Although the Republic in France is traditionally represented by the image of Marianne, this symbol is far from illustrating the role played by women in public life. The fact is that in terms of women's representation in politics, France still shares with Greece the bottom place in the European Union. And this is one of the great paradoxes that foreign observers like to highlight in France.

Unlike the original 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and trade (GATT), the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)1 covers a much wider range of trade. It extends beyond goods and now embraces services, intellectual property, procurement, investment and agriculture. Moreover, the new trade regime is no longer a collection of ad hoc agreements, Panel reports and understandings of the parties. All trade obligations are subsumed under the umbrella of the WTO, of which all parties are members. Member States have to accept the obligations contained in all the WTO covered agreements: they cannot pick and choose.

The Award on Maritime Delimitation concerning the second stage of the Eritrea/Yemen case (hereinafter “Award” or “Second Award”) was delivered on 17 December 1999, pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement signed in October 1996 and following the Award on Territorial Sovereignty rendered on 9 October 1998 (hereinafter “First Award”). The two-stage settlement devised in Article 2 of the arbitral compromis bears a perceptive logic—territorial sovereignty issues precede maritime delimitation—the advantages of which makes it likely to be adopted in future similar dispute settlements. Importantly, in casu, the objective of re-establishing a peaceful relationship between the two peoples and contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in a sensitive region of the world seems to have been attained.1

Evidentiary rules employed in judicial proceedings are not strictly applied in international arbitration. Although this flexibility with regard to evidentiary matters is often considered a benefit of international arbitration, in certain situations it can lead to unpredictability and conflicts with national law. One such area is the application of evidentiary and testimonial privileges in international arbitration.1 There is very little authority addressing how international arbitrators should proceed when presented with a claim of privilege.

A plea of superior orders in response to charges founded upon violations of the international laws of armed conflict has since 1945 been treated as a plea in mitigation of sentence rather than as a defence, a position founded upon article 8 of the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. In 1998 the draft Statute of the proposed permanent International Criminal Court appeared, by article 33, to “restore” superior orders as a defence, a move deprecated by some as an apparent softening of the international legal approach to war crimes in an age in which such violations are all too prominently before the world's scrutiny. In fact both the formerly received “Nuremberg” doctrine and the appearance of a radical change, or reversion, in the 1998 Statute can be argued to be erroneous. It is the contention of this paper that far from advancing a new and stricter doctrine, the Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg correctly applied pre-existing doctrine in extreme and unusual circumstances but was mistakenly taken to have developed a new approach which was then applied with potentially distorting effect for the generality of circumstances. In this view the 1998 Statute has merely recognised the essential doctrine of superior orders as it existed prior to 1945 and which, properly understood, should not have been thought essentially to have been changed even in 1945.

On 27 June 2000, the updated Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the Guidelines) were adopted by the 29 Member States of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) together with the observer governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the Slovak Republic. The Ministerial Conference Chairman, Mr Peter Costello, described the 2000 Review as heralding the most “far reaching changes” to the Guidelines since their introduction in 1976.1 This note proposes to consider only the most noteworthy among them.2 Accordingly, it will not examine those elements that have merely been reaffirmed by the 2000 Review. However, the conclusions will be made that the Chairman's sentiments are only observable in the ongoing textual development of the Guidelines and that the all-important implementation mechanism has only been improved by half-measure

On 31 May 1999 two matters came before the Full Federal Court of Australia, constituted by Justices Whitlam, Wilcox and Merkel. The two cases heard together were different in nature and origin, but their common feature was a claim of genocide. The primary issue was whether the international crime of genocide forms part of the law of Australia. The majority view was that, before an international crime could be prosecuted in an Australian court, specific domestic legislation needed to be enacted. The dissenting opinion was that genocide had become an offence at common law and could be prosecuted. In this case note I will analyse the opinions both in the terms of their impact on the relationship between international law and domestic law in Australia, and in light of recent trends in Australia and other common law countries.

The Strait of Messina is a body of water in the Mediterranean Sea separating the island of Sicily to the west from mainland Italy to the east, linking the Lower Tyrrhenian Sea with the Ionian Sea. The strait is around 30 miles long and its width ranges from 13/4 miles (between Faro Point and the Rock of Scylla) to 10 miles (between Cape Alì and Cape Pellaro). At its northern end it reaches, at one point, a minimum depth of 70 metres.1

The Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) was established by Resolution F of the Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC). Under this resolution the PrepCom is intended to “take all possible measures to ensure the coming into operation of the International Criminal Court without undue delay”, and “to make the necessary arrangements for the commencement of [the Court's] functions”.1

The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991 and still continues. It has led to over 50,000 deaths. The fighting has been characterised by the use of child combatants and widespread mutilation of civilians by amputation. When the conflict began, it would have seemed improbable that any UN response would include a forum for the trial of international crimes. After all, even the high tide of international enforcement of international criminal law, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, had begun to be excised from mainstream treatments of international law.1 The possibility of a permanent international criminal court had recently been revived, and sent to the International Law Commission for consideration, but the record of the ILC with controversial projects would not have led to an expectation of quick progress.2 Yet, nearly 10 years on, the UN is now involved in setting up a fourth criminal court,3 the “Special Court” for Sierra Leone. Despite the selectivity inherent in ad hoc reactions, and the continuing opposition to the Rome Statute in some quarters, it is now difficult to deny that progress is being made towards a new form of international criminal order where the improbability of prosecution for international crimes can ne longer be presumed.

Readers of last October's I.C.L.Q. will recall that this case started life in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea when Australia and New Zealand were granted provisional measures against Japanese high seas tuna fishing in the Pacific.1 That Tribunal had held that the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (“1982 UNCLOS”) invoked by Australia and New Zealand appeared to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal might be founded; that the fact that the 1993 Convention on Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna applied between the parties did not preclude recourse to the compulsory dispute settlement procedures in Part XV of the 1982 UNCLOS; and that an arbitral tribunal would prima facie have jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute.2 Notwithstanding this necessarily provisional view, when the parties then proceeded to arbitration, Japan maintained its initial preliminary objections, and the award handed down in August 2000 thus deals only with the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.3 The facts and background to the case are set out in the earlier case-note and need not be repeated here.

A disturbing feature of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was the extent to which civilians were the target of military attacks by all three of the armed forces of the main ethnic communities. It was the military attacks by the armed forces of one of these ethnic communities—the Bosnian Croats (HZHB)—against Bosnian Muslim civilians and associated events in the Lasva Valley region of Central Bosnia from May 1992 to January 1994 that led to the indictment and eventual conviction of General Tihomir Blaskic.