial consequences, energetic and persistent presidential leadership is required simply to maneuver an indifferent and reluctant Congress into fulfilling its constitutional mandate in the most minimal manner possible on the fewest number of possible occasions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Declaring WarCongress, the President, and What the Constitution Does Not Say, pp. 91 - 125Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012