Book contents
- Frontmatter
- 1 Introduction: the new Durkheim
- Part I: Life, context, and ideas
- Part II: Symbols, rituals, and bodies
- 8 Durkheim and ritual
- 9 Embodiment, emotions, and the foundations of social order: Durkheim’s enduring contribution
- 10 Drag kings at the totem Ball: the erotics of collective representation in Émile Durkheim and Sigmund Freud
- 11 “Renegade Durkheimianism” and the transgressive left sacred
- Part III: Solidarity, difference, and morality
- Further reading
- Index
11 - “Renegade Durkheimianism” and the transgressive left sacred
from Part II: - Symbols, rituals, and bodies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 April 2008
- Frontmatter
- 1 Introduction: the new Durkheim
- Part I: Life, context, and ideas
- Part II: Symbols, rituals, and bodies
- 8 Durkheim and ritual
- 9 Embodiment, emotions, and the foundations of social order: Durkheim’s enduring contribution
- 10 Drag kings at the totem Ball: the erotics of collective representation in Émile Durkheim and Sigmund Freud
- 11 “Renegade Durkheimianism” and the transgressive left sacred
- Part III: Solidarity, difference, and morality
- Further reading
- Index
Summary
Émile Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life ([1912] 1991) (hereafter Elementary Forms) is considered by many the conclusive statement on religion of the Durkheimian school. In fact, this is rather a simplification of a more complicated intellectual history. A more careful evaluation of the examinations of religious phenomena by the members of the Durkheimian team demonstrates some intriguing theoretical distinctions that give rise to broader differences in intellectual position-taking and helps explain serious differences in the trajectory of influence of the Durkheimian school on subsequent generations of intellectuals. These differences stem largely from the description of the nature of the sacred in the Durkheimian tradition.
The sacred is of course the key to the Durkheimian definition of religion. In Elementary Forms, Durkheim proceeds in typical fashion toward a working definition of this difficult category by eliminating competing definitions, only offering his own after all others examined have been effectively annihilated. Religion, he argues, can only adequately and inclusively be characterized as ideas and rites oriented toward the setting aside and protection of sacred things. But in what manner can we as social scientists classify sacred things and distinguish them from things non-sacred? One might suggest that sacred things can be defined merely as those things set aside and protected in any given society. But this is clearly a circular definition. In any society, Durkheim asserts, there are things sacred and things profane. The profane he is content to leave with a negative definition: that which is not sacred. But it will not do to take the same route with respect to the definition of the sacred (i.e. the non-profane), as this is the substantive category upon which his entire theory of religion is based. The sacred inspires respect, but why? What is it about sacred things that so inspire us and that allow us to distinguish them from profane things? And is this awe-inspiring capacity monolithic and identical in all sacred things?
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- Information
- The Cambridge Companion to Durkheim , pp. 274 - 302Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005
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