Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 RULING AGAINST THE RULERS
- 2 THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION
- 3 A THEORY OF COURT-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS: INSECURE TENURE, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
- 4 JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS: INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1976–1999
- 5 THE REVERSE LEGAL-POLITICAL CYCLE: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT
- 6 THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
- 7 CONCLUSION: BROADER LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
- Appendix A Overview of the Federal Argentine Judiciary and the Argentine Supreme Court
- Appendix B The Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Data Set
- Appendix C Equilibria Proofs
- References
- Index
5 - THE REVERSE LEGAL-POLITICAL CYCLE: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 RULING AGAINST THE RULERS
- 2 THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION
- 3 A THEORY OF COURT-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS: INSECURE TENURE, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
- 4 JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS: INSTITUTIONAL INSECURITY ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1976–1999
- 5 THE REVERSE LEGAL-POLITICAL CYCLE: AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT
- 6 THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION: HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER
- 7 CONCLUSION: BROADER LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
- Appendix A Overview of the Federal Argentine Judiciary and the Argentine Supreme Court
- Appendix B The Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Data Set
- Appendix C Equilibria Proofs
- References
- Index
Summary
Having established empirically the validity of several core assumptions underlying the theory strategic defection, the aim of this chapter and the following is to analyze judicial behavior in Argentina. The next step in evaluating the main propositions of the model depends on examining whether the willingness of judges to support their current government changes in response to judges' evolving beliefs and expectations about the threat they faced. In other words, did judges' behavior change as their information about the political environment changed? Did judges who grew less confident in the ability of the current government to insulate them continue to support the current government? Did they suddenly turn against it? Or did they attempt to shy away from deciding cases altogether?
Beginning with a brief overview of the data and methodology, this chapter provides a systematic quantitative analysis of judicial decision making in Argentina. Specifically, I use original individual-level data on the Argentine Supreme Court to assess whether patterns in judicial decision making adhere to the reverse legal political cycle predicted by the theory of strategic defection. Next, the chapter considers the effects of institutional insecurity and uncertainty on judges' participation. In addition, the data are used to explore the proposition that the target and level of threat judges face affect their willingness to act strategically. Finally, I consider several competing hypotheses regarding changes in the court's composition, legality, and the mix of issues being decided by the Court.
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- Information
- Courts under ConstraintsJudges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina, pp. 98 - 125Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004