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THE CONTINUING MYTH OF EURO-SCEPTICISM? THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TWO YEARS AFTER LISBON

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2012

Beke Zwingmann
Beke Zwingmann
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Law & German/PhD candidate, Cardiff Law School, [email protected].
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Abstract

The German Federal Constitutional Court's 2009 decision on the Lisbon Treaty immediately provoked passionate criticisms and revived the Court's image of the Eurosceptic par excellence. However, if one uses the Court's general case law on the interaction between European law and German constitutional law—in particular the Mangold follow-up (Re Honeywell) and the EURO bailout decision—as a background for analysis, a high level of practical support becomes apparent, that is quite the opposite to the all-out war some commentators predicted. It also illustrates how the Lisbon principles can be used to exert a positive influence on the European integration process.

Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 61 , Issue 3 , July 2012 , pp. 665 - 695
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2012

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References

1 Bundesverfassungsgericht (hereinafter abbreviated as BVerfG) Solange I, BVerfGE 37, 271—reported in English as Internationale Handelsgesellschaft in [1974] 2 CMLR 540.

2 BVerfG Maastricht, BVerfGE 89, 155—reported in English as Brunner v European Union Treaty in [1994] CMLR 57.

3 BVerfG Lissabon (Treaty of Lisbon), BVerfGE 123, 267. For the official English translation cf <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> accessed 8 June 2012.

4 Doukas, Dimitrios, ‘The verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty: not guilty, but don't do it again!’ (2009) 34 ELR 879Google Scholar.

5 Khushal Murkens, Jo Eric, ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht (2 BvE 2/08): ‘‘We want our identity back’’—The revival of national sovereignty in the German Federal Constitutional Court's decision on the Lisbon Treaty’ [2010] PL 548Google Scholar.

6 Schönberger, Christoph, ‘Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht's Epigones At Sea’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1202Google Scholar.

7 BVerfG Ultra-vires Kontrolle Mangold, BVerfGE 126, 286—reported in English as Re Honeywell in [2011] CMLR 33.

8 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/EURO-Rettungschirm (Greek aid measures/EURO rescue package), case no 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1099/10 and 2 BvR 1485/10, decision of 07/09/2011 [unreported], <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20110907_2bvr098710.html> accessed 8 June 2012, for an English language press release cf: <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg11-055en.html> accessed 8 June 2012.

9 For further references cf eg Pliakos, Asterios, ‘Who is the ultimate arbiter? The battle over judicial supremacy in EU law’ (2011) 36 ELR 113Google Scholar.

10 ECJ Case C–144/04 Mangold, [2005] ECR I–9981.

11 BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 60.

12 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 133–5.

13 BVerfG Solange II, BVerfGE 73, 339—reported in English as Re: Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft in [1987] 3 CMLR 225.

14 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 240 of the English version.

15 Doukas (n 4) 880.

16 BVerfG Bananenmarktordnung (Bananas) BVerfGE 102, 147.

17 Cf inter alia Satzger, H. and Pohl, T., ‘The German Constitutional Court and the European Arrest Warrant—Cryptic signals from Karlsruhe’ (2006) 4 ICJ 686Google Scholar; Nohlen, N, ‘Germany: The European Arrest Warrant case’ (2008) 6 ICJ 153Google Scholar; Vogel, J., ‘Europäischer Haftbefehl und deutsches Verfassungsrecht’ [2005] JuristenZeitung 801Google Scholar; Masing, J., ‘Vorrang des Europarechts bei umsetzungsgebundenen Rechtsakten’ [2006] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 264Google Scholar.

18 BVerfG Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz (European Arrest Warrant Act), BVerfGE 113, 273.

19 Judge Broß considered the German implementation act to be void because it went beyond the requirements of the Framework Decision and thus violated the limits for integration established in art 23 GG; BVerfG Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz (n 18), para 139 and 151 (para 140 and 152 of the English version).

20 To Judge Gerhardt the Act was sufficiently open to interpretation so that the concerns of the majority could have easily been met during its application, thus combining the duties under the Grundgesetz with those under European law as emphasized by the ECJ in Case C–105/03 Pupino; BVerfG Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz (n 18), paras 190, 195 and 200 (paras 191, 196 and 201 of the English version).

21 BVerfG Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz (n 18), paras 80 and 83 (paras 81 and 84 of the English version).

22 ibid paras 94 and 96 (paras 95 and 97 of the English version).

23 ibid paras 181 and 182 (paras 182 and 183 of the English version).

24 ECJ C–303/05 European Arrest Warrant, [2007] ECR I–3633, para 53.

25 BVerfG Maastricht (n 2), 181–2, 186 and 211.

26 BVerfG Treibhausgas-Emissionshandel (Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System), BVerfGE 118, 79.

27 ibid paras 69 and 71.

28 ibid para 72.

29 BVerfGE Data Retention, BVerfGE 121, 1 (order for interim relief).

30 Incidentally, at that time, the Directive was already under review: ECJ Case C–301/06 Ireland v Council and EP, 10/02/2009 (validity confirmed).

31 BVerfG Data Retention (n 29), para 145.

32 Based on ECJ Case C–465/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft, [1995] ECR I–3761.

33 Art. 101 (1) 2 GG.

34 Ralf Müller-Terpitz ‘Art. 101’ in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, and Axel Hopfauf (eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (12th edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2011) para 5.

35 ibid (n 33) paras 18–19.

36 BVerfG Solange II (n 13), 366–9.

37 BVerfG Case 2 BvR 808/82, [1988] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1456, 1471; reported in English as Re patented Feedingstuffs in [1989] 2 CMLR 902.

38 BVerfG Absatzfonds (Agricultural Sales Funds) BVerfGE 82, 159, para 135 (phrase translated by author).

39 Cf especially ECJ Cases 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415 and 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199.

40 BVerfGE 75, 223.

41 ECJ Case 70/83 Kloppenburg [1984] ECR 1075.

42 BVerfG Absatzfonds (n 38) para 137.

43 Cf the statistics on preliminary reference numbers in the ECJ's annual report 2010, 103–4: between 1952 and 2010, the ECJ received 7005 preliminary references. Of this total number, 1802 references came from German courts alone, representing more than 25%. The closest ‘runner up’ is Italy with 1056 references (about 15%). British courts have referred 505 times (about 7%); <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-05/ra2010_stat_cour_final_en.pdf> accessed 8 June 2012.

44 BVerfG T. Port, Case no: 2 BvR 2689/94 and 2 BvR 52/95, [1995] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 950–1.

45 ECJ Case C–280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I–4973.

46 BVerfG (n 44) 951.

47 Following this judgment, the Regional Administrative Court made a preliminary reference to the ECJ to obtain the required guidance: Case C–68/95 T. Port GmbH & Co. KG [1996] ECR I–6065.

48 Specifically his right to property (art 14 GG) and the right to have access to effective legal remedies (art 19 (4) GG).

49 BVerfG Case no 1 BvR 1036/99, order of 09/01/2001, para 21. <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20010109_1bvr103699.html> accessed 8 June 2012.

50 ibid para 19.

51 BVerfG Case no 1 BvR 2722/06, order of 20/02/2008, paras 31 and 48 <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20080220_1bvr272206.html> accessed 8 June 2012.

52 Cf the examination of the complainant's arguments in BVerfG (n 49) paras 32–48.

53 BVerfG Case no: 1 BvR 230/09, order of 25/02/2010, para 20. <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20100225_1bvr023009.html> accessed 8 June 2012.

54 ibid para 24.

55 BVerfG Mangold (n 7). For a more detailed discussion of the decision cf below Part III B ‘Actions of European institutions under review’.

56 ECJ Case 283/81 CILFIT (n 39).

57 BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 89.

58 Inter alia Grimm, Dieter, ‘Defending Sovereign Statehood against Transforming the Union into a State’ (2009) 5 EuConst 357Google Scholar.

59 Case C–224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I–10239, para 53–5; Case C–173/03 Traghetti [2006] ECR I–5177, para 32.

60 Case C–154/08 Commission v Spain [2009] ECR I–187, para 125.

61 For a similar assessment cf eg Schorkopf, Frank, ‘The European Union as an Association of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe's Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1230Google Scholar.

62 ibid (n 60) 1238, also Schönberger (n 6).

63 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 220 of the English version.

64 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) paras 219–26.

65 ibid para 225 of the English version, emphasis added.

66 Thym, Daniel, ‘In the name of sovereign statehood: a critical introduction to the Lisbon judgment of the German Constitutional Court’ (2009) 46 CMLRev 1807Google Scholar.

67 Cf eg Axel Hopfauf ‘Einleitung’ in Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hofmann, and Hopfauf, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (n 34) para 88.

68 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 240.

69 BVerfG Maastricht (n 2) 188.

70 ECJ Case C–24/95 Re: Alcan, [1997] ECR I–1591.

71 BVerfG EURO, Case no: 2 BvR 532/98, 22 June 1998, para 7 <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk19980622_2bvr053298.html> accessed 8 June 2012; and BVerfG Alcan Case no: 2 BvR 1210/98, 17 February, 2000, para 23; <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20000217_2bvr121098.html> accessed 8 June 2012.

72 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 240.

73 ibid para 340.

74 Inter alia Thym (n 65) 1821.

75 Schorkopf (n 60) 1232.

76 Ziller, Jacques, ‘The German Constitutional Court's Friendliness towards European Law—On the Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht over the Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2010) 16 EPL 72Google Scholar.

77 Schorkopf (n 74).

78 BVerfG Mangold (n 7).

79 ibid para 60. Such an approach had also been suggested directly after Lisbon by eg Ziller (n 75) 71; Schorkopf (n 60) 1234.

80 BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 61. The official English translation referred to in (n 81) uses at this point the phrase ‘sufficiently qualified’, but the context makes it clear that it should read ‘sufficiently serious’.

81 BVerfG Mangold (n 7) quoted after headnote 1 a) of the English version, <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html> accessed 8 June 2012.

82 ibid para 63.

83 Eg because they were limited to individual cases, and either did not impact on the Human Rights of the individuals involved or allowed for compensation at national level; BVerfG Mangold (n 7) paras 66 and 108.

84 ibid para 108.

85 ibid paras 73–4.

86 Case C–194/94 [1996] ECR I–2201.

87 Case C–443/98 [2000] ECR I–7535.

88 BVerfG Mangold (n 7) paras 77–9.

89 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) paras 337 and 333 respectively.

90 For a similar conclusion cf Payandeh, Mehrdad, ‘Constitutional review of EU law after Honeywell: contextualizing the relationship between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 27Google Scholar.

91 As predicted by Kiiver, Philipp, ‘German Participation in EU Decision-Making after the Lisbon Case: A Comparative View on Domestic Parliamentary Clearance Procedures’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1291Google Scholar and Ziller (n 75) 55.

92 As pointed out by dissenting Judge Landau, BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 103.

93 Kiiver (n 910); Ziller (n 76) 71.

94 As done by dissenting Judge Landau, BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 103.

95 Case C–518/07 Commission v Germany, [2010] ECR I–1885 para 48. Cf for further comments also Pliakos (n 9) 111.

96 Commission v Germany (n 94) paras 50–1.

97 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 340. For a detailed discussion of the limits cf below Part IV.

98 ibid para 249.

99 Kiiver (n 90) 1289–90.

100 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) paras 113–18.

101 ibid paras 101–2.

102 ibid para 124.

103 ibid paras 127–8.

104 ibid para 130.

105 ibid paras 133–5.

106 ibid para 141.

107 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 256.

108 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/ EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 129.

109 ibid para 116.

110 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 245 of the English version.

111 ibid paras 242–5.

112 Eg the use of the bridging clauses, but also inter alia the use of art 352 TFEU.

113 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) paras 319, 320, 327, 328 and 365.

114 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 128.

115 Schönberger (n 6) 1217.

116 Eg Murkens (n 5) 548.

117 As does eg the UK. For an overview cf inter alia Kiiver (n 90).

118 The EURO stabilization package statute was adopted, authenticated and entered into force on 07/05/2010. The applicants filed their constitutional complaints on that same day and the Bundesverfassungsgericht decided on the applications for interim relief mere hours after they had been filed by the applicants, cf the order of 07/05/2010, Case no 2 BvR 987/10 at <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20100507_2bvr098710.html> accessed 8 June 2012.

119 Halberstam, Daniel and Möllers, Christoph, ‘The German Constitutional Court says ‘Ja zu Deutschland!’’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1252Google Scholar; Kiiver (n 90) 1293.

120 Cf eg BVerfG AWACS BVerfGE 121, 135, 153; also BVerfGE 104, 151, 208; BVerfGE 108, 34,43.

121 The Lisbon Treaty in its Protocol (no 2) ‘On the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality’, [2010] OJ C83/206, introduced rights for national parliaments to object to European bills before the vote in the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers is taken. The aim is to allow national parliaments a greater influence with regard to the adherence to the subsidiarity principle.

122 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/ EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 53.

123 Cf also the arguments of Kiiver (n 118) 1295.

124 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Breite Mehrheit für Ausweitung des Rettungsfonds’ (Press release of 29/09/2011) <http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/aktuell/35862641_kw39_de_europa.jsp> accessed 8 June 2012. In the debate during the final reading, Volker Kauder (the parliamentary leader of the conservative CDU party) hailed this new regime as a ‘paradigm shift’ towards a new relationship between the Federal Government and the Bundestag in matters of parliamentary scrutiny. Gregor Gysi (leader of the opposition party ‘Die Linke’) on the other hand heavily criticized the level of secrecy still involved under the new regime.

125 This has already been confirmed in BVerfG EFSF/ Bundestag's participation rights, Case no 2 be 8/11, decision of 28/02/2012 [unreported], <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20120228_2bve000811.html> accessed 8 June 2012. For an English language press release cf <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg12-014en.html> accessed 8 June 2012.

126 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/ EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 109.

127 Claimed eg by Doukas (n 4) 876.

128 Cf the conclusions drawn by Murkens (n 5) 550.

129 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/ EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 109.

130 Inter alia Schönberger (n 6) 1209.

131 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 235 of the English version.

132 ibid para 216 of the English version.

133 ibid para 249 of the English version: ‘Essential areas of democratic formative action comprise, inter alia, citizenship, the civil and the military monopoly on the use of force, revenue and expennditure including external financing and all elements of encroachment that are decisive for the realization of fundamental rights, above all as regards intensive encroachments on fundamental rights such as the deprivation of liberty in the administration of criminal law or the placement in an institution. These important areas also include cultural issues such as the disposition of language, the shaping of circumstances concerning the family and education, the ordering of the freedom of opinion, of the press and of association and the dealing with the profession of faith or ideology.’

134 Murkens (n 5) 539; Schorkopf (n 60) 1230.

135 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 248.

136 Eg in the area of social policy, BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 393.

137 Eg in the areas of cooperation in criminal matters and taxes and with regard to the impact of European law on human rights protection in general.

138 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 351.

139 Cf eg BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 73 and ECJ C–555/07 Kücükdeveci, [2010] ECR I–365, para 51.

140 For a similar assessment cf eg Schorkopf (n 60) 1238 or Thym (n 65) 1800.

141 As the Court itself pointed out, BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 351.

142 ibid para 225.

143 As repeatedly stressed by the UK. For further examples cf eg Kiiver, (n 90) 1292ff.

144 As established by BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 264.

145 Schönberger (n 6) 1210.

146 Art 79 (3) GG.

147 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 218.

148 Grimm (n 57) 367.

149 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 280.

150 Succinctly argued by Kiiver (n 91) 1291.

151 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 262.

152 Halberstam and Möllers (n 118) 1248 and 1252; Tomuschat, Christian, ‘The Ruling of the German Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1261Google Scholar.

153 Thym (n 65) 1812.

154 Halberstam and Möllers (n 118) 1251.

155 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 284 of the English version.

156 Kiiver (n 90) 1291; Waibel, Michael, ‘A good day and salutary warning for the European Union’ (2010) 69 CLJ 38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

157 Halberstam and Möllers (n 118) 1247.

158 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 224 of the English version.

159 ibid para 211.

160 For a similar conclusion cf inter alia Schorkopf (n 60) 1222.

161 For suggestions cf eg Thym (n 66) 1820.

162 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 264. cf above Part IVA.