This chapter addresses the question ‘How is sarcasm expressed?’ by analyzing 400 examples of sarcasm drawn from a broad selection of texts, with special reference to the second-century satirist Lucian of Samosata and including Aristophanes, the New Testament (outside Paul), and ancient satirical epigrams, among other texts. After addressing the communication of sarcasm, I return to sarcasm’s rhetorical functions using Lucian as a case study.

This chapter answers the question ‘What is sarcasm?’ by surveying ancient and modern treatments of irony and sarcasm, enabling us to disambiguate sarcasm from other forms of irony and facilitate the creation of a working definition of sarcasm that will serve throughout the project. I define sarcasm as a subset of verbal irony in which an utterance that would normally communicate a positive attitude or evaluation implies a negative attitude or evaluation.

A few years back, I was sitting in Evensong at the Peterhouse Chapel in Cambridge. During the service, the first scripture reading was taken from the Book of Job, the 26th chapter, beginning at the second verse: ‘How you have helped one who has no power! How you have assisted the arm that has no strength! How you have counseled one who has no wisdom, and given much good advice!’ (Job 26:2–3 NRSV). This was read in a tone that conveyed all the grace and solemnity appropriate to the liturgical setting. The passage sounded as if Job was addressing pious thanksgiving unto God. I must confess to having repressed a chuckle with some difficulty, knowing that what sounded so sincere in this context was Job’s bitingly sarcastic indictment of his false comforters. While I do not fault a student reader for mistaking the tone of a passage for which they had no context, this situation well illustrates the exegetical importance of being able to accurately identify sarcasm. Simply put, taking a sarcastic utterance literally or reading a literal utterance sarcastically both have the potential to generate serious misreadings of a text.

Ancient diatribe has played a central role in the interpretation of Romans. To clarify the presence of sarcasm in certain rhetorical questions throughout the letter (Rom 3:8; 6:1, 15), I offer a revised conception of authorial voice in dialogical, diatribe-like passages based on analysis of Romans and Epictetus’ Discourses. I then turn to other passages where Paul is sarcastic with his hypothetical interlocutor (Rom 2:17–19; 11:19–20), discussing the implications of these verses for the identity and characterization of the interlocutor. Finally, I assess subversive and ironic readings of Paul’s discussion of governmental authority in Rom 13:1–7.

This chapter reviews the major findings of the study and compares Paul’s use of sarcasm across the letters surveyed. Attention is paid to the way sarcasm contributes to Paul’s argumentation across the different rhetorical contexts of each letter and the ways in which Paul’s use of sarcasm reflects differences or developments in his relationships with the early Christian congregations represented in his letters.

This chapter investigates the possibility of sarcasm in several passages, including Paul’s paradoxical discussion of divine foolishness (1 Cor 1:18–2:5), his setting Corinthian privilege against apostolic suffering in 4:8–13, and the interpretive crux of 11:19. Other potential sarcasm occurs in relation to the letter’s ‘Corinthian slogans’ (1 Cor 6:12; 8:1–13; 10:23). Critical thinking on how closely or loosely these slogans represent the Corinthians’ actual words or positions is employed to determine which slogans may be considered sarcastic.

The introduction gives an overview of the book’s aim and the conceptual approach to its topic. The subject is the particular way in which the Greeks, in the context of their general project of understanding the world, have made sense of their past. That means it is about history as an element of Greek culture. The concept with which the subject is dealt with is that of intentional history, which is based on the theories of Maurice Halbwachs and Aleida and Jan Assmann on collective memory and social remembrance. With ‘intentional history’, I refer to that part of history that is relevant to the collective identity of social groups of all sizes. This concept allows statements to be made across cultures and epochs and thus makes it possible to draw a connection from antiquity to modernity.