Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- Preface
- Chronology 1987–91
- Abbreviations
- PART 1 STRATEGY AND POLICY
- PART 2 NEW MAJOR PEACE OPERATIONS
- PART 3 THE FIRST GULF WAR
- 10 In defence of vital interests
- 11 Off to the Gulf
- 12 Debate and decision
- 13 Boarding and searching
- 14 A serious decision
- 15 Into the Persian Gulf
- 16 Countdown to a deadline
- 17 A supporting role
- 18 End of the war?
- Conclusion
- Appendix A Australian participation in multinational peacekeeping operations, 1947–2007
- Appendix B Key United Nations Security Council resolutions and statements
- Appendix C Investigations into chemical warfare in the Iran–Iraq War, 1984–87 by Daniel Flitton
- Appendix D Gulf War syndrome by Rosalind Hearder
- Appendix E Major office bearers, 1987–96
- Bibliography
- Index
16 - Countdown to a deadline
Preparing for war: 1–16 January 1991
from PART 3 - THE FIRST GULF WAR
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- Preface
- Chronology 1987–91
- Abbreviations
- PART 1 STRATEGY AND POLICY
- PART 2 NEW MAJOR PEACE OPERATIONS
- PART 3 THE FIRST GULF WAR
- 10 In defence of vital interests
- 11 Off to the Gulf
- 12 Debate and decision
- 13 Boarding and searching
- 14 A serious decision
- 15 Into the Persian Gulf
- 16 Countdown to a deadline
- 17 A supporting role
- 18 End of the war?
- Conclusion
- Appendix A Australian participation in multinational peacekeeping operations, 1947–2007
- Appendix B Key United Nations Security Council resolutions and statements
- Appendix C Investigations into chemical warfare in the Iran–Iraq War, 1984–87 by Daniel Flitton
- Appendix D Gulf War syndrome by Rosalind Hearder
- Appendix E Major office bearers, 1987–96
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
War was probably inevitable once the UN Security Council had passed Resolution 678 on 29 November 1990. Saddam Hussein had no intention of withdrawing from Kuwait by the deadline of 15 January (16 January Kuwait time) as it would result in an unbearable loss of face in the Arab world, while President George H.W. Bush and his advisers believed that nothing short of armed force would compel Saddam to comply. War was the only way that this impasse could be resolved. But it did not seem so certain at the time, especially when, on 30 November, Bush suggested direct talks with Iraq, offering to send his Secretary of State, James Baker, to Baghdad. Bush's offer caused much consternation to his advisers and allies, who initially feared that he was weakening in his resolve. But Bush knew that he needed to persuade the US public, the American allies in the United Nations and pro-Western Arab nations that all options had been exhausted. As Baker later explained: ‘If force ends up being used we owe it to the American people and to others to show that we left no stone unturned in the search for peace.’
Saddam followed this by releasing the remaining hostages, but he prevaricated over making a date for Baker's visit. Meanwhile, the leaders of Jordan, Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organisation met Saddam in Baghdad.
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- Australia and the New World OrderFrom Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: 1988–1991, pp. 410 - 432Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011