Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- SECTION I
- 1 Ambition Theory and Political Careers in Brazil
- 2 In the Absence of Congressional Careerism: Short Stints, Flat Hierarchies, and Low Payoffs in the Chamber of Deputies
- 3 Progressive Ambition and Congressional “Hot Seats” in Brazil, 1945–1998
- 4 Labyrinths of Power, Brazilian Style: Post-Chamber Political Careers
- SECTION II
- SECTION III
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Coding of Political Positions by Level of Government
- Appendix 2 List of Interviews
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
3 - Progressive Ambition and Congressional “Hot Seats” in Brazil, 1945–1998
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- SECTION I
- 1 Ambition Theory and Political Careers in Brazil
- 2 In the Absence of Congressional Careerism: Short Stints, Flat Hierarchies, and Low Payoffs in the Chamber of Deputies
- 3 Progressive Ambition and Congressional “Hot Seats” in Brazil, 1945–1998
- 4 Labyrinths of Power, Brazilian Style: Post-Chamber Political Careers
- SECTION II
- SECTION III
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Coding of Political Positions by Level of Government
- Appendix 2 List of Interviews
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
I have argued that Brazilian deputies do not aim to build a political career within the Chamber of Deputies. Instead, they are “progressively” ambitious and focus their energies while in the Chamber on ways to continue their careers outside of the Chamber. In this chapter I provide evidence of another manifestation of deputies' progressive ambition, what I call “Congressional Hot Seats.” I explore how deputies rotate out of the Chamber to take national-, state-, or municipal-level political positions immediately following their election as Deputy, during their terms. In recent legislatures, over one-third of all sitting deputies have either rotated out or have manifested a desire to find a position outside of the Chamber during the term, and we might suppose that the percentage of deputies who would like to rotate out is actually much higher – a notion that politicians support when interviewed. If deputies were generally interested in developing a career within the Chamber, this “Hot Seat” behavior would be extremely puzzling. However, given progressive ambition, it is perfectly understandable.
In the first two chapters I argued that when careers are short, few deputies have incentives to institutionalize a hierarchy of positions within the legislature and a system of norms that regulates access to those positions. In this situation, the relative value of a seat in the Chamber does not increase with time served. Consequently, few incentives exist for deputies to develop a career in the Chamber. However, this internal dynamic tells only half of the story.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil , pp. 48 - 57Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003