The dispute between Hungary and Slovakia concerning the Gabcïkovo-Nagymaros project could easily be described as one of the most important cases to come before the International Court of Justice (“the Court”) in recent years. The case raised a number of very important questions of international law, many of which had received no previous consideration in the Court's jurisprudence. In the first place, the Court was asked by both parties for orders of specific performance. Although the competence of the Court to issue orders of specific performance or injunctive relief had been the subject matter of much discussion in the academic literature, the issue had never before been raised squarely before the Court. Second, this was the first dispute in which the Court was directly asked to consider the consequences of the legal developments in the field of environmental protection. Despite the proliferation of treaty developments in that field, the status of many of those norms remains problematic Third, although the relationship between the law of treaties and the law of State responsibility has generated much general interest, the Court had not in the past been presented with an opportunity to pronounce on some of these issues. Finally, this is also one of the few cases in which the Court has been asked to consider the legal implications of State succession outside the context of decolonisation.

This article examines whether there are any limitations on constitutional amendment powers that are external to the constitutional system and above it—‘supra-constitutional’ limits. It considers the theory and practice of the relationship between natural law, international law or other supranational law, and domestic constitutional law in a comparative prism. After considering the alleged supremacy of supranational law over constitutional amendments, the author explores the problem of the relationship between the different legal orders in the external/internal juridical spheres, and the important potential and actual role of national courts in ‘domesticating’ supranational law and enforcing its supremacy. It is claimed that despite the growing influence of supranational law, state practice demonstrates that constitutional law is still generally superior to international law, and even when the normative hierarchical superiority of supranational law is recognized within the domestic legal order, this supremacy derives not from supranational law as a separate legal order, but rather from the constitution itself. Therefore, it is claimed that existing practice regarding arguments of ‘supra-constitutional’ limitations are better described by explicit or implicit limitations within the constitution itself, through which supranational standards can be infused to serve as valid limitations on constitutional amendment powers.

The United Nations Security Council is often described as an opaque body, closed in both membership and approach, and unaccountable for its conduct. For many years, this view has motivated calls for reform to the Council's working methods. This article aims to shine light on the Council's approach to process matters, recognizing the Council's preference for making change through developments in practice. The article reviews the efforts undertaken by the ‘Small Five’ group of States from 2005 to 2012, followed by the efforts since 2013 of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, while also acknowledging the contributions made by Japan. With some proposals having received some degree of Council support, the sustained implementation of change is identified as the key priority. The article argues for the contextual application of the key concepts of transparency, engagement and accountability, as well as prevention, to provide a principled basis for both the maintenance and development of working methods reform.

The beginning of the new millennium spawned a biosafety protocol1 for the transboundary movement of genetically modified organisms,2 against the background of an existing WTO code3 concerned mainly with liberal trade. The co-existence of the two codes, and their almost separate development, reflects the fact that the international movement of GMOs raises concerns both of biosafety and liberal trade. However, their co-existence also invites a number of questions—viz., the level to which they complement each other, the level of duplication, and the levels to which they are adequate qua normative frameworks for biotechnology products. In short, the two systems beg the question whether they co-exist happily, or provide for incoherence. This article is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of the codes, but rather as a framework for a focus on the respective codes, as well as their relationship to each other, from a legal perspective.

The texts of two brief judgments by district judges at Bow Street are reproduced below. In each case, an application was made for proceedings against a serving foreign official to answer allegations in England of conduct which constituted crimes against international law which were within the jurisdiction of the English court, even though committed abroad and by non-UK nationals. In each case, the judge decided that the official was protected by the law of State immunity rationae personae against the proceedings and the applications were dismissed.

The ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003 raised many international legal questions, which all have been more or less addressed in the academic literature since then. However, the thrust of the relevant legal etiology pertained to the implementation of a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, whose hermeneutics, ie the rules of interpretation, in contrast to other issues, have been scarcely explored and elucidated. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to address the latter question of the hermeneutics of Security Council Resolutions, and propound a coherent thesis in this respect, which would be applicable not only in the Iraqi conflict but even beyond. It will examine, first, whether the provisions of Articles 31–33 of VCLT are applicable either ipso jure or mutatis mutandis in this respect and then having deprecated both of these options, it will turn its focus to the question of which theoretical framework in relation to the hermeneutics in international law could better serve its purposes. Drawing insights from, amongst others, Stanley Fish, Ian Johnstone and Aharon Barak, it will be possible to propound the thesis that any relevant regulatio interpretations should pay due regard to the institutional setting of the ‘community’ of the Council, which in turn qualifies the ‘inter-subjective’ approach or the collective will of the Council in light of the object and purpose of the Charter, ie the maintenance of peace and security, as the most pertinent hermeneutic paradigm. Premised upon the latter, the article proceeds and articulates a rubric of interpretive principles and presumptions to be applied in this regard, which, at the end, will be tested in the case of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’.

The European Union (EU) is contemplating the adoption of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which would extend its domestic carbon price to emissions that are produced outside its borders but are embodied into its imports of carbon-intensive commodities. In doing so, the EU is testing the boundaries of permissible unilateral action at the interface of international climate and trade law. However, the question of whether the proposed CBAM is compatible with these two multilateral legal regimes is yet to be addressed in an integrated manner. This article seeks to fill this gap in the scholarship and makes two main arguments. First, the CBAM as presently designed does not respect the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDRRC) and needs to be adjusted through two forms of differential treatment: a full exemption for least-developed countries and Small Island Developing States and the use of CBAM-generated revenue to support decarbonisation efforts in other affected developing countries. Secondly, this CBDRRC-based differentiation should be permissible under WTO law on the grounds that it does not amount to discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail.

In July 2001, 40 years after the entry into force of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) decided to establish a Permanent Secretariat to the Treaty. This latest development within what has been described as ‘an evolving international institutional structure’ will undoubtedly serve to strengthen the Treaty, as well as provide support for the wider Antarctic system, in particular, the 1991 Environmental Protocol. Its impact within the wider environmental institutional context will depend to an extent upon the grant of legal personality to the secretariat, and the definition of its functions, rights and privileges. Described as an historic and landmark decision, the establishment of a permanent secretariat has the potential indirectly to provide an additional line of defence in the fight to preserve and protect the Antarctic environment. The purpose of this article is to consider the future impact of, and issues relating to, this significant institutional development.

A court of law can take various approaches when dealing with a case before it: judicial restraint, judicial activism or a proactive policy. In the present article the recent case law of the International Court of Justice is analysed in this light. The author is of the view that the Court, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations should, wherever possible, by a careful judicial policy, apart from deciding the case in hand, give guidance and provide clarification on a number of questions which are of primordial importance in present-day international society but still are largely obscure from a legal point of view.

With China's resumption of sovereignty over Macau on 20th December 1999, another step was taken towards the reunification of Greater China. The reunification of Macau as of Hong Kong is based on the principle of “one country, two systems’, under which the socialist systems of the People's Republic of China are not applied in these territories. Instead most constituents of their previous economic, legal and social systems are preserved. In either case China negotiated what are called Joint Declarations for the resumption of sovereignty with the colonial power, under which the terms of “one country, two systems’ were spelled out. China undertook to give effect to the Declarations in Basic Laws, passed by its National People's Congress. Except for defence and foreign affairs, most matters are vested in the new entities, called Special Administrative Regions. The Basic Laws describe the constitutional system established for the regions as being characterised by a “high degree of autonomy’. As such they are an interesting addition to autonomy systems which are increasingly being applied as solutions to problems of divided societies. But the institutional support for the autonomy is particularly weak, and a closer examination of the articulation of the regions with the central authorities suggests that the primary concern in establishing the special administrative regions is less the automony for the people of Hong Kong or Macau as finding a framework for managing different economic systems from those on the mainland (I have developed these arguments in Ghai 1999).

It is generally acknowledged today that comparative law plays a decisive role in the harmonisation of European private law, in particular of European contract law.1 Dölle has emphasised this strong link between comparative law and European integration as early as 1950 in his report on the refoundation of the German Association of Comparative Law:

This article analyses both cooperative and confrontational interactions between domestic judges and UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies. Based on a number of cases collected through multiple databases, this article addresses the basis on which the monitoring bodies encourage the domestic acceptance of their views, general comments, and reports; how domestic courts engage with these findings; on what basis; and why some courts are more willing to engage with these findings. A key argument is that judicial accommodation is highly selective; domestic judges occasionally avoid, discount, and contest the interpretation put forward by the treaty monitoring bodies and thereby pose a challenge to their legitimacy.

This article offers a critical assessment of the role of international human rights law in the regulation of genome editing. Given the rapid scientific developments in the field of genetics, it is important to explore the implications of the human rights framework for the research into and the clinical application of genome editing. The broader normative question is whether the existing human rights standards are sufficient to address the challenges posed by this new technology. It will be argued that while international human rights law does not prohibit genome editing, it imposes important restrictions upon it. However, existing human rights are arguably insufficient to regulate germline genome editing as there are significant loopholes in the protection of embryos. Nor do they fully address the wide-ranging implications of the new technology for society and humankind. It will be suggested that new standards are needed, ideally set out in a new international instrument and supported by an institutional framework, which address the specific challenges posed by this new technology.

Recognition in contemporary international law is generally seen as a declaratory act. This is indeed the only plausible explanation in situations where a new State emerges consensually and in the absence of territorial illegality. Unilateral secession and territorial illegality, however, create different legal circumstances in which the applicable rules of international law imply and even presuppose that (collective) recognition could have constitutive effects. This article therefore suggests that the interpretation of the legal nature of recognition and non-recognition should not start on the premise that recognition always merely acknowledges the fact of the emergence of a new State. This is not to say that States cannot exist without being recognized. Rather, the legal effects of recognition may depend on the mode of a certain (attempt at) State creation.