2 - Intentions in speaking and acting: the Standard Theory and its foes

Summary

Introduction

The anthropological critique of the use of intentions for explaining human action focuses on a small group of authors, who helped establish what could be considered the “Standard Theory” of interpretation in linguistics, the philosophy of language, and the cognitive sciences in the twentieth century. In this chapter, I review the Standard Theory, with special attention to Searle’s use of intentions in his model of linguistic as well as non-linguistic acts, Rosaldo’s criticism, and other authors’ earlier accounts and criticism of intentionality as a key feature of meaning. I also return to the question of the universality of the notion of intention by reviewing the history of the term and then engaging in a cross-linguistic analysis that will reveal hidden aspects of the semantic field covered in English by intention, intent, and intending.

The Standard Theory: Grice, Austin, and Searle

The three major authors associated with the standard theory are: H. P. Grice, for whom it is the reliance on intentions that makes linguistic meanings different from all other kinds of phenomena to which an interpretation can be given; John Austin, who included intentions in the felicity conditions for speech acts; and John Searle, who made intentions a central component of his speech act theory, his theory of mind, and, in combination with the notion of “we-intention” (see Chapter 10), his theory of society.