In this article the scope for dialogue between UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights is considered in theory and in practice. Having demonstrated that meaningful dialogue does take place in certain circumstances, the author considers the impact of dialogue and questions whether or not there can be any further expansion in dialogue whilst avoiding negative outcomes such as confusion over the creation of human rights norms and a loss in legitimacy for national courts adjudicating upon human rights issues.

As a consequence of the state unity theory, the conduct of all state organs is attributed to the state in an undifferentiated manner. It follows that, in both international and European Union law, state liability can be based on the substance of judicial decisions despite the independence of the judicial branch. However, beyond the matter of attribution, there is a significant divergence between the two legal systems. In international law, the judicial origin of challenged decisions does not influence the application of liability criteria, whereas, in EU law, the liability criteria can be applied to judicial decisions in a tightened manner. This article has the twofold aim of establishing and explaining this difference.

This article examines the controversies over and implications of the 2010 French ban on the covering of the face. It carries out an internal critique of the new law and, in a broader European context, questions its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. It argues that the ban has strayed away from the confines of laïcité (the separation of State and religion in the public sphere) by encompassing activities and people who in no way emanate from the State. Far from being a flagship of a secularism—à la française—or a French way of life, the ban—it is argued—goes against entrenched French legal traditions and unduly conflates the concept of national identity at the cost of individual liberties, thus forgetting the true goal of secularism: the conciliation of different beliefs and values. Assuming that the defence of secularism is nevertheless (for reasons we will explore) upheld by the European Court of Human Rights as a legitimate aim pursued by the law, the French ban, it is argued, is likely to fall foul of European requirements for lack of proportionality.

As scholars in the Global Administrative Law project have recognized, doctrines familiar from domestic administrative systems are beginning to appear, in nascent forms, in some areas of international law. This article makes a first attempt to examine the appearance of one such doctrine, the duty to give reasons for administrative decisions, in international case-law. The existence of and rationales for this duty have been contentious in many domestic jurisdictions. The article thus considers the extent to which these debates have been replicated amongst adjudicators at the international level. The focus is on cases in the areas of WTO law, investment law and human rights law. It is found that the case law is not yet extensive, and (perhaps as a result) that no coherent picture emerges. In contrast to domestic systems, the areas examined in international law demonstrate some agreement on the desirability of the duty. However, different international adjudicators have recognized different rationales for the duty, with only limited consensus even within each area of international law studied.

The German Federal Constitutional Court's 2009 decision on the Lisbon Treaty immediately provoked passionate criticisms and revived the Court's image of the Eurosceptic par excellence. However, if one uses the Court's general case law on the interaction between European law and German constitutional law—in particular the Mangold follow-up (Re Honeywell) and the EURO bailout decision—as a background for analysis, a high level of practical support becomes apparent, that is quite the opposite to the all-out war some commentators predicted. It also illustrates how the Lisbon principles can be used to exert a positive influence on the European integration process.

This article considers whether there is any lawful authority for foreign armed forces assisting a territorial State during a non-international armed conflict to arrest and detain civilians. Taking the backdrop of Iraq and Afghanistan it considers relevant UN Security Council resolutions including Resolution 1546 (2004) relating to Iraq which authorized the multi-national force (MNF) ‘to take all necessary measures’ and provided for the internment, for imperative reasons of security, of civilians. In respect of Afghanistan, a number of resolutions authorized the International Assistance Stabilisation Force (ISAF) to ‘take all necessary measures’. It challenges the notion that the positive rights under international humanitarian law applicable to an international armed conflict apply, mutatis mutandis, to a non-international armed conflict, where national law (including human rights law having extra-territorial effect) is of primary (although not of exclusive) significance. It also considers which body of national law, that of the sending or that of the receiving State, applies to determine the lawfulness of detention of foreign civilians. The article recognizes that the arrest and detention of civilians may be necessary during a non-international armed conflict but concludes that the lawful justification for doing so needs to be clearly established.

This article analyses two nearly identical lawsuits regarding the actions of UN peacekeepers during the Srebrenica genocide. The decisions are of importance as a matter of international law for three reasons. First, the Court applied human rights obligations abroad, not by holding that the relevant treaties have extraterritorial effect, but by finding the ICCPR to have been incorporated into the domestic law of the host state (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and determining that the standards codified in the relevant provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR were rules of customary international law that were binding extraterritorially (whether or not the treaty obligations themselves would extend abroad). Second, in finding those obligations to have been breached, the Court relied on the Dutch battalion's eviction of the victims from its UN compound, not on any responsibility to protect those already outside the compound. Finally, on the issue of attribution, the Court of Appeal developed the doctrine of ‘effective control’ in several key respects. I argue that the Court was largely correct in its attribution analysis and that this may prove to be a landmark in the development of international law on attribution in such contexts. Most important among the issues addressed in the Court's discussion of attribution are its findings that: (i) the ‘effective control’ standard applies equally to the contributing state and the receiving international organization; (ii) ‘effective control’ includes not just giving orders, but also the capacity to prevent the wrongdoing; and (iii) troop-contributing states may sometimes hold that ‘power to prevent’ by virtue of their authority to discipline and criminally punish their troops for contravening UN orders.

On 23 February 2012, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court), sitting as a Grand Chamber, delivered its long-anticipated judgment in the Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (Hirsi) case.1 The case was filed on 26 May 2009 by 11 Somalis and 13 Eritreans who were among the first group of 231 migrants and refugees (191 men and 40 women) that left Libya heading for the Italian coast. Halted on 6 May 2009 by three ships from the Italian Revenue Police (Guardia di Finanza) approximately 35 miles south of Lampedusa on the high seas, in the SAR zone under Maltese competence, they were summarily returned to Libya without identification and assessment of their protection claims.2

On 17 January 2012 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) handed down its judgment in Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom.1 Abu Qatada, a radical Muslim cleric once described as ‘Osama bin Laden's right-hand man in Europe’, was convicted in absentia in Jordan for various terrorist offences.2 He alleges, however, that part of the evidence against him had been obtained under torture. In 1994 he was granted refugee status and permitted to remain in the United Kingdom (UK) temporarily. Qatada later applied for indefinite leave to stay. While his application was pending, he was arrested in October 2002 and detained without charge or trial under the now-repealed Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. In March 2005 he was released from detention and put under a ‘control order’ under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. A few months later, the UK government sought to deport Qatada to his native Jordan, having first concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Jordanian government that he would not be subjected to torture or ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The deportation order was challenged before English courts, but ultimately upheld by the House of Lords in RB (FC) and Another v Secretary of State for the Home Department and OO v Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2009.3 In contrast, the ECtHR ruled unanimously that the UK could not lawfully deport Qatada to Jordan. The decision was criticized by Home Secretary Theresa May as ‘unacceptable’ and predictably led to several Conservative backbenchers in the House of Commons calling on the government to withdraw from the ECHR.4

Africa has been struggling for years to establish a mechanism of human rights protection comparable to other international and regional mechanisms. Illiteracy and the low standards of economic development and social welfare, especially in rural areas, as well as the absence of financial resources were certainly not the best grounds to build on. Moreover, as Nmehielle notes, the creation of a human rights mechanism in Africa was equally hinged on other questions, more controversial ones, such as the existence of the concept of ‘law’ and ‘rights’ in pre-colonial Africa.1 In this respect, a Western-style mechanism of human rights protection would be naturally perceived with suspicion, as a form of foreign intervention.