The Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases—the ancestor of the International Law Reports—was first published “under the direction” of the Department of International Studies of the London School of Economics. The “chief inspirers”, to use Fitzmaurice's phrase, were Arnold McNair and Hersch Lauterpacht, the latter then on the teaching staff of the School. There was also an Advisory Committee of Sir Cecil J. B. Hurst, a former President of the Permanent Court of International Justice and later Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office; W. E. Beckett, also of the Foreign Office; A. Hammarksjöld, the Registrar of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and Sir John Fischer Williams of Oxford and the Reparation Commission.

On 9 September 1958 the UK government signed the Convention on the Continental Shelf, which had been concluded in Geneva on 29 April 1958 following a UN conference on the law of the sea at which three other conventions were concluded.2 On 11 May 1964 it ratified the Convention, which came into force on 10 June 1964.3 Meanwhile, on 15 April 1964, the Continental Shelf Act received the royal assent. Although the Act's long title indicates that it gives effect to certain provisions of the Convention on the High Seas,4 it does not expressly mention the Continental Shelf Convention. Yet the relationship between this Convention and the Act is more than a mere coincidence of time and title. It is the purpose of this article to investigate only one of the many important problems to which this relationship gave rise, namely how the basic concept of continental shelf rights as embodied in Article 2(1) of the Convention was incorporated into UK law. Other problems, such as the application to the shelf of UK civil and criminal law, will have to await discussion elsewhere.

Since the late 1940s, economic considerations relating to the globalisation of world markets have led an ever larger group of Western European countries to unite in the quest for a supra-national legal order which, in time, generated the European Community. Most of these countries' legal orders claim allegiance to what anglophones are fond of labelling the “civli law” tradition,1 although two common law jurisdictions joined the Community in the early 1970s. The European Community's early decision to promote economic integration (and, later, other types of integration) through harmonisation or unification has involved, at both Community and national levels (for the implementation of Community rules in the member States carries the adoption of national rules in all member States), a process of relentless “juridification”; law, in the guise of legislatively or judicially enacted rules, has assumed the role of a “steering medium”.2 This development was foreseeable: once the interaction among European legal systems had acted as a catalyst for the creation of a supra-system,3 the need to achieve reciprocal compatibility between the infra-systems and the supra-system naturally fostered the development of an extended network of interconnections (such as regulations and directives) which eventually raised the question of further legal integration in the form of a common law of Europe.4

Fundamental issues sometimes hide themselves behind what to an untrained eye might look like a technical and somewhat dry debate. Thus, a layman hearing Community lawyers' talk about the legal basis of legislation might be excused for not realising that the issue may be that of the role of the European Parliament in the European Union, and therefore the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions. The debate about the function of the concept of discrimination in the law on the free movement of goods, services and persons in the Community is one of those discussions which has more to offer than meets the eye. What the debate is really about is the balance of powers between the member States and the Community and the federal nature of the Community legal order as well as, incidentally, the balance between market principles and other values embodied in legislation. Translated by specialists in the free movement of goods in the Community, it has become, in the context of Article 30 of the Treaty: should we read a “rule of reason” within Article 30, or can Cassis de Dijon be explained in terms of indirect discrimination?

Policy-making in the European Community in the area of education for migrants is driven by two conflicting pressures. On one side, the principle of effectiveness requires that the rights of free movement within the Community be supported by the best possible education for the children of migrants. However, on the other side is the importance of primary education to the member States as a political and cultural matter. This pressure is reinforced by the principle of subsidiarity. Member States have been relatively willing to support co-operative action by the Community in the area of higher education, such as in the ERASMUS exchange programmes. However, member States have been active in protecting their jurisdiction over education policy, particularly at the primary and secondary levels. As result, Community laws protecting the education rights of migrants have been most effective where two factors are present: first, that the rules are closely attached to the rights of free movement within the single market; and second, that the rules interfere as little as possible with substantive education policy. The first factor constitutes a significant weakness in Community education rights because it has created a distinction between Community migrants and those from third countries. The second factor has meant that the only Community policy on the education of migrants which could be described as an education right is the guarantee of equality of access to education within a member State.

International sports law is more than a static set of rules and principles: it is better described as a process for avoiding and resolving disputes. Recent cases highlight its significance. The Swiss Equestrian case,1 decided by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, demonstrates the efficacy of using this process in cases involving issues of eligibility for competition. By contrast, the Reynolds case,2 decided by US federal courts, shows the folly of ignoring non-judicial remedies prescribed by international sports law. As a result, Reynolds became a sort of Dickensian struggle involving three years of litigation and some nine decisions before the case was finally dismissed. The courts could have, and should have, reached the same result by simply enforcing decisions of the appropriate international sports federation and the arbitral tribunal that had upheld the federation's decision. The Harding case,3 which was also decided in the United States, demonstrates that adjudication outside the prescribed process of international sports law is fundamentally unstable.

The Council should not commit itself to procedures which in practice might prove to be excessively rigid, since each dispute with which the Council has to deal has unique characteristics. Attention has been drawn to the danger that any premature formalization of the procedures of the Council might impede the latter in the discharge of its responsibilities under the Charter.1

In the early evening hours of Saturday, 26 June 1993, the United States launched a missile attack on Iraq. Twenty-three Tomahawk sea-to-ground missiles were fired from two US warships, the USS Chancellorsville and the USS Peterson, located in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea respectively.1 Sixteen of those launched hit their desired military target, the Military Intelligence Headquarters, situated just outside the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. A further four missiles fell within the compound of the intelligence service complex. Conflicting reports put the death toll at between six and eight civilians, with 20 injured, when the remaining three missile warheads went astray.2 The Venezuelan Embassy was also reported to have been damaged.3

In Re A Company (No.007946 of 1993)1 it was held that a company incorporated in Northern Ireland was an “unregistered company” within section 220 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and, accordingly, was amenable to the winding-up jurisdiction of the English court. In so holding Morritt J specifically declined to follow the view expressed in Dicey and Morris,2 a view which had been adhered to by a number of writers on both English and Scottish law.3 Prior to his Lordship's determination it was considered as a general proposition that a company incorporated in one part of the United Kingdom could be wound up only in the place of incorporation (such judicial authority as there was in respect of Northern Irish companies4 was to this effect—although it was not brought to the attention of Morritt J). Whilst as a matter of precedent it was undoubtedly open to Morritt J to hold that there was jurisdiction to wind up a Northern Irish company, such a conclusion is completely at odds with the history and underlying intention of the relevant statutory provisions.

The Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, agreed in Brussels on 27 September 1968 (and generally referred to as the Brussels Convention), has been part of English law since the coming into force of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.1 The Convention now dominates the law of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters as well as the law governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

The European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement signed in May 1992 between the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) States, the European Community (EC) and the EC member States' seeks to establish “a dynamic and homogeneous” area by extending provisions which apply within the European Community to the EEA.2 The first decision of the EFTA Court,3 interpreting the EEA Agreement to determine its application within the legal orders of the EFTA States, concerned the Finnish alcohol monopoly. The Restamark decision was awaited with great interest to know to what extent the EFTA Court would follow the European Court of Justice's interpretation of the EC Treaty in order to achieve the aims of the EEA Agreement.

The European Court's efforts to locate the outer limits of Article 30's control of national measures have been discussed before in these surveys of current developments in EC law.1 The Court was tempted to use Article 30 to catch a wide range of measures that affected trade even where the rules applied in an even-handed manner to all traders. The most notable example of this expansionist trend was found in the so-called Sunday trading cases, in which Article 30 was exploited to challenge rules restricting commercial activity in England and Wales even though the rules did not put cross-border strategies at any particular disadvantage. The Court pursued an erratic course before finally ruling the laws compatible with Article 30.2 Academic comment, though nuanced in its detailed appreciation of the Court's stance, was largely convinced that Article 30 had been extended beyond both its intent and necessary function in the process of market integration.3

The arrival of Neil Kinnock, in January 1995, as the new Commissioner in charge of the transport portfolio, has led to particular emphasis on three objectives: improvement of the quality of the European transport system; integration of the transport policy into the single market; and negotiations with non-Community countries.1 During the last 18 months, the main legal developments continue to be concerned primarily with infrastructure, safety, negotiations with non-Community countries and improving the competitiveness of the industry by adopting liberalising measures and enforcing the EC competition rules.

In the period covered by this note (early 1994 to the middle of 1995) some signifi cant and interesting judgments have been handed down by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance on both substantive and procedural issues of competition law, in particular that of the Court of Justice in the Magill case, which deals with the relationship between Article 86 and intellectual property rights. In the legislative field there is now a group exemption on the operation of liner transport services. As regards general problems of enforcement, the Commission's 1993 Notice on Co-operation between National Courts and the Commission1 has provoked a good deal of discussion and a number of commentators and also the Commission itself are now advocating sharing responsibility for enforcement with national competition authorities rather than relying on the direct effect of Articles 85(1) and 86 being invoked before national courts.2

There are still unresolved conflicts at the final stage of the completion of the internal financial market.1 Member State actions have been brought against the European Parliament and Council Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes2 and against the Commission Communication on an Internal Market for Pension Funds.1