The recent jurisprudence of the ICTY concerning the proper interpretation of the doctrine of superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute has been stifled by division and uncertainty. In particular, the question of the responsibility of successor superiors for crimes committed by their subordinates prior to taking command has led to a number of 3–2 majority decisions. This paper seeks to reconcile the divergent judicial opinions by moving away from a narrow analysis of successor superior responsibility, instead focusing on the determination of the underlying nature of the doctrine of superior responsibility. While a polarity of opinions also exists in relation to the nature of the doctrine of superior responsibility, this paper argues that the opinions can be reconciled by adopting a more principled approach to customary international law, an approach justified by the international criminal law context. Such an approach involves two elements: first, ensuring that a clear distinction is drawn between international humanitarian and international criminal legal concepts; and, second, the invocation of the principle of individual culpability as a standard against which the weight to be attributed to authorities evidencing custom ought to be assessed. A principled approach would enable the identification of the nature of the doctrine of superior responsibility while ensuring that the doctrine reinforces international criminal law principles rather than acts as an exception to them; in addition, by determining the nature of the doctrine of superior responsibility, the principled approach would unravel the confusion concerning successor superior responsibility in the ICTY jurisprudence.

This article examines the judgment on Kantaga's appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court that the case against him was admissible. The Appeals Chamber rejected Katanga's appeal, and affirmed the admissibility of the case. However, it did not do so on the same basis as the Trial Chamber (that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was unwilling). Rather, it looked at the plain language of Article 17, and found that at the time of the challenge the DRC was not investigating or prosecuting Katanga. This judgment can be seen as an example of judicial restraint. The Appeals Chamber dealt only with those questions which were necessary to dispose of the appeal. It did not engage in policy debates or seek to create new facts, but rather applied the Statute as drafted to the facts of the case before it. In doing this, the Appeals Chamber confirmed certain basic principles of the admissibility regime. The case also provides an insight into the relationship between admissibility and ‘positive complementarity’.

With a looming referendum on the secession of South Sudan, the drafters of the Abyei Arbitration Agreement were faced with a complex intra-state dispute and a limited time to resolve it. The parties to the dispute agreed on a procedural regime to govern the arbitration, combining both traditional and innovative provisions on procedural rules, the constitution of the tribunal, the schedule of pleadings, transparency, financing of the proceeding, and the role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This article examines the key provisions of the Abyei Arbitration Agreement and their implementation during the course of the arbitration, and evaluates the case's significance as procedural precedent for future intra- or inter-state arbitration. The article does not provide an analysis of the substantive findings of the tribunal.

It was recognized that it was critical to the process of national reconciliation and the maintenance of peace in Sierra Leone that the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) be a strong and credible court operating in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness, and due process of law. This article assesses the fulfilment of this mandate through an examination of the fairness of the RUF trial as illustrated through two issues: the interpretation of the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges and the approach taken by the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber in assessing the evidential links between the accused and the crimes pursuant to the joint criminal enterprise (JCE) mode of liability. First, the article discusses the decisions that led to the omission of 250 charges from the indictment and their introduction into the trial through late evidential disclosures after the commencement of the prosecution case. Second, the article examines the way in which the charges, in a majority of cases, were found to be part of a common criminal purpose without a sufficient nexus being established to the accused or any member of the alleged JCE. The article concludes that the judicial approach to these issues abandoned the safeguards contained in the jurisprudence developed at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, giving rise to a trial that failed to adhere to international standards of justice, fairness, and due process, leading to manifestly unjust convictions.

On 25 September 2009, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a seminal decision on the subject of complementarity in the case Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga. The outcome of the Chamber's decision is that, even if a state has initiated an investigation or prosecution against an individual, the ICC may prosecute that individual for the same crimes or even a more selective range of crimes, so long as the state is willing to close the ongoing investigation or prosecution at the request of the ICC Prosecutor. While this decision is defensible under the language of the Rome Statute, this article concludes that, absent vigilance on the part of the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor, the decision could produce consequences inconsistent with the principle that the ICC is intended to act as a court of last resort. These potential consequences, in turn, suggest that the prosecution's policy of ‘positive complementarity’ – that is, encouraging genuine national proceedings whenever possible – should be at the core of its case selection strategy. At the same time, in those instances when the ICC prosecution determines that, despite activity by a national system with respect to a particular case, it is appropriate for the ICC to take over the case, the prosecution should clearly and publicly explain the factors that led to its decision.

Of the three existing core crimes in international criminal law, crimes against humanity is the most elusive one, a chameleonic crime that can change colour over time, since it does not possess an unambiguous conceptual character. The characterizing element of genocide obviously is the specific intent to destroy. War crimes must have a nexus with an armed conflict. The identifying element of crimes against humanity is more difficult to pin down as the contextual elements have changed over time.

In the Brđanin and Krajišnik judgments, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the accused may incur criminal liability for crimes carried out by low-level non-joint criminal enterprise (JCE) physical perpetrators who are used as tools or are otherwise instrumentalized by JCE members other than the accused to carry out the crimes of the common plan. Similarly, the Appeals Chamber held that the accused may also incur liability for crimes of excess committed by non-JCE perpetrators. However, as for the precise nature of liability in such cases, no clarification was provided. From this ambiguity the author detects an inclination on the part of the Appeals Chamber to construe JCE not only as an expression of commission but also of complicity. The author then identifies and elaborates the theoretical difficulties that this construction would instil in the traditional doctrine of JCE as formulated by the Tadić Appeals Chamber and the international law of individual criminal responsibility. He suggests that awareness of these very problems of theory is the reason behind the conspicuous ambiguity in Brđanin and Krajišnik as to the nature of JCE liability.

Establishing the pattern of crime is fundamental for the successful investigation of international crimes (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). A pattern of crime is the aggregate of multiple incidents that share common features related to the victims, the perpetrators, and the modus operandi. Pattern evidence and analysis have been used successfully, mainly in the investigation of large-scale killings, destruction, and displacement; the use for sexual violence charges has been remarkably more limited. There is a need to overcome this gap by setting proper methods of data collection and analysis. At the level of evidence collection, under-reporting should be addressed through victimization surveys or secondary analysis of data available from different sources. At the level of analysis, the available evidence needs to be subject to impartial examination beyond the pre-conceptions of the conflict parties and advocacy groups, in compliance with scientific standards for quantitative, qualitative, and GIS (Geographic Information Systems) methods. Reviewing the different investigative experiences and jurisprudence will help to set the right methodology and contribute most efficiently to putting an end to the impunity regarding sexual crimes.

Based on interviews with 23 key figures at the International Criminal Court, this study represents an effort to go beyond the text of the Rome Statute. It tries to understand the different views or interpretations of the law regarding victim participation that exist within the organization and will ultimately shape how victims’ rights are applied in the Court. Rather than being a legal study, this research is rooted in organizational psychology.

This article argues for amending the Rome Statute to remove the state or organizational policy requirement from the classification of crimes against humanity. After a brief look at the requirement itself, the article presents arguments to show how the policy loophole creates an accountability loophole in international criminal law, and how removing it both resolves inconsistencies in the Rome statute and facilitates prosecutions for international crimes. The article's final section examines and responds to leading arguments for keeping the policy requirement. The article is intended to show how the policy requirement limits international criminal law's scope in unwelcome ways and to challenge the use of state or organizational policy as a dividing line between domestic and international crimes.

The crime of attack on peacekeepers has gained specific attention in the practice of various international courts and tribunals, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court. This article revisits the historical origins, the foundations, and the main issues from a prosecutorial perspective arising in the interpretation and litigation of this crime. It argues that the crime poses unique challenges in relation to charging practice and evidence.

This article considers the initiative of UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) in criminalizing incitement to terrorist acts, in the light of criminal and international human rights law. The analysis is informed by the specific type of terrorism with which Resolution 1624 (2005) is concerned, namely ‘modern’ terrorism. The article argues that the rationales for a prohibition on incitement to terrorist acts call for a relatively wide definition of potentially proscribed speech. This can be achieved without excessively infringing freedom of expression. However, the present interpretation of the proposed prohibition is so restrictive that the prohibition may fail to counter the phenomenon with which it grapples. The article also considers whether incitement to terrorist acts can be regarded as an international crime. It concludes that in some instances there may be an overlap between incitement to terrorist acts and certain international crimes, but classification of incitement to terrorist acts as an international crime requires a fragmented approach to terrorism, which is contrary to current trends.

This article analyses the recent state practice in which the right of self-defence has been invoked in order to justify the use of force in response to attacks by non-state actors. The main purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the law of self-defence has evolved through this practice. It is submitted that the latter confirms the tendency, evidenced by the US operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan in 2001, towards allowing states to respond in self-defence to private armed attacks, that is, attacks which are committed by non-state actors only. The article also aims to shed some light on other fundamental conditions of the law of self-defence which played a significant role in the legal assessment of the recent state practice. It is argued in this respect that this practice confirms that any armed attack must reach some level of gravity – which may be assessed by accumulating minor uses of force – in order to trigger the right of self-defence, and that proportionality of the action taken in self-defence may be assessed in quantitative terms, but only as a means of making a prima facie judgement about the necessity of this action.

In this commentary to Matt Halling's paper, the author takes issue with Halling's proposal to amend Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute with regard to the ‘policy element’. Halling's view of plugging ‘loopholes’ in the Rome Statute in abstracto is met with a voice of realism. The author's realism is expressed on different levels and can be summarized in the following questions. As to the need for an amendment of Article 7(2), how realistic are the scenarios presented by Halling? Do they really call for an amendment? As to the function and role of the court, why expand the Court's mandate when it can only prosecute a handful of cases at any one time? As to the Court prosecutorial policy, does the Court need a fine net when it has limited resources and a mandate that requires it to focus on those who bear the greatest responsibility?

Like all rules of customary international law, those existing in the field of international investment law are binding on all states. According to the theory of the persistent objector, however, a state is not bound by a rule if it objected to it in the early stages of its formation and continued to do so consistently thereafter. This paper analyses the different grounds of criticism that have been raised against the concept. We found that there is only very weak judicial recognition of the concept, that there is no actual state practice supporting it, and that it is logically incoherent. Specifically, this paper argues that the concept should not be successfully used in investor–state arbitration proceedings to prevent the application of a custom rule by an arbitral tribunal. This is essentially because of the great importance of the few custom rules existing in that field and the fact that they represent universally recognized values.

At the beginning of the renaissance of international criminal law in the 1990s, the law on crimes against humanity was in a fragile state. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decisively contributed to the consolidation of customary international law on crimes against humanity and paved the way for its first comprehensive codification in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the same time, the ICTY in its early decisions already showed a certain inclination to broaden the scope of the application of the crime by downgrading its contextual requirement. More recently, this tendency culminated in the complete abandonment of the policy requirement. While this ‘progressive’ facet of the ICTY's jurisprudence largely took the form of obiter dicta, the Situation in the Republic of Kenya has confronted the ICC with the need to ‘get serious’ about the present state of the law. This has led to a controversy in Pre-Trial Chamber II about the concept of organization in Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute. While the majority essentially follows the path of the more recent case law of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone and supports a liberal interpretation, Judge Kaul prefers to confine the term to state-like organizations and generally calls for caution against too hasty an expansion of the realm of international criminal law stricto sensu. This comment agrees with the main thrust of the Dissenting Opinion and hopes that it will provoke a thorough debate.

Investment treaty arbitration, unlike commercial arbitration, is not a purely private dispute settlement mechanism that is entirely subject to party autonomy and limited in its effects to the parties to the proceedings. Rather, it fulfils a public function in influencing the behaviour of foreign investors, states, and civil society more generally by crafting and concretizing international standards of investment protection. Investment treaty arbitration thus implements and operates as part of a public system of investment protection. Arbitrators, as a result, incur obligations not only towards the parties to the proceedings, but vis-à-vis the whole system of investment protection. These obligations can be conceptualized as part of the public law implications of investment treaty arbitration and affect, inter alia, the role and status of arbitrators in investment treaty disputes, the procedural maxims that such arbitrations should follow, and the way arbitral awards should be crafted.

Although multiparty elections are not explicitly required by international human rights instruments or the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), certain human rights provisions have been interpreted as leading to such a requirement. While a democratic interpretation of human rights law has been settled in the ECHR framework, it remains disputable at the universal level. Despite numerous references to democracy in the documents adopted in the UN framework in the post-Cold War era, this article argues that an explicit link between international human rights law and multiparty elections has yet to be established. On the other hand, such a link has been developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Multiparty elections are considered to be part of the European public order. Moreover, the ECtHR has shown that it understands democracy beyond the existence of electoral procedures. But the role and understanding of democracy within the ECHR cannot be universalized.