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10 - Subjective Conditional Control: Return of the Strongman in China’s Party–Army Relations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 January 2024
Summary
China’s four decades of economic development have invariably coincided with a profound transformation of the PLA; nowhere has that change been more apparent than in the period following the 18th Party Congress of the CCP. With Xi Jinping’s assumption of the trifecta of Party–state–military power coinciding with the structural growth in China’s comprehensive strength, the PLA’s status in Beijing’s domestic and international calculus has become more pronounced. Since arriving at the top, the incumbent has shown considerably greater interest than his immediate predecessor in harnessing the Party’s coercive forces as his own domestic powerbase as well as foreign policy instrument to complement hard Chinese economic power. To be sure, Xi’s meddling in PLA affairs reflects his aspiration to reshape the Party–army into a force commensurate with Beijing’s global stature in conformity with his ‘China Dream’ – that is, a strong country needs to possess an equally powerful military (Xinhua, 2017). Notwithstanding the increased time and resources devoted by Xi to managing his country’s military affairs – suggestive of the growing clout of the armed forces in the PRC – the PLA’s rising stature has nevertheless been accompanied by the conundrum of concurrent efforts by its commander-in-chief to destabilize it. These have come in the form of purges against PLA elites on graft charges and Xi’s push for the latest iteration of Chinese military modernization to streamline the PLA and its operations.
Not unlike previous eras of civilian paramountcy over the CCP’s armed servants under the regime’s revolutionary forebears, Xi’s emergence as China’s strongman leader would not have been possible without first gaining control of the Party’s gun. What accounts for the return to this manifestly politicized nature of authority more commonly associated with Mao Zedong – and to a lesser extent, Deng Xiaoping? Has Maoist absolute control of the Party’s army returned to the fore? And what is its significance for the trajectory of CCP–PLA interactions in the medium to long term?
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- Asian Military EvolutionsCivil-Military Relations in Asia, pp. 197 - 228Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2023