Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
While altruism has come to be treated with suspicion in some academic circles, either because it is taken to be basically contrary to human nature for some or because it is seen to be detrimental to human prospects as an ideal for others, the general perception of altruism seems not only to regard it as good, but as so obviously good that it is inconceivable that there could ever be too much of it. The significance of these academic and popular perceptions will be considered, in conclusion, by relating what we have seen about the nature of altruism to central issues at stake in it: the “truism” of altruism, the question of how far the assumption of the obvious goodness of altruism is justified; the “ism” of altruism, the question of the merits and liabilities of the prominent ways in which altruism has been assessed; and the “alter” of altruism, the question of the significance of otherness that is most characteristic of the focus of altruism.
THE TRUISM OF ALTRUISM
In spite of the high moral tone the term tends to evoke, “altruism” is not without its difficulties, as we have seen.
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