This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the framework of transition and the enactment of a new constitution for Egypt. It does so by using the relatively under explored concept of transitional constitutionalism, interrogating some of the key claims on which transitional constitutionalism is based, and questioning their application in the Egyptian context. By doing this the paper explores the broader paradox of the imposition of a framework of transition that is rooted in principles of liberalism in the context where liberalism is far from the agreed or prevailing political model.

Prior to the rise of international investment treaties and institutionalization of investor–state arbitration, the protection of foreign investors from mistreatment in the host state courts was the preserve of customary international law, which prohibited a denial of justice and provided for diplomatic protection as a principal means of dispute settlement. In contrast, contemporary international investment law offers a whole array of legal standards that can be invoked in seeking redress for the acts of national courts before international arbitral tribunals. In addition to relying on the customary prohibition of denial of justice, investors can challenge judicial conduct under the treaty standards on expropriation, fair and equitable treatment and, in some cases, the obligation to ensure effective means of asserting claims. Although the multiplicity of standards available to aggrieved investors can be regarded as an inalienable part of an effective regime for the protection of foreign investment, it also gives rise to a number of fundamental problems relating to the application of procedural mechanisms designed to control the review of the conduct of national judiciary by international courts and tribunals. Focusing on arbitral cases in which claims of a denial of justice were brought under the rubric of ‘a judicial expropriation’ and ‘a failure to provide effective means of asserting claims’, this article seeks to ascertain when investor claims relating to the administration of justice in the host state courts become amenable to arbitral scrutiny. It argues that, by providing a variety of standards under which the acts of judiciary can be challenged, investment treaty law allows investors to circumvent procedural barriers and thus muddles the boundaries demarcating the scope of international review of national judicial conduct.

The jurisdictional framework of the Singapore courts has become more nuanced with the establishment of the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) on 5 January 2015 and the signing of the Hague Convention on the Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (Hague Convention) on 25 March 2015. Although the Hague Convention has yet to be incorporated in domestic law, it is expected this will happen in the near future. The SICC project, on the other hand, is part of Singapore's strategy to promote the jurisdiction as an international dispute resolution hub. In essence, the SICC is a domestic specialist court established to deal with international commercial litigation. Adapted from the arbitral model but underpinned by judicial control, central to the SICC framework are party autonomy and flexible procedural rules. The Hague Convention complements the SICC project by increasing the number of jurisdictions in which Singapore judgments will be recognized and enforced. These 2015 developments—key to establishing Singapore as the regional hub for dispute resolution—requires careful working out and an evaluation is needed of the jurisdictional regime that applies to the SICC and the internal allocation of jurisdiction as between the SICC and the Singapore High Court sans the SICC, as well as the impact of the Hague Convention. This article focuses on explaining the in personam jurisdictional rules of the Singapore High Court that now includes the SICC division. Its chief objective is to offer the international community an overview of the working framework of Singapore's version of an ‘international’ commercial court.

On 1 March 2001 Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children of both Spouses (Brussels II) entered into force.1 In the United Kingdom at least this significant step went relatively unnoticed. Nevertheless, the Regulation marks a new departure for the European Community and is likely to be but the first in a series of instruments dealing with family law issues. This article will use an analysis of the evolution of the Brussels II initiative to explore how and why the European Community has been able to move into an area not innately associated with traditional European goals.2 It will then reflect on the wider impact of the Regulation and any future initiatives for private international law and family law in Europe.

This article argues that judicial independence is a poor indicator of the capacity of courts effectively to resolve commercial disputes. Judicial power is a more accurate measure because it assesses whether courts have sufficient jurisdiction, discretionary authority and enforcement powers to make decisions over socially meaningful commercial problems. In fact, judicial independence may reduce the power of newly emerging commercial courts in socialist-transforming Asia, which need politics to protect them from interference by powerful governments and private investors. This article explores the trade-offs between judicial power and political patronage by inquiring into the circumstances where patronage may slide into interference. It also investigates the conditions in which judges are most likely to acquire or arrogate discretionary powers to understand politics on their terms. Finally, this article analyses the highly polarized views in this region about what constitutes valid judicial determinations. The message for international agencies contemplating judicial reforms is that reducing political influence and promoting law-based decisions will not uniformly generate popular support and legitimacy for courts.

Since many offensive and defensive wars or acts of terrorism, such as the atrocities of 11 September in the United States and the July 2005 bombings in London, are committed under the banner of Islam and the duty of jihad, it is important to shed some light upon the Islamic laws of war in general, and the controversial concept of jihad in particular. This article traces the origins of, and rationale for, the use of force within the Islamic tradition, and assesses the meaning and evolution of the contentious concept of jihad within its historical context. Following an analysis of the opposing doctrinal views on the potential implications of jihad, the study argues that the concept of jihad should not be interpreted literally, but be adjusted in accordance with new historical and international conditions, and conducted by peaceful means, rather than by the sword.

The European Court of Human Rights has decided in the last three years five cases dealing with state or international immunities.1 Although the facts differed, the arguments of the applicants were much the same. They contended that allowing a foreign State or an international organisation to claim immunity in a civil action in proceedings in the defendant State violated the applicants' rights to access to a court for the determination of a civil right.2 The European Court accepted the claims in principle but concluded in each case that the limitation imposed on the right of access was for a legitimate reason (the protection of State or international immunities, a condition for effective co-operation between States or with international organisations) and was proportionate to this aim, because in each case, the grant of immunity was required by international law and that in each case there was the possibility of the applicant using another procedure to try to assert his rights, action in the courts of the foreign State or under the special staff regime of the international organisation.

This article explores how a procedural approach in the case law of the ECtHR combines subsidiarity and progressive development of international obligations. Rather than constituting a simple retreat from substantive commitments, it renders the obligations of Conventions States more flexible and has the potential to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Court's rulings. This article first sets out various aspects of proceduralization in international human rights law. This is followed by a discussion of how procedural approaches are linked to subsidiarity. In the case law of the ECtHR, procedural approaches facilitate dynamic evolution, both in the practice of Convention States (analytic or bottom-up approach) or by the Court itself (constructive or top-down approach). This interaction of the procedural approach and arguments based on European Consensus allows the ECtHR and domestic institutions to fulfil their ‘shared responsibility’ for the effective protection of human rights in Europe.

The current international law applicable to the cooperative development of petroleum resources imposes few procedural requirements on States. In the event of a failure to agree, they may choose to make further efforts at developing cooperative arrangements, or go ahead independently anddevelop the resource. Recent bilateral agreements in the North Sea and the Caribbean seek to move beyond the cooperation established under bilateral delimitation treaties. They indicate a willingness to design innovative legal frameworks in which different, sometimes diverging interests may be managed. Nonetheless, early experience suggests that, in the event of a breakdown, unilateral action may follow.