In one of his most famous dicta, the German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt proclaimed it “obvious” that “all political concepts, images, and terms have a polemical meaning,” because “[t]hey are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation.” Taking Schmitt at his word, I argue that one must read Schmitt's masterpiece of comparative law from the Weimar period, Verfassungslehre, as a response to the Weimar state crisis. Schmitt's conceptual approach in Verfassungslehre aims to create a form of constitutional theory capable of compensating for structural defects of the Weimar state. Reading Verfassungslehre in this way also reveals that Schmitt does not present his constitutional theory as an alternative to liberal constitutionalism, but rather Schmitt's comparative history of constitutionalism in Verfassungslehre locates his decisionism at the very core of the liberal constitutional tradition.

Does the Internet offer the promise of a newly empowered, egalitarian public sphere more completely informing the institutions of representative democracy through an engaged and articulate public sphere? The Internet is with us now as a social fact. Its potential remains inchoate at a time when mass media, already debased as an intermediate medium for public discourse, suffers further erosion. The limitations of the Internet as a new medium for an enriched deliberative discourse are not necessarily fatal. Indeed the time may well be right. The institutional means for realising it are largely untried and controversial but not likely beyond our capabilities. In short, there is a need and a promise but not yet an active engagement. Against idealised Habermasian criteria the prospects are bleak and indeed there is danger of further fragmentation of publics. But judged against already debased modes of political discourse and the reality of the erosion of their mass media forms the prospects are perhaps not so bleak. The utopian best ought not to be allowed to crowd out the achievable good.

This is a Critical Notice of From Normativity to Responsibility, Joseph Raz’s brilliant treatment of the nature of normativity and reasons. Building on the thought that the law claims to give reasons to its subjects, I consider the application of Raz’s views about reasons to some questions in legal philosophy. I concentrate on what I take to be the central idea of the book, Raz’s “normative/explanatory nexus”, according to which a consideration cannot be a (normative) reason for an agent to perform an action unless the agent could follow the consideration in performing the action. I show (briefly) how the nexus can explain some of the Fullerian principles of legality. And I examine (at somewhat greater length) the implications of the nexus for our understanding of the psychology of legal obligation; here I suggest that the nexus might cause trouble for Raz’s own well-known exclusionary reasons account of legal obligation.

In the common law world the oath has long provided one way of ensuring that trial witnesses tell the truth. The moral power of the oath supplements the judicial power of perjury laws. But unlike laws forbidding perjury, the oath cannot be used automatically. Through ignorance, belief or conscience a person may be incapable of meaningfully swearing an oath. Over the years there have been many legislative enactments and judicial pronouncements which sought to clarify conditions for the use of the oath and establish alternatives to it. With increasing secularization of society, the traditional ground rules have required modification. Because there has been little serious, theoretical discussion of the nature of the oath, these modifications have often exhibited inadequate understanding of the moral dimensions of the oath. As a result, judicial discussion has reached an impasse. In January, 1988 Bill C-15 became law. It contained yet another attempt to satisfactorily harness the power of the oath to the needs of the judicial system. The interpretation of this new legislation will offer excellent opportunities to eliminate some of the confusion surrounding the oath in Canadian law. This paper will analyze the nature of the oath with special attention to its obligation-generating capacity. The analysis developed here may help provide the understanding necessary for sensible judicial interpretation and reform.

In this essay, I argue that the role for exclusionary reasons in a sound account of practical rationality is, at most, much more circumscribed than proponents of exclusionary reasons might suppose. Specifically, I argue that an attractive account of moral motivation is in tension with the idea that moral reasons can be excluded. Limiting ourselves to the tools of first order moral reasons—including such relations as outweighing, and disabling—allows us to preserve a more attractive account of the relationship between what there is strongest reason to do, what one is motivated to do, and that for which one is praiseworthy or blameworthy. In closing, I argue that we can capture the normativity associated with legal decision-making using only the resources of the first-order model.

Bentham’s hatred of the major elements of the legal culture of his times is legendary. He thoroughly criticised the notions of natural law and social contract that were at the roots of Blackstone’s legal doctrine as so many fictions. His criticism also centred, in a more technical manner, on several fictions that belonged to the ordinary legal reasoning of the common lawyers. Substantive fictions such as the crime of grand larceny and procedural fictions such as the procedure of ejectment were everyday fare for legal practitioners. By unveiling how these fictions, understood as linguistic devices, operated, Bentham highlighted how they contributed to debase the law’s addressee’s practical reasoning in order to reinforce her subjection to the class of jurists. His contempt for artificial (but purposeful) legal technicalities allows to understand how full blown the hermeneutics of suspicion he developed against the hegemony of legalism (which will sound familiar to Marxists) was. Nevertheless, one cannot help concluding that Bentham might have been the very victim of the power structure he fought.

The theory of unjust enrichment – the theory supporting the recognition of a doctrinal category of unjust enrichment – has been accepted across much of the common law world. The recognition of a doctrinal category is not just a matter of presentation. It has a role in legal reasoning that reflects the fact that it is based on a particular principle or distinct justification for a claim. The theory of unjust enrichment is misguided because there is no principle or distinct justification common to the various claims that have been gathered together to form the new category. The theory has appeared attractive, it would seem, not because a plausible version of the principle of unjust enrichment has been identified, but because it has appeared impossible to explain these various claims in any other way, in particular as claims in property or contract. This difficulty has arisen, it is suggested, largely as a result of a mistaken analysis of primary and remedial rights. The article explores these issues with respect to contract law and property law.

Legal philosophers make a number of bold, contentious claims about the nature of law. For instance, some claim that law necessarily involves coercion, while others disagree. Some claim that all law enjoys presumptive moral validity, while others disagree. We can see these claims in at least three, mutually exclusive ways: (1) We can see them as descriptions of law’s nature (descriptivism), (2) we can see them as expressing non-descriptive attitudes of the legal philosophers in question (expressivism), or (3) we can see them as practical claims about how we should view law or order our society (pragmatism). This paper argues that we should understand these claims in the pragmatist way, as claims about how we should view law or order society.

The crucial question for many legal disputes is “what happened,”? and there is often no easy answer. Fact-finding is an uncertain endeavor and risk of inaccuracy is inevitable. As such, I ask, on what basis can we accept the legitimacy of judicial fact-findings. I conclude that acceptable factual determinations depend on adherence to a legitimate process of fact-finding. Adopting Jürgen Habermas’s insights, I offer a theoretical grounding for the acceptability of judicial fact-finding. The theory holds that legal processes must embody respect for legal subjects as equal and autonomous agents. This necessitates two procedural features. First, fact-finding processes must be factually reliable. This requires: (a) relevant evidence is admissible and exclusions are justified based on respecting human autonomy; (b) error-risk management is internally coherent and consistent; (c) the standard of proof is, at minimum, a balance of probabilities; (d) evidence is used rationally. Second, fact-finding processes must ensure fulsome participation rights. This project is justificatory—civil justice systems are imperfect, but there are attainable conditions that make them good, which must never be compromised.

This paper asks whether refugee law is morally trustworthy. Trustworthiness here denotes that those who make refugee law—in particular those who decide refugee claims—are competent in this domain and are moved by the fact that refugee claimants and citizens of countries of refuge count on them to make morally sound decisions. Drawing on Adam Smith’s sentimentalist theory of law, the paper argues that refugee law is presumptively subject to various corruptions of the moral sentiments, namely national prejudice, contempt for the lowly, love of domination, and self-deceit. Combined, these corruptions may explain the apparent arbitrariness of refugee claim outcomes. They also suggest that we should be skeptical of any claims regarding the moral trustworthiness of refugee law. What they do not suggest, contrary to more cynical theories, is that refugee law is free of normative constraint.

The political conception makes sense of human rights strictly in light of their role in international human rights practice, more specifically by describing how they justify interventions against states that engage in or fail to prevent human rights violations. This conception is, therefore, normative and fact-dependent. Beyond this, it does not seem to have much to say about the actual nature of international human rights practice. The argument sustained here reinterprets the political conception by resorting to a heuristic device that explains how normativity can be fact-dependent: the Hartian model. The characteristics of H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition are useful to determine the characteristics of human rights practice from the viewpoint of the political conception. Also, they help to overcome some of the problems typically faced by the political conception, such as whether there is only one practice or many, whether the notion of human rights becomes too contingent on the way the world is currently organised, how agents can violate content-changing practices, or how reliance on current states of affairs leaves room for criticism of those states of affairs.

This essay is an examination of the relationship between phenomenology and analytic method in the philosophy of law. It proceeds by way of a case study, the requirement of compliance in Raz’s theory of mandatory norms. Proceeding in this way provides a degree of specificity that is otherwise neglected in the relevant literature on method. Drawing on insights from the philosophy of art and cognitive neuroscience, it is argued that the requirement of compliance is beset by a range of epistemological difficulties. The implications of these difficulties are then reviewed for method and normativity in practical reason. A topology of normativity emerges nearer the end of the paper, followed by a brief examination of how certain normative categories must satisfy distinct burdens of proof.

Current legal trends tend to obscure the sharp distinction between substance and procedure. This tendency is manifested, inter alia, as a growing dependence of procedural norms in substantive law; greater flexibility of procedural norms; and growing judicial discretion to deviate from procedural rules. In order to evaluate these contemporary trends, we provide a theoretical analysis of the basic relationships between procedural norms and substantive legal outcomes. This framework reveals the moral commitments underling these modern trends as opposed to the moral foundations of the traditional view that legal decisions should be made under rigid procedural constraints. Focusing on criminal evidence law, the proposed theoretical framework is applied to some of the ongoing legal debates, such as about the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of rights, the exclusion of statistical and character evidence, and the flexibility of the reasonable doubt standard of proof.

Alan Brudner’s closely-argued, richly-textured and wide-ranging work, Constitutional Goods, provides a striking and original account of the rule of law and its implications for legitimate government. Since the rule of law includes the enforcement of substantive principles ofjustice, it requires a clear separation of powers between court and legislature. The role of the court is chiefly confined to pure practical reason, determining what the public reason of the liberal consti-tution requires. It is the role of the legislative assembly to give its assent to governmental measures that apply the principles ofjustice to empirical circumstances, where the scope for reasonable disagreement provokes a transition from natural law to political judgment. Judicial review carries no anti-democratic implications because it defends the conceptual boundaries of popular decision-making: ‘Democracy is not defeated but protected if the court invalidates a law no free person could impose on himself, for the majority has no more authority to pass such a law than an autocrat nor any jurisdiction to decide by fiat a question to which there is a correct legal answer.’

Should property owners have a unique right to express their opinion just because they own property? While current law recognizes owners’ rights to express their voices in certain instances, it does not provide comprehensive and coherent answers to this question. This article provides an analytical framework for recognizing the owners’ right to voice as an independent property entitlement within the owners’ property bundle of rights and delineates its boundaries. Yet even when the owners’ voice is property-dependent, there is a difference between voice that facilitates the realization of another property entitlement (such as the right to exclude, use, or trade) and voice that is constitutive to ownership in and of itself. Only the latter instances justify recognition of the owners’ right to a voice as an independent property entitlement. By examining different branches of both tangible and intellectual property law, such as inheritance law, eminent domain, homeowners’ association law, zoning law, and copyright law, this article demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed analytical framework in explaining certain parts of the current law and suggests modifications of other parts.

Eric Posner’s signaling theory of social norms holds that individuals adopt social norms in order to signal that they have a low discount rate (that is, they value the future more than the present), and are therefore reliable long-term cooperative partners. This paper radically expands Posner’s theory by incorporating internalization into his model (the sense that norms possess some sort of binding quality, an “ought to”). I do this by tethering Posner’s theory to an evolutionary model. I argue that internalization is an adaptive quality that enhances the individual’s ability to play Posner’s signaling game and was thus selected for. The idea that internalization is evolutionarily conditioned is not new; however, linking this to Posner’s theory of discount rate signals is, and doing so offers tremendous explanatory potential.

Part I identifies the limitations of Posner’s purely rational choice approach, argues for the necessity of including internalization, and then proposes a model that does so – what I call the Expanded Signaling Model of Norms (ESM). Part II examines the problems that arise when we embrace such a model. How this model answers some key criticisms plaguing sociobiology is also briefly explored. Part III then examines existing criticisms of Posner’s theory, demonstrating how the Expanded Signaling Model clearly resolves these issues. The paper concludes that incorporating internalization into Posner’s signaling model greatly broadens the explanatory reach of Posner’s theory, providing a measure of clarity and predictability regarding how and why norms are internalized – an important insight, as these beliefs form the normative underpinning to law.

In recent years democracy has become a prominent topic in the development of international law and relations. The trend in the international system in pursuit of international legal requirements of democracy is perhaps most evident in Europe with significant support coming from the regional organisations of Europe. The EU is part of this development having established treaty-based provisions making democracy a requirement for current and potential members. At the same time the economic integration project of the EU places a range of demands upon states which directly impact the type of democracy they may be striving for. Significantly, the EU’s requirements will influence the extent to which social democratic practices may be pursued. Examining the type of democracy the EU is promoting among its current and potential members will be useful for understanding the meaning and content of the type of democracy international law is working towards and also for the future of social democratic practices in Europe.

Karl Marx wrote that ‘the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways’, whereas ‘the point is to change it’. Are international legal scholars exposed to the same charge? Have they too placed theory before the demands of real-world emancipatory practice? The author explores these questions, and shows how Marx’s concerns about the philosophers indeed have resonance in the field of international law. At the same time, however, she observes that the problem is not with theory per se, if by theory is simply meant academic enquiry. Rather, it is with theory of a particular kind. Against this background, she discusses some of the ways in which academic enquiry can be itself a form of emancipatory practice, some of the features of what she refers to as transformative scholarship. In developing her account, she highlights the point that those who seek social transformation need not only to transcend the limitations for which Marx criticised certain kinds of philosophy (‘idealism’). They also need to avoid the antithetical pitfalls for which, much later, Frankfurt School theorist Adorno criticised certain modes of politics (‘actionism’).

The purpose of this article is to explore the resources available within the economic analysis of law for rationalizing the constitutional right to freedom of expression. I have sought to falsify the hypothesis that economics is incapable of supplying a rationale for the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. I have argued that, from an economic perspective, the guarantee may be understood as a device for the facilitation of political competition and the mitigation of the agency costs of government. Nevertheless, economics provides no support for the notion that the fact that an act is undertaken by a person in the exercise of her “autonomy” is a licence for that person to set back another individual’s welfare. This applies to expressive acts as it does to all other acts that produce external consequences. There might be good reasons to require each of us to suffer the negative consequences of other individuals' self-fulfillment, or to place the information marketplace as a whole (and not only that part which relates to the political marketplace) under judicial protection. However, any such reasons do not appear to sound in economics; they require other frameworks of analysis and evaluation.