While the public nature of investment treaty arbitration has been increasingly recognized, its procedures are modelled on those of international commercial arbitration. This creates a gap between (public) substance and (private) procedure in investment treaty arbitration. Against this background, this article examines the increasing acceptance of amicus curiae submissions in investment treaty arbitration. It argues that investment treaty arbitration tribunals should make effective use of amicus curiae submissions in order to include neglected perspectives of the issues raised in arbitration, which may bridge this public/private gap.

In December 2007, the international community adopted the Bali Action Plan which launched a process to reach an ‘agreed outcome’ on long-term cooperative action on climate change, with a scheduled end in Copenhagen, December 2009. The term ‘an agreed outcome’ suggests a lack of agreement on both the legal form that the likely outcome of this process could take, and the level of ambition that it should reflect. This lack of agreement continues to haunt the process. There are a range of legal form options for a new climate instrument—from a set of Conference of Parties decisions to a legally binding instrument, either to replace or supplement the Kyoto Protocol—and the choice between them for States is predicated primarily on political and strategic considerations. Nevertheless the legal status, procedural requirements, symbolic signalling effects and regime-building characteristics of different legal form options will play an important role in determining the legal form of the Copenhagen ‘agreed outcome’. This article identifies and explores the range of legal form options available to States in the negotiation process, and outlines the political and strategic considerations at play and will ultimately govern choice of legal form. This article argues that one of the most significant factors hindering substantive progress on a post-2012 climate agreement is what is characterized here as the ‘post-Kyoto stress disorder’, a lack of trust amongst some developing countries that industrialized countries will, given current and past form, honour their commitments, and/or take the lead in the new climate agreement. This article makes the case that post-Kyoto stress disorder will likely prevent certain legal form options from acquiring traction in the process and favour others.

In November 2001, a new weapon was added to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation's2 arsenal used to protect and preserve the world's cultural heritage, in the form of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage.3 This Convention, while not yet in force, will complement UNESCO's three other heritage conventions, the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Heritage in the Event of Armed Conflict,4 the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1971)5 and the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.6

Party autonomy is the basic principle for international contracts. By making a ‘choice of law’, the parties to a contract can agree amongst themselves which law is to regulate their contractual relationship. In international transactions, the law of the parties' choice replaces the law that would otherwise have governed the contract, including the mandatory rules (ius cogens) of the latter law. Article 3 of the 1980 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (hereafter: the ‘Rome Convention’) fully recognises this principle of party autonomy. Under Article 3 the parties are free to choose whichever law they deem appropriate to govern their contractual relationship. It is not even necessary for the transaction to display some connection with the chosen law.

The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the European Court of Justice's (‘ECJ’) past and present contribution— both procedurally and substantively—to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. While it is too early to speculate what the ECJ's contribution to this area will be under the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, the latter's modifications to the ECJ's jurisdiction merit close attention. After describing how the procedural limitations that were imposed on the ECJ's jurisdiction by ex Title IV of Part Three of the EC Treaty and by ex Title VI of the old EU Treaty have been almost entirely eliminated by the Treaty of Lisbon, this article posits that not only does the latter Treaty improve significantly the judicial protection of private individuals, but it also facilitates the dialogue between the Union and the national judiciaries in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Next, the article briefly explores the special ECJ procedures which may be followed in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in cases where time is of the essence. There, it is argued that, when having recourse to these procedures, the ECJ strives to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, swift judging and, on the other hand, the preservation of a qualitative and fair judicial procedure. As to substantive issues, drawing on examples from the fields of judicial cooperation in civil matters, asylum and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, it is argued that the ECJ's contribution to this area is largely grounded in the protection of fundamental rights. Finally, a brief conclusion supports the contention that the ECJ's contribution to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has favoured a ‘mutual borrowing’ of concepts and principles as between this area and other fields in relation to which the EU has competences, such as the internal market and competition. The Treaty of Lisbon having entered into force, an unprecedented level of coordination between different areas of EU law on both the procedural and substantive levels is to take place. Respect for fundamental rights will definitely be a unifying factor binding them all together.

While lacking the raw excitement of the live “penalty shoot-out” that was the announcement of the decision of the House of Lords in Reg. v. Bow Street Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet,1 the initial impression of the decision in Reg. v. Bow Street Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)2 was of a solid majority support for the position that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity in the United Kingdom in respect of the criminal acts he is alleged to have committed. Even as Lord Browne-Wilkinson attempted to explain the intricacies of the decision, the matter of immunity appeared settled and of secondary consideration to the “new” requirement of double criminality which alone, it seemed, had resulted in the considerable reduction in the list of crimes for which Pinochet could be extradited to Spain. Closer examination of the reasoning of their Lordships, however, quickly dispels that impression and reveals a range of opinions across a wide spectrum. What agreement there was between their Lordships on the matter of Pinochet's immunity from jurisdiction is diverse and often contradictory. In particular, the Lordships who formed the majority were equally divided on the question as to whether Pinochet was acting within his official capacity when carrying out the acts of which he is accused. Given that immunity rationae materiae appears to be available only in respect of official acts, it is difficult to see how the six could have agreed on the fact that Pinochet was not entitled to such immunity. Indeed, given the fact that Lord Goff (dissenting) was of the opinion that the alleged acts were performed in the course of Pinochet's functions as head of state, there was in fact a majority in favour of the prima facie existence of immunity rationae materiae.

Issues of State complicity arise ever more frequently in international relations. Rules which deal with the responsibility of States for aiding or assisting in the commission of internationally wrongful acts by other States are, however, not yet fully developed. States frequently support each other's actions without necessarily considering the potential implications of the rules on complicity in international law. This leads to another problem: is support given to another State automatically to be seen as relevant practice for the development of new customary rules or the interpretation of treaties through subsequent practice? Or is it possible for complicit States to play two different roles: to assist in some conduct while not endorsing the legal claim associated with it? This contribution aims to untangle the various facets of complicit State behaviour. It will argue that in some cases, States can indeed play two different roles. States should, however, be careful in considering the long-term implications of such behaviour.

The aim of this article is to look at the phenomenon of Europeanization of judiciaries of third countries through the prism of EU external policy. It is argued that external factors (objectives of EU external policies, EU soft law, EU technical and financial assistance, favourable interpretation of EU law by the ECJ towards third country nationals) play important role in persuading third country judiciaries to apply the EU acquis in their judgments. The similar pattern can be envisaged with regard to Russia and Ukraine. Case study shows that EU policies towards these countries led to generally favourable attitude towards applying the EU acquis by Russian and Ukrainian courts, though mainly as a persuasive source of law. However, problems linked to effectiveness, independence and fight with corruption hinder further Europeanization of judiciaries in Russia and Ukraine.

Collective redress mechanisms for consumer claims seek both to allow legal systems to accommodate mass litigation without being overwhelmed and to enable litigation to be viable where individual claims would not be economic. The article maps a number of recent reforms and reform proposals relating to consumer collective redress at national level and comments on EU developments. It notes that there is insufficient recognition of the differences between schemes geared at managing mass litigation as opposed to those aimed at facilitating otherwise non-viable claims. There are however signs that a European style of collective redress procedure is developing, which emphasize the role of public authorities and consumer organizations as gatekeepers to collective redress. The EU is unlikely to be able to impose collective redress procedures on national civil procedures, but the EU could prompt Member States to reflect on the need for national reforms. There may be limited scope for an EU mechanism to address the problem of individually non-viable consumer claims. This would however have to address certain fundamental issues such as the opt-out mechanism, cy-près distribution and funding if consumer organizations are to be encouraged to bring such actions. At a legal doctrinal level, it is interesting to note the influence of comparative studies on policy development within Member States as well as at the EU level.

As with other legal systems based on a separation of powers, the World Trade Organization is marked by a degree of tension between its political organs and its quasi-judicial organs, in particular the Appellate Body. In late 2000 this tension spilled out into the public domain, when the Appellate Body announced a procedure for the filing of amicus curiae briefs in the EC-Asbestos case.1 The question of public participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is sensitive to many WTO Members, and in expressly encouraging the submission of amicus briefs in this way the Appellate Body was felt to be overstepping its functions.2 In the end, this dispute settled with a draw, the Appellate Body deciding that it had no need to consider any of the amicus briefs submitted in that particular case, and yet still maintaining that panels and the Appellate Body have the right to take unsolicited amicus briefs into account, should they so choose.

Global experimentalist governance has emerged within and across a number of international regulatory regimes, but its potential contribution to the global governance of climate change remains largely unexplored. This article investigates the opportunities and barriers to developing global experimentalist governance approaches in the international regulation of climate change technologies, focusing on the recent framework for marine geoengineering under the London Dumping Protocol. It argues that, in the face of the limits of international law in dealing with uncertainty, multilevel distribution of power and regulatory disconnection, global experimentalist governance is attractive to catalyse adaptability, iterative learning, participation and cooperation. Such approach can help rethink the way international law deals with technological development, by emphasizing its problem-solving function.

Once upon a time, a Professor of European Institutions, at least if a lawyer by training, could simply assert that the European Communities are based on the rule of law, that they create institutions with autonomous powers, which are able to issue legislation binding as law throughout every member State of the Community, and that they create courts which have power to exercise judicial control over a complex network of relationships between the Community institutions, the member States and private citizens. While these statements are still true, however, they must now be laced in a rather more complex context. Furthermore, there is a contrast between on the one hand the intensification (to borrow a word from the Common Agricultural Policy) of certain fundamenta s of the EC legal order in the recent case law of the European Court, and on the other hand attempts by member States to escape this through non-EC forms of cooperation in the framework of the European Union, the development of the idea that not all the rules of the EC Treaty apply to all the member States, and the entry by the majority of the member States into a separate Treaty, the Schengen Agreement, dealing with matters which might be thought to fall under the EC Treaty or the Home Affairs and Justice pillar of the Treaty on European Union—all of which might generically be referred to as variable geometry. In the other direction, it may be observed that large amounts of substantive

This article documents and discusses recent developments in English law towards polygamy. It begins by introducing the question of the legal treatment of polygamy in the Afro-Asian context, and discussing the consequences that colonial and post-colonial developments may have had on the character (or visibility) of English case law on the subject. The article then turns to the examination of English developments in response to different phases of non-European immigration