Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 January 2008
In the early evening hours of Saturday, 26 June 1993, the United States launched a missile attack on Iraq. Twenty-three Tomahawk sea-to-ground missiles were fired from two US warships, the USS Chancellorsville and the USS Peterson, located in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea respectively.1 Sixteen of those launched hit their desired military target, the Military Intelligence Headquarters, situated just outside the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. A further four missiles fell within the compound of the intelligence service complex. Conflicting reports put the death toll at between six and eight civilians, with 20 injured, when the remaining three missile warheads went astray.2 The Venezuelan Embassy was also reported to have been damaged.3
1. Fourteen Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched from the USS Peterson and the remaining nine from the USS Chancellorsville: Evans, “Clinton Opts For Tomahawk”. The Times (London), 28 June 1993, p.3.
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5. Security Council Res.688. adopted on 5 Apr. 1991, expressed the Council's grave concern over the “repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas”.
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14. UN Doc.S/5657 (27 June 1993). This position was expressed by the representative of Cape Verde, speaking on behalf of Council members belonging to the group of non-aligned countries (comprising Cape Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan and Venezuela). The Chinese representative took a very similar view.
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42. Caroline case, supra n.24.
43. Supra n.10.
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45. Greenwood, loc. cit. supra n.33, makes a similar point in connection with the “proportionality” issue over the 1986 American air raid on Libya.
46. See the comment of General Colin Powell: “What we didn't want to do is go all over Baghdad blowing up headquarters and palaces and other targets that might result in a lot of civilian casualties.” Quoted in Cockburn, “Tomahawk Signals Limits of US Power”. Independent (London), 28 June 1993, p.8. Powell estimated that the missile strike could involve the loss of a dozen lives in the neighbourhoods surrounding the Iraqi intelligence headquarters: Clift et al., op. cit. supra n.38.
47. See e.g. the view of Sir David Hannay, the British Representative to the UN, who considered the strike a “proper and proportionate” response to the Iraqi sponsorship of a terrorist act: supra n.14.
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59. Nicaragua, supra n.21, at p.103, para.195. Although see the dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings, who, at p.543. argued for a broader notion of “armed attack”. The narrowness of the ICJ's interpretation has been criticised by Hargrove, , “The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defence” (1987) 81 A.J.I.L. 135.Google Scholar
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80. Notably, the British government and the Russian Representative in the Security Council, Ambassador Voronstov, concurred with the legal justification for the strike: Idem, pp.22 and 23 respectively.
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