The concept of sovereignty plays too large a part in contemporary discussion. No nation is sovereign in the sense that it is free to do what it wants within its own borders and not subject to influences from outside. It is not self evident either that political systems have to be hierarchically organized or that there should be one final arbiter of law for all decisions. There are advantages in having different centres of power for decisions affecting differing matters. There is a case for the co-existence of overlapping power centres and for sharing in decision-making and being prepared to live with a decision which does not in itself reflect the wishes of your State. There are advantages in being part of a larger conglomerate. The State can then have some influence and control over what goes on outside its boundaries. There is no reason why that conglomerate should itself be a large sovereign State. The European Union offers the hope of transcending the sovereign State rather than simply replicating it in some new superstate. It may prove to be a model and an inspiration.

The success of an international claim impugning a series of State acts, or a ‘composite act’, straddling the date a treaty comes into force can depend on the weight the tribunal gives to the elements of the composite act occurring before that date. Recent bilateral investment treaty decisions highlight ambiguities on this critical issue. One tribunal practically ignored State acts occurring before the treaty came into force in finding that there had been no breach of the treaty, whereas another tribunal considered those previous acts in reaching the opposite conclusion. This paper identifies steps to ensure future tribunals give consistent weight to the elements of a composite act occurring before a treaty comes into force.

This article compares and contrasts Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code with the UK administration procedure under the Insolvency and Enterprise Acts. It focuses in particular on who runs a company during the restructuring process—debtor-in-possession or management displacement in favour of an outside administrator. Various reasons have been given to explain the US/UK divergence in this respect including differences in entrepreneurial culture and differences in the lending markets in the two countries. The article suggests that the divergence cannot be reduced to a single factor but instead implicates a complex web of circumstances.

International law recognizes two mechanisms for the protection of individuals in case of violations of peremptory norms affecting individuals: invocation of State responsibility erga omnes and diplomatic protection. While they share some fields of applications and are both based on some measure of indirect injury, there are important differences between these two mechanisms. This paper analyses and discusses these differences and similarities, and concludes by demonstrating that the essential distinction is to be found in the legal interest in the claim and the nature of the claim. The traditional conditions for the bringing of a claim based on indirect injury that are applicable to diplomatic protection (exhaustion of local remedies and nationality of claims) are not applicable to invocation of responsibility erga omnes. This paper will argue that the latter is based on an obligation owed to the community as a whole, including the claimant State, and therefore constitutes a direct claim. In the interest of enhancing protection of individuals against violations of peremptory norms, the simultaneous existence of these two mechanisms should be welcomed.

Within common law systems a body of jurisprudence has developed according to which indigenous peoples' land rights have been recognized based upon historical patterns of use and occupancy and corresponding traditional land tenure. Looking at the emerging common law doctrine on aboriginal or native title, this article examines how legal institutions are building a theory on historical land claims through the recognition of indigenous laws deriving from prior occupation. The article analyses how the common law doctrine builds a bridge between past events and contemporary land claims. The aim of this article is to examine to what extent the common law doctrine proposes a potential model for the development of a legal theory on the issue of indigenous peoples' historical land claims. In doing so the article analyses how the common law doctrine compares with international law when dealing with historical arguments by focusing on issues of intertemporal law and extinguishment.

This article deals with the revocation of wills in South African private international law with reference to other Commonwealth jurisdictions and the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Conflict of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary Dispositions (1961). Specific reference is made to section 3bis (1) (d) of the South African Wills Act 7 of 1953 (which is partially based on Article 2 of the Convention) and to revocation of wills by marriage and divorce.

International tribunals and legal scholars have been considering the relationship between International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) and International Human Rights Law (‘IHRL’) for a number of years.1 The International Court of Justice famously or infamously (depending on your perspective) considered their relationship in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion in 1996.2 The Court concluded that while IHRL did apply in times of armed conflict, when it came to the prohibition of arbitrarily taking human life in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, the content of that prohibition had to be found in the lex specialis of IHL.

A peculiar and unique agreement exists between Australia and Nauru, which has ensured that, since 1976, appeals may be brought from the Supreme Court of Nauru, an independent Republic, to the High Court of Australia by virtue of a bilateral treaty1 and statutes of the respective Parliaments.2 In 1998 and 1999 two High Court judgments left a question mark hanging over the constitutional validity of this appellate scheme.3 Furthermore, in 2001, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) expressed the view that Australia should terminate the agreement as the arrangement was of no perceived ‘utility’ to Australia.4 For 29 years only two rather trivial cases were appealed from the Supreme Court to Australia's High Court.5 In 2005 a much more significant case, Ruhani, 6 was appealed from Nauru to Australia. The case was not only significant in that it concerned the validity of the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’, which involved Australia holding asylum-seekers offshore in Nauru for the processing of their refugee claims, but it also raised doubts about the desirability of the offshore municipal model of foreign appeals. This article examines the latter of those issues, intending to demonstrate that the model of foreign appeal adopted in the Nauru Treaty is a compromised version of appeal in comparison with the other two more common models.

The expansion of claims of extended territorial and extraterritorial criminal legislative jurisdiction and the increasing facility with which States are able to obtain custody over defendants by way of more effective extradition arrangements is leading to a new problem in transnational criminal law. The result of these developments is that more than one State may have legitimate jurisdiction to legislate for the same conduct and the courts of more than one State may be entitled to exercise judicial jurisdiction over those persons charged with crimes arising from that conduct. For prosecutors, the problem may present itself as one of prosecutorial efficiency—how may the case be proceeded with expeditiously, in particular, in which jurisdiction is a conviction most likely to be secured? Considerations such as the availability of witnesses or the admissibility of evidence may influence the prospects of conviction and prospective punishments may be a factor when deciding in which system prosecutors prefer the case to go ahead. Defendants have different perspectives. In many cases involving extradition to face a charge based on an exercise of extended jurisdiction, the defendant will be removed from the place where he lives and works to another State. There may be adverse consequences for him compared to facing a trial where he is usually located. Criminal proceedings abroad will be in an unfamiliar legal system; bail may be harder to obtain because of a perceived greater danger of flight; the impossibility to continue working during the period in which the trial is being prepared may impose financial hardship; defendants will be removed from their families and social networks for considerable periods.

Somalia has been without government since 1991. A transitional government was established in 2004 under the presidency of Abdullahi Yusuf, with the backing of the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the Arab League and the Inter-governmental Agency for Development (IGAD). The Government sat in Baidoa in southern Somalia from June 2005 until December 2006. In June 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) took control of much of southern and central Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu, but not Puntland and Somaliland. They declared and tried to establish an Islamic State. Somalis were told to comply with stringent Islamic rules or face harsh punishment. In the meantime, efforts to achieve national reconciliation were ongoing under the auspices of IGAD, though without much success. It was reported that on 20 July 2006 Ethiopian troops crossed into Somalia. Ethiopia only admitted to having military trainers to help the Somali Government (estimated to be 400 military personnel). On 21 July, the UIC declared a ‘holy war’ against Ethiopia. In September 2006 the Somali interim President survived an assassination attempt in Baidoa. On 25 October 2006 Ethiopia said that it was ‘technically at war’ with the Islamic Courts. After few days the UIC claimed to have ambushed and killed Ethiopian troops near the Ethiopian border.1

On 19 May 2006, France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom deposited a joint submission with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (the Commission) concerning the continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles out into the Bay of Biscay and the Celtic Sea. The Commission was established under Annex II of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This was the sixth submission received by the Commission, but the first such joint submission made by a group of coastal States.1 The Commission's task is to make recommendations on the outer limits of the continental shelf, not to delimit the boundaries of the continental shelf among the four coastal States. That will be done by the four States themselves through consultation and negotiation after the Commission has made its recommendations. The Commission began consideration of the joint submission at its 18th session which began on 21 August 2006 at the UN Headquarters in New York. The Sub-Commission that it appointed to examine the joint submission in detail has held a number of hearings with the four delegations—in August 2006, and January and March 2007. It is not expected to transmit its recommendations to the full Commission until the 20th session beginning in August 2007.

The judgment in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (‘Genocide case’) was handed down on 26 February 2007.1 Broadcast live across Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and making front-page news,2 it is a landmark opinion of considerable substance that contains a whole host of interesting international legal issues. The judgment and individual opinions attached thereto contain many important points on evidence, the law on genocide and state responsibility. This comment will touch upon only some of the many issues raised. In order to do so, though, it is first necessary to recall the history of the case.

1. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)

On 2 July 1993, in pursuance of a Special Agreement of 7 April 1993, Hungary and Slovakia requested the Court to determine certain issues arising out of the implementation and termination of a 1977 Agreement on the construction and operation of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros barrage system. In its judgment of 25 September 199790 the Court found both States to be in breach of their obligations and called on them to negotiate a settlement in good faith.91 On 3 September 1998 Slovakia filed a request for an additional judgment, arguing that Hungary was unwilling to implement the judgment92 and it was subsequently agreed that Hungary would file a written statement of its position regarding this request by 7 December 1998.93

2. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) Guinea instituted proceedings against the Democratic Republic of Congo on 28 December 1998 alleging grave breaches of international law perpetrated upon a national of Guinea. By an order of 25 November 199994 the following time limits were set for the submission of written pleadings: Republic of Guinea, memorial, 11 September 2000; Democratic Republic of the Congo, counter-memorial, 11 September 2001. By an order of 8 September 200095 these were extended to: Republic of Guinea, memorial, 23 March 2001; Democratic Republic of the Congo, counter-memorial, 4 October 2002. On 3 October 2002 the Democratic Republic of the Congo filed preliminary objections to the admissibility of the Application and in an order of 7 November 200296 the Court fixed 7 July 2003 as the time limit for submission of written observations by the Republic of Guinea. On 18 July 2006, the Court set 27 November 2006 as the date for the opening of public hearings on preliminary objections in relation to the case.97 The public hearings concluded on 1 December 2006 at which time the Court commenced its deliberations.98 The Court gave its decision in the case on 24 May 2007.99

On 8 February 2007 the Court re-elected Mr. Philippe Couvreur as Registrar of the International Court of Justice for a term of seven years.

On 29 January 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (the ICC) handed down its decision confirming the charges brought against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the first defendant to appear before the Court. In this and earlier decisions in the case, the Chamber has said a number of interesting things about the admissibility of cases before the Court, the elements of the war crime of child recruitment and the modes of liability under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute).140 More generally, however, the Chamber's actions also say much about the role the judges of the ICC see themselves as undertaking in the Court's proceedings.

Thomas Lubanga is a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo (the DRC). He describes himself as a politician. It is alleged that from its foundation in 2000 he has been the leader of the Union des patriots congolais (the UPC) and commander-in-chief of its military wing, the Forces patriotiques pour la liberation du Congo (the FPLC). From mid-2002 to the end of 2003, the FPLC was engaged in fighting in the region of Ituri in the DRC. During the conflict, the UPC/FPLC is alleged to have committed numerous atrocities, including the widespread recruitment of children into its ranks.141

The DRC had become a party to the Rome Statute on 11 April 2002 and, accordingly, the Statute entered into force for it on 1 July 2002, the date of the Court's establishment. Following strong hints from the Prosecutor,142 on 19 April 2004 the President of the DRC referrred to the Court ‘the situation of crimes within the juris- diction of the Court allegedly committed anywhere in the territory of the DRC since the entry into force of the Rome Statute’.143 On 23 June 2004, the Prosecutor opened an investigation into the situation, the ICC's first.144 On 19 March 2005, Lubanga was arrested and detained by the DRC authorities, and charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, murder, illegal detention and torture in relation to crimes alleged committed between May 2003 and February 2005. On 17 March 2006, Lubanga was transferred from Congolese custody to that of the ICC.