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Evidentiary Privileges in International Arbitration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Richard M. Mosk  and
Tom Ginsburg
Tom Ginsburg
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. The authors would like to thank Claudia Acosta, Peter Maggs and Diane Valk-Schwab.
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Extract

Evidentiary rules employed in judicial proceedings are not strictly applied in international arbitration. Although this flexibility with regard to evidentiary matters is often considered a benefit of international arbitration, in certain situations it can lead to unpredictability and conflicts with national law. One such area is the application of evidentiary and testimonial privileges in international arbitration.1 There is very little authority addressing how international arbitrators should proceed when presented with a claim of privilege.

Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 50 , Issue 2 , April 2001 , pp. 345 - 385
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2001

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References

1. This article will treat testimonial and evidentiary privileges together under the rubric of privileges and sometimes refer to them together as “evidentiary privileges”. The article does not deal with “privileges” as used in some systems to refer to immunities from legal processes granted to diplomats, members of the royal family and members of parliament.

2. Dugan, C. F., “Foreign Privileges in U.S. Litigation” (1996) 5 J. Int'l L. & Prac. 33, 34.Google Scholar

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4. Reichenberg, K., “The Recognition of Foreign Privileges in United States Discovery Proceedings” (1988) 9 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 80Google Scholar, 109 n.161.

5. See e.g. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

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8. “Developments” supra n.6, at p.1456.

9. Peiris, G. L., “Privilege and Confidentiality in Commonwealth Law” (1985) 18 Comp. & Int'l L.J. of Southern Africa 320, 328.Google Scholar

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11. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 501 states that: Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.

12. See e.g. California Evidence Code §§952–1070.

13. Damaska, M., Evidence Law Adrift (1997), p.12.Google Scholar

14. See infra sec. II B.I.

15. For example in Germany. Martens, Dirk-Reiner, “Germany” in Platto, C. (ed.), Obtaining Evidence in Another Jurisdiction in Business Disputes (2nd edn 1993); Reichenberg, supra n.4, at p.88 n.37.Google Scholar

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17. Damaska, M., The Faces of Justice and State Authority (1986), p.209 n.55 (quoting Code of Civil Proc. of the Swiss Canton of Zurich §159).Google Scholar

18. Idem at p.210.

19. See e.g. Cross, R. and Tapper, C., Cross on Evidence (7th edn, 1990), p.201.Google Scholar

20. See e.g. UNCITRAL Model Law, Art.27 (“The arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal may request from a competent court of this State assistance in taking evidence. The court may execute the request within its competence and according to its rules on taking evidence.”); English Arbitration Act 1996 § 43(1)Google Scholar (a party “may use the same court procedures as are available in relation to legal proceedings to secure the attendance before the tribunal of a witness in order to give oral testimony or to produce documents or other material evidence”); Swiss Law on Private International Law, Art.184 (tribunal can request judicial assistance when necessary); German Civil Procedure Code §1036(1) (arbitrators must seek judicial assistance for discovery) and §1036(2) (court is competent to decide in event of a refusal to testify); cf. 9 U.S.C. §7 (1994) (arbitrators may subpoena persons and documents even from non-parties); Amgen Inc. v. Kidney Center of Delaware County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (arbitrators' discovery power extends to those outside jurisdiction of the court); In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing Russian and Swedish law).

21. Redfern, A. and Hunter, M., Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edn, 1999), pp.317–318.Google Scholar

22. Code Pénal, Arts. 226–13 and 226–14 (formerly Art. 378). The privilege has even been found to extend to telephone operators. Cass. 15 Mar. 1948, Pas 1948 p.169, cited in Hampson, F. J., “The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the Reluctant Witness” (1998) 47 I.C.L.Q. 50, 60 n.35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23. See e.g. German Code of Civil Procedure §383; Belgian Code Judiciaire Art.929; Netherlands Code of Crim. Proc. Art.191 para.4; Civil Procedure Code of Brazil, Art.406; Japanese Code of Civil Procedure Arts.280–281; German Penal Code Art.300; Italian Penal Code Art.622; Decree 32,171 (29 July 1942) Art.7 (Portugal); Swiss Penal Code Art.321; Dessemonte, F. and Ansay, T. (eds.), Introduction to Swiss Law (1995), p.274Google Scholar; Boateng, J. Ofori, “Privileges under the Evidence Decree: Non-professional and Professional Communications” (1982) 16 U. Ghana L.J. 25Google Scholar. See also Eijsvoogel, P. (ed.), Evidence Before International Arbitral Tribunals (1994), pp.85, 271 (Belgium, Tunisia)Google Scholar. Among common law countries, the Canadian Law Reform Commission recommended such a general privilege. Report on Evidence by the Law Reform Commission of Canada § 41 (1975).Google Scholar

24. Platto, C. (ed.), Obtaining Evidence in Another Jurisdiction in Business Disputes (1st edn 1988), p.113.Google Scholar

25. D. Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals (1975) at p.377 (citing the drafting committee's report as saying “in its own courts every government must claim to exercise occasionally the right to refuse to produce a document on the ground of public interest and of that interest it claims to be the sole judge”).

26. Hazard, G. et al. , “Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure: Rules and Commentary” (1997) 30 Cornell Int'l L.J. 493.Google Scholar

27. Idem. Rule 20 enumerates the attorney-client, work-product, husband-wife, priest-penitent, and doctor-patient privileges. The doctor-patient privilege explicitly incorporates a psychotherapist-patient privilege.

28. Radin, M., “The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client” (1928) 16 Cal. L. Rev. 487, 488.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29. “Developments” supra n.6, at p.1501; 8 Wigmore on Evidence, §2290–91.

30. See e.g. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. [1978\ 1 All E.R. 434 (United Kingdom)Google Scholar; Codice Penale, Art.622 (Italy) (cited in Mastromarco, D. R., “Disparity in the Application of Legal Principles as a Form of Trade Restraint: Attorney-Client Privilege in the European Community” (1990) 13 Hastings Int'l Comp. L. Rev. 479, 490 n.50)Google Scholar; Evidence Act of Nigeria (1945) §169, 172; Field, D. and Raitt, F., The Law of Evidence in Scotland (1996) pp.262–265Google Scholar; Fennell, C., The Law of Evidence in Ireland (1992), pp.166–179Google Scholar; Lai, Ho Hock, “History and Judicial Theories of Legal Professional Privilege” (1995) Sing. J. Legal Stud. 558 (Singapore)Google Scholar; Paizes, A., “Towards a Broader Balancing of Interests: Exploring the Theoretical Foundations of the Legal Professional Privilege” (1989) 106 S. Afr. L.J. 109 (South Africa).Google Scholar

31. ICTY Rules of Evidence, Rule 97 (“All communications between lawyer and client shall be regarded as privileged, and consequently not subject to disclosure at trial, unless: (i) the client consents to disclosure; or (ii) the client has voluntarily disclosed the content of the communication to a third party, and that third party then gives evidence of that disclosure”). Decision on Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness Statements, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, Case No. IT-94–1-T, Trial Chamber II, 27 Nov. 1996, reprinted in McDonald, G. K. and Swaak-Goldman, O. (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts (2000), Vol. II, p.966Google Scholar. See also Rule 14 of proposed rules of evidence for the International Criminal Court as quoted in Rasmussen, M., “Rules of Evidence for the International Criminal Court” (1995) 64 Nordic J. Int'l L. 275, 281Google Scholar; Wedgwood, R., “International Criminal Tribunals and State Sources of Proof: The Case of Tihomir Blaškic” (1998) 11 Leiden J. Int'l L. 635, 635–36 (describing difficulty of constructing a system of evidence before international criminal tribunals).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32. American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1(6) and Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4 (professional rules proscribing the conduct); Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 4.21 (describing disbarment as an appropriate sanction for knowingly improper disclosure which causes injury or potential injury).

33. Cross and Tapper, supra n.19, at p.440.

34. For example, when filing the action is seen to constitute a waiver. Byers v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436 (D.D.C. 1983). See also Witkin, B., California Evidence (3d edn, 1986), p.1107.Google Scholar

35. Cross and Tapper, supra n.19, at pp.441–442; United States v. United Shoe Machine Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950).

36. Swidler and Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).

37. In the United States, courts have come to different conclusions as to whether inadvertent disclosure constitutes a waiver. Compare In re Sealed Case, 877 F. 2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (privilege waived by inadvertent disclosure) with Aramony v. United Way of America, 969 F. Supp. 226, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (privilege not waived).

38. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575 (Case 155/79). See generally A. M. Hill, “A Problem of Privilege: In-house Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States and the European Community” (1995) 27 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 145.

39. This decision provoked controversy insofar as it excluded in-house counsel and non-European Union lawyers. See P. H. Burkard, “Attorney-Client Privilege in the EEC: the Perspective of Multinational Corporate Counsel” (1986) 20 Int'l Lawyer 677, 684. D. R. Mastromarco, supra n.30; see also John Deere v. EEC Commission, 28 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 35) 58, 59 (1985)Google Scholar (relying on in-house counsel's advice to support finding of antitrust violation).

40. In most jurisdictions in the United States, legal advice by in-house counsel is included by the privilege, but any communications involving only business responsibilities are not included. See A. Stevens, “An Analysis of the Troubling Issues Surrounding In-house Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege” (1998) 23 Hamline L. Rev. 289; Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); J. Rogers, “Corporate Counsel—Attorney-Client Privilege” 16 ABA/BNA Manual on Professional Conduct 335 (5 July, 2000).

41. Shuman, D. W., “The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret” (1985) 39 Sw. L.J. 661, 679–80.Google ScholarPubMed

42. See supra n.22.

43. New Zealand Evidence Act 1908 §81; Israel Evidence Ordinance, §49; Victoria Evidence Act (Australia) 1958 §28; , Bernfeld, “Medical Secrecy” (1972) 3 Cambrian L. Rev. 11, 14, cited in Shuman, supra n.41, at n.85.Google Scholar

44. As of 1999, all states but South Carolina and West Virginia had some form of the privilege. A federal case declining to recognise the privilege is Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc. 5 F. 3d 785 (5th Cir. 1993), See also American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association, American Medical Association, Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution, Draft Final Report, 27 July 1998, 598 PLI/Lit 551 (WESTLAW) (stating arbitrators should carefully consider claims of privilege and confidentiality in addressing evidentiary issues).

45. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1797 (Case 155/78).

46. Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355 (1776).

47. Cross and Tapper, supra n.19; see also Law Reform Committee (London) Privilege in Civil Proceedings 20–22 (1967). The very limited British privilege does not extend to arbitral practice. International Chamber of Commerce, The Taking of Evidence in International Arbitral Practice (1989), pp.63–64Google Scholar. The limited privilege was presumably enough for the European Court in the Miss M case to find that privilege formed a principle common to all Member States.

48. See e.g. People v. Aercega, 32 Cal. 3d 504, 523, 651 P. 2d 338 (1982) (criminal proceedings); Conn. Gen. Stat. §52–146f (1983); Tex. R. Evid. 510(d)(5).

49. See ALI Res't Evidence R. 211; Uniform Rules r. 27.

50. See Silver, S. A., “Beyond Jaffee v. Redmond: Should the Federal Courts Recognize a Right to Physician-Patient Confidentiality?” (1998) Ohio State Law Journal 1809, 1855 nn. 216–218Google ScholarPubMed; 10 A.L.R. 4th 552.

51. Shuman, supra n.41, at pp.683–684.

52. See also Article 10 of Additional Protocol II, applicable in non-international conflicts.

53. For a discussion, see Ragsdale, T. D., “The Constitutional Right to Privacy and the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege as Limitations on the National Transportation Safety Board's Right to Investigate Air Traffic Accidents” (1991) 57 J. Air L. and Com. 469, 480–496.Google Scholar

54. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) at n.11.

55. See e.g. In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); United States v. Colletta, 602 F.Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D.Pa.) (“[t here is no general federal common-law physician-patient privilege”), aff'd mem., 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir.1985).

56. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996). The “reason and experience” language of Rule 501 comes from Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934) “which in turn referred to the oft-repeated observation that ‘the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.’” Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927 (quoting Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933)).

57. See e.g. Cal Evid. Code §1016–1027 (1995). See B. J. Wadsworth, “Case Note: Jaffee v. Richmond” (1997) 32 Land & Water L. Rev. 873, 880–881; Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P. 2d 334 (Cal. 1976); but see Boynton v. Burglass 590 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1991).

58. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996,) at n.19.

59. See Further Order on Motion for Access to Non-public Materials in the Lasva Valley, 16 Feb. 1999.

60. Khuluse, D. R., “Journalistic Privilege” (1993) 9 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 279.Google Scholar

61. See e.g. California Evidence Code §970 (immunity for refusing to disclose “any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, reviewing or processing information for communication to the public”).

62. H.M.A. v. Airs, ]1975] S.L.T. 177.Google Scholar

63. Re Kevin O'Kelly (1974) 108 I.L.T.R. 97.Google Scholar

64. Attorney-General v. Mulholland [1963] 2 Q.B. 477.Google Scholar

65. Contempt of Court Act 1981 Sec. 10 (England) (“No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime”).

66. Attorney-General v. Clough [1963] 1 Q.B. 773; Attorney-General v. Mulholland, [1963] 2 Q.B. 477.

67. Reporters Privilege, 580 Practicing Law Institute/Pat 27, 37 (1999) (31 states and District of Columbia have shield laws allowing journalists to protect their sources).

68. Baker v. F and F Inv. 470 F. 2d 778 (2nd Cir. 1972).

69. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (no constitutional right to refuse to disclose confidential information in a criminal grand jury proceeding).

70. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).

71. Reporters Privilege, supra n.67.

72. Goodwin v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123.Google Scholar

73. Wright, C. A. and Graham, K. W. Jr, Federal Practice and Procedures, § 5427 (state statutes and cases).Google Scholar

74. See e.g. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (rejecting privilege claim).

75. Internal Revenue Code §7525.

76. Martin and Co. v. Martin [1953] 2 Q.B. 286.Google Scholar

77. See e.g. Sec. 104, Patent Act of 1977 (U.K.)

78. Cal. Evidence Code §1035.8.

79. Hampson, supra n.22. The ICTY has found that the International Committee of the Red Cross has a right, under the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, to non-disclosure of certain information related to its work. “Decision Denying Request for Assistance in Securing Documents and Witnesses from the International Committee of the Red Cross”, Trial Chamber III, 7 June 2000.

80. Kryschuk, R. and , Zulprik, (1958) 14 D.L.R. 676 (2d.) (P.M. Ct. of Sask.).Google Scholar

81. G. v. G. (1964) 1OR 361 (AC of Ont.).

82. People v. Carter, 34 Cal. App 3d 748, 751, 110 Cal. Rpts 324 (1973).

83. University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 493 U.S. 182 (1990); see also Stevens, C. J., “Note: Preventing Unnecessary Intrusions on University Autonomy: A Proposed Academic Freedom Privilege” (1990) 69 Cal. L. Rev. 1538.Google Scholar

84. Holdsworth, supra n.7, at p.333.

85. 8 Wigmore, supra n.29, §2251.

86. Bassiouni, M. Cherif, “Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions” (1993) 3 Duke J.Comp. & Int'l L. 235, 265 n.138Google Scholar (listing 48 countries that have constitutionally codified right against self-incrimination). This right is also recognised in Germany, the Netherlands, France, England, Israel, and Norway. See also Walker, J. K., “A Comparative Discussion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination” (1993) 14 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1Google Scholar; Stessens, G., “The Obligation to Produce Documents Versus the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Human Rights Protection Extended Too Far?” (1997) 22 Eur. L. Rev. 45Google Scholar; Zupancic, B. J., “The Crown and the Criminal: the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Towards General Principles of Criminal Procedure” (1997) 9 Rev. Euro. Dr. Pub. 11.Google Scholar

87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 Dec. 1966, art. 14(3)(g), S. Treaty Doc. No. 95–2, at 28, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees…not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt”).

88. Article 67(1)(g) of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC).

89. “No person…shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself…” U.S. Const, Amend. v. The privilege against self-incrimination is the subject of much scholarly commentary. See e.g. Griswold, E., The Fifih Amendment Today (1955)Google Scholar. For a useful article on the application of the privilege with regard to foreign privileges, see Amann, D. M., “A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in an International Context” (1998) 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1201.Google Scholar

90. See Ingraham, B. L., The Structure of Criminal Procedure: Laws and Practice of France, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States (1987), pp.62, 79Google Scholar; see generally Pieck, M., “The Accused's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Civil Law” (1962) 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 585.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

91. See e.g. New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v. Master & Sons Ltd., [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 191, 196Google Scholar (stating that “[t]here seems no policy reason why a corporation should not avail itself of the rule” granting right against self-incrimination); Triplex Safety Glass Co. Ltd. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass Ltd., [1939] 2 K.B. 395, 409Google Scholar (Ct. App.) (asserting that court could “see no ground for depriving a juristic person of those safeguards which the law of England accords even the least deserving of natural person”).

92. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69–70 (1906) (denying corporations the right to privilege against self-incrimination); see Caltex, 118 A.L.R. at 405 (“[T]he modern and international treatment of the privilege as a human right which protects personal freedom, privacy and human dignity is a less than convincing argument for holding that corporations should enjoy the privilege”). See discussion in Yoshida, D., “The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Communication with Foreign Legal Professionals” (1997) 66 Fordham L. Rev. 209.Google Scholar

93. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) and subsequent cases discussed in “Note: Testimonial Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination” (1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 1752.Google Scholar

94. See e.g. Ansay, T. and Wallace, D. Jr (eds.), Introduction to Turkish Law (3d edn, 1987), p.233.Google Scholar

95. See e.g. California Evidence Code §970; Weinstein, J., Evidence Manual 18–47 (1999)Google Scholar; Witkin, B., California Evidence, 1116–18 (1986).Google Scholar

96. Strong, J. W. et al. , McCormick on Evidence (4th edn, 1992) §98, at p.112.Google Scholar

97. See e.g. Introduction to Swiss Law, supra n.23, at p.274 (Switzerland); Introduction to Dutch Law for Foreign Lawyers (2d ed. 1993) 209 quoting Art.191 para.1, Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvording (Netherlands); see also Wetboek Strafvoerding Art.217. In Italy, family were treated as incompetent witnesses, a position subsequently reversed by the Constitutional Court. Certuma, C., The Italian Legal System (1985), p.205Google Scholar. Family testimony cannot be compelled however, so it remains a waivable privilege in Italian law. Idem.

98. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).

99. 8 Wigmore on Evidence §2227.

100. 2 B. Witkin, California Evidence §1113–1120.

101. See e.g. In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply Dutch parent-child privilege in the United States); Harris, D. J. and O'Boyle, M., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (1995)Google Scholar (family testimony privilege not a violation of accused's right to call and hear witness on his behalf).

102. See “Family Matters: Congress to Consider a Parent-Child Legal Privilege” (Jan. 1999) Cal. Lawyer 21.

103. The foundational cases in family privacy are Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see Meyer, D., “The Paradox of Family Privacy” (2000) 53 Vand. L. Rev. 527, 533.Google Scholar

104. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (1997).

105. Shuman, supra n.41, at p.668; Code of Canon Law of the Catholic Church 1983 c. 983 §§1–2 (“The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore it is a crime for a confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any other manner or for any reason”).

106. Shuman, supra n.41, at p.680.

107. Mazza, M. J., “Should Clergy Hold the Priest-Penitent Privilege?” (1998) 82 Marq. L. Rev. 171, 173 n.27.Google Scholar

108. See Bodington, supra n.22, at p.100; Quebec C. Civ. Proc. Act, SQ 1965 Vol. 2 §308.

109. Cook v. Carroll [1945] IR 515; see Fennell supra n.30, at pp.183–86.

110. Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F. 3d 1522, 1532 (9th. Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F. 2d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 1990).

111. See e.g. Wis. Stat §905.06(1)(a).

112. In re Murtha, 279 A. 2d 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971); but see Eckmann v. Board of Education, 106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (Federal court coming to opposite conclusion).

113. Mazza, supra n.53, at p.185.

114. See discussion in Mazza, supra n.53, at pp.187–192. United States statutes also vary on who holds the privilege: the penitent alone, or both the penitent and the member of the clergy.

115. Zivilprozessordnung §384(3).

116. Durst, T. S. and Mann, C. L., “Behind Closed Doors: Closing the Courtroom in Trade Secrets Cases” (2000)Google Scholar 8 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 355. See WIPO Arbitration Rules Art.52 and ICC Arbitration Rules Art.20(7) (allowing panels to issue protective orders to protect confidential information).

117. Reichenberg, supra n.4, at p.93.

118. Baldwin, C. S., “Protecting Confidential and Proprietary Information in International Arbitration” (1996) 31 Tex. Int'l L.J. 451, 462–465.Google Scholar

119. Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital, 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).

120. See D. Motzenbecker, “Two Courts Refuse to Protect Self-Critical Analysis: Can the Privilege Find Solid Ground?” (March 2000) Litigation News, at 3; Clark, M., “The Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis” (1999) 42 Res Gest. 287, J. Kesan and B. Mishra, “Do We Need the Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege?” (unpublished draft on file with authors).Google Scholar

121. See e.g. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 408 (evidence of offers of compromise not admissible to prove liability, invalidity of claim, or damages). See discussion in R. Clifford Potter, “Settlement of Claims and Litigation: Legal Rules, Negotiation Strategies, and In-house Guidelines” (Feb. 1986) 41 Business Lawyer 515.

122. California Evidence Code §1119; Folb v. Motion Picture Industry Pension and Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

123. Cross and Tapper, supra n.19, at p.452.

124. See e.g. U.K. Official Secrets Act 1989; Canada Evidence Act §36.1; Nigeria Evidence Act 1945 §166 (preventing disclosure of any unpublished official records except with permission of department head).

125. See e.g. Totten v. U.S., 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. [1942] A.C. 624; Ellis v. Home Office [1953] 2 Q.B. 135; see also 8 Wigmore on Evidence, pp.792–807, §2378.

126. Fed. R. Ev. 501.

127. See e.g. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1945); Totten v. U.S., supra n.125; Clift v. U.S., 808 F. Supp. 101 (D.Conn., 1991) (state secrets privilege bars discovery of government information on encoding devices in a civil action; when government makes showing of reasonable danger to security, no need to inspect documents, even in camera).

128. Weinstein, supra note at 18–56.

129. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–8.

130. See e.g. California Evidence Code 915 (h).

131. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.

132. See e.g. Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

133. See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C.app §6. See also Martella, D., “Defending the Land of the Free and the Home of the Fearful: the Classified Information Procedures Act” (1992) 7 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 851Google Scholar; J. Jarvis, “Protecting the Nation's National Security: the Classified Information Procedures Act” (1995) 20 Thurgood Marshall L. Rev 319.

134. See U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see also M. J. Rosell, Executive Privilege: The Dilemma of Secrecy and Accountability (1994).

135. Capital Info. Group v. Alaska, 923 P.2d 29, 33–34 (Alaska 1996); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 3d 1325, 283 Cal. Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240, 248–251 (Cal. 1991); City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1041 (Col. 1998); Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914, 924 (Md. 1980); Ostoin v. Waterford Township Police Dep't, 189 Mich. App. 334, 471 N. W.2d 666, 668 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 386 A.2d 846, 853 (N.J. 1978); State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330, and Accountability333–334 (N.M. 1981); Dorchester Master Ltd. Partnership v. Cabot Pipeline Corp., 137 Misc.2d 442, 521 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210–211 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1987); Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, 153 Vt. 628, 572 A.2d 1368, 1373–1374 (Vt. 1990). But see Rubin v. City of Los Angeles, 190 Cal App. 3d 560, 235 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1987) (trial court could not create nonstatutory, local state secrets privilege that functioned as special defence barring organisation's suit, and organisation's motion to compel responses to its interrogatories was improperly denied based on that privilege).

136. See Burmah Oil Co. v. Bank of England [1979] 1 W.L.R. 772.

137. Code Civ. Proc. Art.271; see Ansay and Wallace, supra n.94, at p.233.

138. Act No. 801 (24 Oct. 1977); Arts. 202–204 Code. Crim. Proc.

139. Coliver, S.et al. (eds.), Secrecy and Liberty: National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (1999).Google Scholar

140. See 552 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1) (matters “specifically authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy” exempt from disclosure).

141. See e.g. U.K Official Secrets Act 1989 §1 (national security exception); Act of 17 July 1978 (France) (right to information subject to enumerated exceptions including national security); New Zealand Official Information Act 1982 (including national security exception).

142. European Convention on Human Rights Art.10(2) (right to information may be restricted in the interests of national security) as applied in Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1987 (national security exception applied when plaintiff sought access to Swedish government information denying him a security clearance).

143. See e.g. European Convention of Obtaining Abroad of Information and Evidence in Administrative Matters, Art.7(b) noting that a State can refuse to comply with a request for information if “compliance with the request might interfere with sovereignty, security, public policy, or other essential interests”. Article 72 of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC) is specifically addressed to the protection of national security information.

144. Swaak-Goldman, O. Q., “Who Defines Members' Security Interest in the WTO?” (1996) 9 Leiden J. Int'l L. 361, 364 (exception has proven “relatively uncontroversial”)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schloemann, H. L. and Ohlhoff, S.,“‘Constitutionalization’ and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence” (1999) 93 A.J.I.L. 424, 426 (1999).Google Scholar

145. Sandifer, supra n.22, at p.380.

146. Idem.

147. (1949) ICJ Reports, 32.

148. See Mawdsley, A. A., “Evidence Before the International Court of Justice”, in MacDonald, R. St. John (ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (1994), pp.533Google Scholar, 540. But see Sandifer, supra n.22, at p.379 (arguing that the refusal was based not on the confidential character of the documents, but on their inaccessibility to certain parties in the proceedings).

149. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision on the Objections of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum, Case No. IT-95–14-PT, Tr. Ch. II, 18 July 1997, reversed in part and affirmed in part, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of the Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case. No. IT-95–14-AR108 bis, A. Ch., 2 Oct. 1997, available at www.un.org/icty (hereafter Blaskic).

150. Idem.

151. Para. 69 Blaskic trial decision.

152. Tribunal Rules Art.54 bis.

153. Para. 68 of Blaskic Appeals Decision.

154. See Amerasinghe, C. F., “Problems of Evidence Before International Administrative Tribunals”, in R. Lillich (ed.), Fact-Finding Before International Tribunals (1992), pp.205, 219.Google Scholar

155. See discussion in Rubino-Sammartano, supra n.207, at p.368.

156. See e.g. H. Smit, “The Role of the Arbitral Tribunal in Civil and Common Law Systems with Respect to the Presentation of Evidence”, in A. J.van den Berg (ed.), Planning Efficient Arbitration Proceedings, ICCA Congress Series No. 7, (1996), p.168.

157. P. Eijsvoogel, supra n.23, at p.5.

158. Idem.

159. See n.23 supra.

160. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

161. See e.g. Republic Gear v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F. 2d 551, 555–556 (2d Cir. 1967).

162. Fed. R. Evid. 501. See text in n.11 supra.

163. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Criminal Matters (18 Mar. 1970), Art.11. Article 12 of the Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad has a similar provision.

164. The Convention applies in instances when the evidence or witness is present in the State of execution. See B. Ristau, II International Judicial Assistance (Civil and Commercial) (1984), pp.216–220; Westinghouse, discussed in Ristau, pp.5–39; see also Dugan, supra n.2, at p.43 (arguing that this evinces a practice for courts to be bound by privilege rules of State of execution that should be recognised by U.S. courts).

165. See e.g. U.K. Evidence Act 1975 §3 (protecting a witness from having to give any evidence which would be privileged in ordinary civil proceedings in the requesting country, subject to certain procedural limitations); and New Zealand Evidence Act 1908 §48D(1) (Witnesses “shall have the same right to refuse to answer any question, whether on the ground that his answer might tend to incriminate him, or on the ground of privilege …”).

166. Platto, supra n.24, at p.94.

167. Dudley, E. C. Jr, “Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law” (1994) 82 Geo. L.J. 1781.Google Scholar

168. Klaxon Con. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); see e.g. Hyde Construction Co. v. Koehring, 455 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1972).

169. See e.g. Hercules Inc. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 143 F.R.D. 266, 268–69 (D. Utah 1992).

170. Res't (2d) Conflicts of Laws Sec. 139 (1971) (“(1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the communication will be admitted even though it would be privileged under the local law of the forum, unless the admission of such evidence would be contrary to the strong public policy of the forum. (2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the communication but which is not privileged under the local law of the forum will be admitted unless there is some special reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be given effect”). Note that the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law takes a different approach with regard to assertions of foreign privilege by providing that statements privileged where made will not be subject to discovery. Res't (3d) For. Rel'ns Law §442 comment d. Comment c suggests that the court ought to “look to the way that confidentiality or disclosure fits into the regulation by the foreign state of the activity in question, and to reflections of the foreign state's concern for confidentiality in laws existing prior to the start of the controversy …” This balancing approach looks to an assessment of the interests at issue rather than a choice-of-law analysis to determine if a privilege should be applied.

171. See Shaklee Corp. v. Gunnell, 110 F.R.D. 190, 192 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955); but see In re Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); see also In Re Codey, 82 N.Y. 2d 521, 530 (1993) (applying privilege law of the trial court jurisdiction). In cases where both laws would reach the same conclusion, the court may not specify which law is applied. In re American General Life and Accident Ins. Co., 26 Med. L. Rprt. 1606 (Sup. Ct. Bronx 1996).

172. Dudley, supra n.167.

173. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 286 (D.D.C. 1952)Google Scholar; Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc. 101 F.R.D. 503, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1987); see generally K. Reichenberg, supra n.4, at p.80 n.211.

174. See 28 U.S.C. §1782 (1988), Article 12, which allows a court to compel testimony for use in foreign proceedings, and states that “[a] person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement … in violation of any legally applicable privilege.” Although this was intended to include deference to foreign privileges when they legally apply, see In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (1993), this does not constitute a blanket incorporation of foreign privileges into United States law. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe # 700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir. 1987). Note also that the Hague Convention does not include international arbitration in the scope of “foreign proceedings”. NBC v. Bear Stearns, 165 F. 3d 184 (1999).

175. In re Asia Medica, S.A. 981 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992). But see In re application of Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 58 (2d. Cir. 1993) (discovery possible under 28 U.S.C. §1782 even when information would not be discoverable in the jurisdiction of the party seeking production); In Re Application of Metallgesellschaft AG, 121 F.3d 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same).

176. ALI Res't Law Governing Lawyers, Sec. 122 comment e.

177. See e.g. Foseco Int'l Ltd. v. Fireline, Inc. 546 F. Supp 22, 25 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (recognising that communications between patent agents and foreign corporations may be treated as privileged if privilege is recognised in the country in which patent application is filed). In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 391 (D.D.C. 1978) (recognising that U.S. has no strong policy interest in patent agent communications relates to patent activity in the U.K. and therefore will defer to U.K. rule in U.S. litigation). Golden Trade S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., et al. 143 F.R.D. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (claims of attorney-client privilege attached to communications between a company and its patent agents outside the U.S. determined under law of the place of the corporation because of comity). Stryker Bayer AG and Miles, Inc. v. Bayer Laboratories, Inc. 33 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1655, 1994 WL 705331 S.D.N.Y. (communications between a company and its patent agents outside the U.S. privileged).

178. Duttle v. Bandler and Kass, 127 F.R.D. 46, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See discussion in Dugan, supra n.2, at p.49 (arguing that the court may have been reluctant to apply the privilege because it was raised by plaintiff as opposed to defendant). See also Ghana Supply Com'n v. New England Power Co., 83 F.R.D. 586, 589 (D. Mass 1979) (refusing to allow a plaintiff to claim foreign privilege in U.S. courts when it chose the forum).

179. Odone v. Croda International PLC, 950 F. Supp. 10 (1997). See also In re Honda America Motor Co., 168 F.R.D. 535, 539 (1996); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc. 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1169 (1975) (finding Article 378 of the French Penal Code and §15(1) of the British Civil Evidence Act extend attorney-client privilege to those who are not a member of a bar).

180. In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (1993).

181. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Art.5, 12 June 1981 U.S-Neth., T.I.A.S. No. 10, 734.

182. Some countries have passed blocking statutes that prohibit compliance with discovery orders for the production of evidence located within the blocking State's territory. Such statutes can include penal sanctions for violations. See Born, G., International Civil Litigation in United States Courts 371–373 (2d ed. 1992).Google Scholar

183. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).

184. U.S. v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).

185. United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F. 2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983) (no production ordered in response to IRS summons when Greek law imposed criminal sanctions for disclosure of bank documents).

186. United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998). See Amann, supra n.89, at p.1201; Leahy, S. A., “United States v. Balsys: Foreign Prosecution and the Applicability of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-incrimination” (1999) 48 DePaul L. Rev. 987.Google Scholar

187. See Renfield Corp. v. Remy Martin S.A., 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982) (applying choice-of-law analysis to determine United States law had most significant relationship with the case, leading to decision not to order discovery of privileged documents).

188. Reichenberg, supra n.4, at 132.

189. Civil Evidence Act [1968] §14(1).

190. Re: Westinghouse Electric Corp. [1977] 3 All E.R. 703 (Denning, J.).

191. [1997] A.C. 238 (PC).

192. Idem at 251B–D.

193. Credit Suisse Fides Trust SA v. Cuoghi, [1997] All E.R. 724.

194. Bank Valletta PLC v. National Crime Authority, [1999] 164 A.L.R. 45.Google Scholar

195. Spencer v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278Google Scholar

196. Arab Banking Corp. v. Wightman 70 A.C.W.S. 3d 50 [Quebec Ct. App. 1997].

197. Unilever PLC v. Procter and Gamble, 38 F.T.R. 319 (Fed. Trial Div. 1990).Google Scholar

198. Bourns v. Raychem Corp., [1999] All E.R. 154.

199. For example, Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and the Arbitration Rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) do not mention privileges.

200. International Arbitration Rules of Zurich Chamber of Commerce (1989), Article 38 (granting testimonial privilege to party's spouse and other relatives, and providing that a witness can “refuse to testify against himself and refuse testimony which would infringe official or professional secrecy protected by criminal law, unless the witness has been freed of its secrecy obligation”).

201. 1996 Rules, Art.22(6).

202. Rule 12.2.

203. Art.20.6, reprinted in (1997) Y.B. Comm. Arb. 303, 313. The CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes likewise do not require the tribunal to apply rules of evidence used in judicial proceedings, but require the tribunal to “apply the lawyer-client privilege and the work-product immunity.” Rule 11.2.

204. But see the CPR Rules, Rule 11.2, idem.

205. Cremades, B. M., “Powers of the Arbitrators to Decide on the Admissibility of Evidence and to Organize the Production of Evidence” (1999) 10 ICC Int'l Ct. of Arb. Bull. 49, 50.Google Scholar

206. IBA Rules Art.9(2) paras a and f.

207. Ibid. para b. Previously IBA Rules of Evidence had no such provisions and in fact allowed the drawing of an inference if a party failed to comply with an order to produce documents. See Rubino-Sammartano, M., International Arbitration Law (1990), p.382Google Scholar. The Mediterranean and Middle East Institute of Arbitration's Standard Rules of Evidence, Art.5(8) allows the arbitrator to draw such inferences when there is an “unjustified refusal” to produce documents or testify. Idem at 383.

208. See supra n.116.

209. Rodman, R., Commercial Arbitration with Forms 405 (1984).Google Scholar

210. Born, G. B., International Commercial Arbitration in the United States (1994), p.840.Google Scholar

211. See Bernstein, R. (ed.), Handbook of Arbitration Practice (1987), pp.162–163Google Scholar; see also Moore v. Conliffe, 7 Cal. 4th 634, 637–638 (1994) (AAA arbitration functionally equivalent to judicial proceedings to which the litigation privilege applies); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognition of accountants' privilege by arbitral tribunal not grounds for vacating award); Minerals and Chemicals Philipp Corp. v. Panamerican Commodities, S.A., 224 N.Y.S. 2d 763 (Sup. Ct. 1962)Google Scholar (arbitrators' subpoena not enforceable as to privileged material); but see DiMaina v. N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 386 N.Y.S. 2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1976)Google Scholar (arbitrators' subpoena enforceable under theory that privileges had been waived).

212. Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11024 (S.D.N.Y. 23 Aug. 1990) (arbitrators properly applied privilege); see also 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(3). However, in Chiarella v. Viscount Industrial Co., 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16903 (S.D.N.Y.24 Nov. 1993), the court held that arbitrators did not exceed their authority by ordering production of some, but not all, evidence asserted to be privileged. Commentators have noted that the arbitral panel in this case did not actually view any documents asserted to be privileged. J. Carter, “The Attorney-Client Privilege in Arbitration” (Winter1996/97) ADR Currents 1, 17.

213. Painewebber Group v. Zinsmeyer Trusts 187 F. 3d 988 (1987) (1999); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1487, 1511.

214. Marc Blessing (1993) “Mandatory Rules of Law versus Party Autonomy in International Arbitration” 14:4Journal of International Arbitration 25.Google Scholar

215. Redfern, A. and Hunter, M., Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (3d. ed. 1999) p.94Google Scholar. Sometimes procedural rules might give the panel discretion in the choice-of-law issue. See e.g. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Rules, Art.33 (providing broad discretion to the Tribunal in determining what law is applied).

216. Smit, supra n.156.

217. See Res't (2d) Conflict of Laws 138 cmt. c (1971) (“a rule phrased in terms of evidence may in fact be a rule of substantive law”).

218. See e.g. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Art.5 (Iran-United States Claims Tribunal allowed to decide cases on basis of principles of international law).

219. See e.g. Berger, K. P., The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (1999).Google Scholar

220. Art.38(1c). See generally Degan, V. D., Sources of International Law (1997), pp.14–141.Google Scholar

221. Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. and The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1952) 1 I.C.L.Q. 247CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see discussion in Redfern and Hunter, supra n.21, at pp.112–123; see also Veeder, V. V., “The Lena Goldfields Arbitration” (1998) 47 I.C.L.Q. 747CrossRefGoogle Scholar (arbitration key for developing the general principle of unjust enrichment).

222. Degan, supra n.220, at pp.118–124; Redfern and Hunter, supra n.21, at p.122.

223. See e.g. Hercsegh, G., General Principles of Law and the International Legal Order (1969), pp.97–100 (arguing that general principles should not be a source of international law).Google Scholar

224. Degan, supra n.220; see also Cheng, B., General Principles of Law (1953).Google Scholar

225. Degan, supra n.220, at p.42 (provisions were “well-known principles from the law of procedure common to the majority of advanced legal systems of States”).

226. See also Article 69(5) of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC) requiring the Court to respect and observe privileges on confidentiality, as provided in the rules.

227. Degan, supra n.220 at p.73. (“As precepts of a very broad character they can obtain in different times and in various types of legal relationship a content which is not always quite identical”).

228. Idem at pp.76–77 (discussing fraud).

229. Oil Field of Texas, Inc. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Interlocutory Award No. ITL 10–43-FT (9 Dec. 1982), reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 347. The Tribunal frequently relies on general principles of law or the lex mercatoria and has contributed to their development in international law. George Aldrich, Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1996), p.157, and Brower, Charles N. and Breuschke, Jason D., The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1998), pp.637–638.Google Scholar

230. See Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96–22A (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 7 Oct. 1997) at para. 57; see also Cheng, supra n.224, at pp.29–99 (discussing the general principle of self-preservation of States).

231. Derains, Y., Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International Arbitration in Sanders, P. (ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration ICCA Congress Series No. 3 (1987), p.227Google Scholar; P. Lalive, supra n.239, at p.257.

232. P. Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration in P. Sanders (ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration ICCA Congress Series No. 3 (1987), at p.273.

233. Idem at p.276.

234. Idem at p.284.

235. Idem at p.287.

236. Idem at p.314.

237. Reimman, M., “Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contract Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century” (1995) 39 Virginia J. Int'l L. 571, 592.Google Scholar

238. Dugan, supra n.2, at pp.38–39 (“deprived of their expectations of confidentiality merely because they find themselves haled into unexpected forums”).

239. Lalive, supra, n.232 at pp.305–306; see also Caron, D., “The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution” (1990) 84 A.J.I.L. 104.Google Scholar

240. New York Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Art.V(2)(b).

241. See Hearn v. Rhay, 68 FRD 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975); Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. Ambrose Corp, 150 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Paramount Communications v. Donaghy, 858 F. Supp 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

242. O'Connor, J. F., Good Faith in International Law (1991)Google Scholar; Cheng, supra n.224.

243. Cheng, idem at 105.