Book contents
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Analytic Philosophy
- Section One Language, Mind, Epistemology
- 1 Analytic Philosophy of Language
- 2 Analyticity
- 3 Philosophy of Linguistics
- 4 Varieties of Externalism, Linguistic and Mental
- 5 An Analytic-Hermeneutic History of Consciousness
- 6 Computational Philosophies of Mind
- 7 Philosophy of Action
- 8 Contemporary Responses to Radical Skepticism
- 9 Post-Gettier Epistemology
- Section Two Logic, Metaphysics, Science
- Section Three Analytic Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy
- Section Four Analytic Aesthetics and Philosophy of Religion
- Part II Continental Philosophy
- Part III Bridge Builders, Border Crossers, Synthesizers, and Comparative Philosophy
- Part IV Epilogue: On the Philosophy of the History of Philosophy
- References
- Index
9 - Post-Gettier Epistemology
from Section One - Language, Mind, Epistemology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 November 2019
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Analytic Philosophy
- Section One Language, Mind, Epistemology
- 1 Analytic Philosophy of Language
- 2 Analyticity
- 3 Philosophy of Linguistics
- 4 Varieties of Externalism, Linguistic and Mental
- 5 An Analytic-Hermeneutic History of Consciousness
- 6 Computational Philosophies of Mind
- 7 Philosophy of Action
- 8 Contemporary Responses to Radical Skepticism
- 9 Post-Gettier Epistemology
- Section Two Logic, Metaphysics, Science
- Section Three Analytic Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy
- Section Four Analytic Aesthetics and Philosophy of Religion
- Part II Continental Philosophy
- Part III Bridge Builders, Border Crossers, Synthesizers, and Comparative Philosophy
- Part IV Epilogue: On the Philosophy of the History of Philosophy
- References
- Index
Summary
What value is there in the counterexample method in philosophy? For sure, a well-constructed counterexample is an effective means of revealing the deficiency in a proposed analysis of a concept. But where do we go from there? If, for example, as is clearly the case in the recent history of analyses of “S knows that p” (hereafter just “knows”), there is no consensus on an adequate definition, does the churning out of ever more clever counterexamples simply devolve into a competition to knock contenders out of the ring? It can certainly seem that way, which leads many philosophers to despair of the very idea of analysis. In my view, however, drawing that inference misses the point and beauty of the proposed-analysis-and-counterexample method. We learn a lot from the failures of analysis, which drives us to original thinking about the concept at issue. Nowhere is this clearer than in the history of epistemology after Gettier’s (1963) refutation of the Justified True Belief analysis (JTB) of “knows.” In this chapter, I aim to show how the ground beneath Gettier’s demolition has proved to be remarkably fertile.
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- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015 , pp. 125 - 134Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019